Loyalty Among Government Employees by Emerson, Thomas I. & Helfeld, David M.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 58 DECE-MBER, 1948 Nu-.mnB 1
LOYALTY AMONG GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
THOMAS I. EMERSON*
DAVID M. HELFELD t
I. BACKGROUNM
MOUNTING tensions in our society have brought us to a critical
point in the matter of political and civil rights. The stresses are in
large measure internal. They grow out of the accelerating movement
to effect far-reaching changes in our economic and social structure, a
movement which evokes ever-increasing resistance. As the conflicts
sharpen, there is rising pressure to discard or undermine the basic
principles embodied in the democratic concept of freedom for political
opposition.
Maintenance of free institutions in a period of deepening crisis would
be difficult enough if the struggle were confined to our shores. But the
domestic problem is only an element of the world problem. Large areas
of the world have abandoned the system of capitalism in favor of
socialism. Other areas are far advanced in economic and social change.
Everywhere there is struggle, uncertainty, fear and confusion. Pro-
tagonists of the more militant economic and social philosophies are
organized into political parties which have their offshoots and counter-
parts in other countries, including our owm. As a result, the preserva-
tion of political freedom, the right to hold and express opinions di-
verging from the opinion of the majority, is often made to appear
incompatible with the overriding requirements of "loyalty," "patri-
otism," "national security" and the like. The danger of "foreign id-
eologies," "infiltration," "subversion" and "espionage" are invoked
to justify the suspension of traditional rights and freedoms.
If we look to our basic traditions and attend the counsel of our wisest
forbears, the path before us should be reasonably clear. Recognizing
that no political organism can survive vithout evolution and change,
we must face change with courage and imagination. The journey to-
wards a new destination must be undertaken within the framework of
the democratic process. We must seek to plot our course through
rational and intelligent discussion. We must encourage the fullest
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-participation of all elements in our society. We must be willing to
,compromise when the road ahead is obscure and to advance firmly
'when the road is clear.
There are tragic signs that this is not our course, that we have lost
the path. The opponents of change have resorted increasingly to the
delusively simple expedient of cutting off political opposition or of
hounding it out of existence through appeals to irrationalism and
prejudice. For ten years now the House Committee on Un-American
Activities has spearheaded a drive which, while largely failing in its
announced objective of exposing the activities of "subversive groups,"
has undoubtedly succeeded in arousing fierce and emotional opposi-
tion to progressive ideas and organizations. In the Alien Registra-
tion Act of 1940 Congress enacted an anti-sedition law comparable in
sweep with the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. In Section 304 of the
Taft-Hartley Act Congress undertook to emasculate the political power
of labor by prohibiting expenditures for political purposes by labor
organizations. The dangerously increasing ascendancy of the military
in our national life is not only a threat to representative government
but reflects a serious weakening of democratic vitality. And recent
proposed legislation, aimed ostensibly at the Communist Party,
threatens the existence of all political organizations not adhering to
orthodox views.
These and other manifestations of the trend have aroused a number
,of open minded citizens to warn publicly against the rising threat to
-democratic institutions.1 And certainly the danger is real. The sup-
pression of political opposition is opposed to every tenet of democracy,
It entails, among other things, the retention of outworn institutions,
the elimination of every possibility of compromise and mutual adjust-
ment, and the fomenting of class hatred, racial and religious prejudice,
and allied social disorders. It must lead inevitably to an internal ex-
plosion in the form of revolt or an external explosion in the form of war,
The fear of "disloyalty" and "subversion" among the government
bureaucracy is a modern aspect of the problem, brought to the fore by
the greatly expanded function assumed by the executive in recent
years. But the underlying issues are not new to America. Our history
has been marked by a never ending struggle between the ideal of free-
dom in political expression and the efforts of temporarily dominant
groups, particularly in periods of crisis, to demand rigid political or-
1. See, e.g., To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, REPoRT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RIGHTS 13-95 (1947); CUSHMAN, NEW THREATS TO AMERICAN FREEDOMS (1948);
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, OUR UNCERTAIN LIBERTIES (1948); Gellhorn, The
Challenge to Civil Liberties, 15 CONGRESS WEExLY No. 15, p. 11 (April 10, 1948); Com-
mnager, Who Is Loyal to America?, 195 HARPER'S 193 (Sept. 1947); Gillmor, Guilt By
Gossip, 118 NEW REPUBLIC No. 22, p. 15 (May 31, 1948) ; letter from 22 members of the
faculty of the Yale Law School to the President, the Secretary of State and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Nov. 27, 1947, p. 1, col. 6.
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thodoxy. An invariable attribute of the struggle has been the stig-
matization of the non-conformists as "disloyal." This is the typical
behavior of standpatters, moved by fear and hostility toward the
forces of change. Its malignance has been accentuated in the United
States by the constant flow into a new and developing country of
people and ideas from foreign lands.
The founders of our government, successful in their revolution-
against established governmental authority, embodied the principles of
free political expression in the new Constitution. Two features of that
document are noteworthy here. The provision on treason was designed
to insure that the government's right to protection against treasonable
acts would never be perverted, as it had been in England, to a weapon
for the outlawing of political opposition. Secondly, the First Amend-
ment constituted an express guarantee that the rights essential to the
exercise of political freedom would be protected.
Within a decade after adoption of the Constitution these principles
were put to a severe test. The period was in many respects similar to
our own. Relations between the United States and France were
critical. When President Adams publicized the notorious X.Y.Z.
papers, anti-French and anti-foreign hatred was aroused to a frenzied
pitch. The pro-British Federalists, who despised French libertarianism,
fanned the flames with wild stories of French invasion plans. Federalist
teachers, preachers and judges aroused the people with clamor for war.
The Federalists contended that the French government was spreading
pro-French propaganda through paid agents and sowing revolutionary
doctrine. This hysteria even seized some of the Republicans, normally
pro-French and anti-monarchist. Thus divided, the Republicans were
easy prey. Denouncing all opposition as "disloyalty," the Federal-
ists forced through Congress the Alien and Sedition Laws.
2
The Alien Act was designed to harry the revolutionary Irish immi-
grant as well as the French, both of whom were attracted to the lib-
ertarian Jeffersonian Party. It provided for the imprisonment or
expulsion of "enemy aliens" at the President's discretion. The Sedi-
tion Act was even more severe. It provided fines and imprisonment for
the publication of any "false, scandalous and malicious writing"
against the Government, or which brought officers of the government
"into contempt or disrepute," provisions which would effectively seal
opposition lips, even including members of Congress.
Even the hardbitten arch-Federalist Hamiliton was amazed at the
ruthlessness of the measures. But his counsel of moderation was
ignored and the Acts were vigorously enforced against indignant and
alarmed Republicans. One major objective of the campaign was
2. Act of June 25, 1798, 1 STAT. 570; Act of July 14, 179S, 1 STAT. 590. For excellent
histories of the period see generally Bowfins, JEFrEson M,;D H wr1-o,. (1923) ; Bowrms,
JEFFERSON ir PowEa (1936) ; 1 BEAR, THE RISE OF A-m. mcv CvIz=ATxo (192).
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to eliminate Republican office-holders. Thus the first prosecution
under the Sedition Act was against a Republican member of Congress
running for re-election.
The constitutionality of the Sedition Act was sustained in the lower
federal courts and by three Supreme Court justices sitting in circuit,
but the issue of constitutionality never reached the Supreme Court.
Jefferson and Madison, in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of
1799, attacked the laws as unconstitutional. Regardless of their
legality, the harsh enforcement of the Acts stunned the American
people, and the legislation seems to have been a major reason for the
defeat of the Federalists in 1800.
4
Upon the accession of the Republicans to power, the Alien and
Sedition Acts were repealed and Jefferson pardoned the persons-all
Republicans-convicted under them. In his inaugural address
Jefferson boldly reaffirmed the ideal of political freedom:
"If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this Union, or to
change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed, as monu-
ments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated
where reason is left free to combat it." 5
Thus the first experiment with "loyalty" as a weapon in political
struggles came to a happy end. But the issue arose in another form
shortly afterwards. Nativist anti-foreign bias flared up again with the
addition of Louisiana to the Union in 1803. The different national
loyalties of the polyglot population of the new territory created much
concern. Fortunately this was short-lived.6 But in the 1830's nativism
fastened upon the Catholics from Ireland and Germany. The legend
spread that the Leopold Association, an Austrian missionary society,
was "pouring gold into America to undermine the Protestant faith." 7
Prominent citizens denounced Catholic immigrants, the Papacy and
the church hierarchy; mobs rioted at Catholic churches; there was a
demand for a twenty-one year probationary period before immigrants
could become citizens. The loyalty of the foreign-born and especially
of Catholics was impugned and it was suggested that these groups be
denied access to political office. When a well-known Catholic was
3. For an account of the cases under the Alien and Sedition Acts see Anderson, The
Enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Laws, AxNUAL RoR OF TrE AmERICAN t His-
TORiCAL ASSOCATION 115 (1912).
4. Historians disagree as to the effect of the Alien and Sedition Laws on the elec-
tions. Compare 4 CHANNING, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 232 (1929) and Anderson,
A Contemporary View of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 5 AM. HIsT. Rnv. 45
and 225 (1899-1900) with 1 BEmm, RISE oF AMERICAN CIviLiZATiON 377 (1928) and
Cushman, Alien and Sedition Acts, 1 ExcYc. Soc. Sc. 635 (1930).
5. 8 JnmrrusoN, WRITINGS 1, 3 (1897).
6. Cunrr, THE Roors OF AMUERICAN LOYALTY 75 (1946).
7. Id. at 77.
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appointed Postmaster General by President Pierce the vituperation of
the anti-Catholic Know-Nothings reached a new pitch. It was as-
serted that Catholics in the Post Office would become members of a
spy ring for the Pope, and it was solemnly claimed that Catholic im-
migrants were not and could not be loyal to the nation.,
With the coming of the Civil War loyalty to the Union once more
became a crucial matter. Congress passed stringent legislation grant-
ing the President discretionary power "to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States." 0
Harsh accusations of disloyalty were levelled against Democratic army
officers because many Democrats at home opposed continuation of the
war, and there were demands for stern measures of repression.10 But
even in the heat of war "disloyalty," short of actual treason, was not
invoked to bar government employees or elected officials from office."
The wise and tolerant leadership of President Lincoln was a significant
factor in minimizing infringements on democratic liberties.
In the bitterness of reconstruction following the Civil War, Congress
and some of the states passed legislation requiring various forms of
loyalty oaths as a condition to practicing certain professions. These
laws were struck down by the Supreme Court as bills of attainder and
ex post facto legislation.-
1 2
The issue of disloyalty among government employees and office-
holders was not seriously raised again until the First World War.
Indeed, affirmative steps were taken under the Civil Service Act,
passed in 1883, to assure political independence among government
employees. Civil Service Rule I, issued in 1884, required that "no
question in any form of application or in any examination shall be so
framed as to elicit information concerning the political or religious
opinions or affiliations of any applicant, nor shall any inquiry be made
concerning such opinions or affiliations, and all disclosures thereof shall
be discountenanced." "
8. MYERS, HISTORY OF BIGOaY IN THE UNITrE STATES 187-9 (1943).
9. 12 STAT. 755 (1863). For an account of the thousands of political prisoners ar-
rested under this statute, see WHIPPLE, THE STORY OF Crm LinnnrY n; Tn UNrm
STATES 133 et seq. (1927).
10. GRAY, THE HIDDEN Cnu VN AR 127 (1942).
11. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrEo STATES 263 (1941).
12. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867); Ex Parte Garland, 4 WaIL 333
(1867).
13. Presidential promulgation, April 15, 1903, under authority of 22 STA.T. 403 (13),
5 U.S.C. 633 (1946). But cf. Report of President's Temporary Commission on Employee
Loyalty, Appendix B, p. 3 (1947). While the President's Temporary Committee contended
that Rule I was intended only to remove partisan politics from the Civil Service and notto
exclude "all questions designed to uncover adherence to ideologies inimical to our form of
government," analysis of the Civil Service Act of January 16, 18 confirms the conclusion
that Congress intended a complete bar to political investigation, regardless of context. In
practice, the Commission's selection of Federal employees was based solely on technical
qualifications and character.
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InWorld War I military tensions again inflamed suspicion and dis-
trust of those who might hinder the war effort. Public attention cen-
tered on foreign-born groups, particularly the Germans, even though
many were citizens and had been assimilated into the American
culture. Government activity concentrated on aliens, who were sus-
pected of potential disloyalty, and numerous deportations took place. 4
While government employees as a class escaped notice, certain elected
officials did not. In the early stages of the war Victor Berger, elected to
Congress as a Socialist, was denied his seat because of his opposition
to war.'
The Berger affair gave impetus to the doctrine that "disloyalty"
was a legitimate basis for barring duly elected representatives from
public office. Shortly after the war the New York Assembly expelled,
without hearing, five members elected on the Socialist slate. The
grounds were that the five were "disloyal" to the American govern-
ment, and that the Socialist Party was not a political party but in
reality a subversive organization which adhered to the revolutionary
principles of Soviet Russia. A half-hearted allegation was made that
the five had violated the Espionage Act, but the charge was not
supported. They never regained their seats. 6
Political suppression reached flood-tide with the widespread raids of
A. Mitchell Palmer, U. S. Attorney General, whose dragnet swept
thousands of "disloyal" aliens into prison.' At the same time, the
Lusk Committee in New York, which fathered the expulsion of the
Socialists from the New York legislature, forced the enactment of
legislation drastically curtailing political expression. Teachers, usu-
ally the first group of government employees subject to attention,
felt the sting of the Loyalty Oath and those suspected of radicalism were
,dismissed.18
14. See Posr, DEPORTATIONS DELnuu or NiN=ET N-TwENTY (1923).
15. Berger was indicted for conspiracy under the Espionage Act and convicted, but his
conviction was later reversed. In 1923, after the Department of Justice had dropped es-
Ipionage charges, Berger took his Congressional seat without dissent. A comprehensive
-discussion of the Berger incident is to be found in CHAFEE, op. Cit. supra note 11, at 247-
269.
16. See O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, 61 HARV. L. Rv. 592, 592-
594 (1948) and CHAFEE op. cit. supra note 11, at 269-282. For a vivid picture of the pre-
vailing emotional attitude of the early 20's, see Brown, The Disloyalty of Socialism, 53 Am.
L. REv. 681 (1919).
17. For a re-telling of the Palmer raids story, see CuMINas AND MCFARLAND, FEa-
AL JusricE 429-30 (1937) and LAOR RrsEARCH AssocrATioN, Tun PALmER RAIDS
(1948). See also Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 1920).
18. See AmmuCAN Civm LiBETIzs UNION, THE GAG ON TEACniNV (1931). Excel-
lent analyses of teachers' oaths are found in Friedrich, Teachers Oaths, 172 HARMS'
171. (1936) ; Remarks by Samuel E. Morison, at Hearings on Bill to Repeal the Teachers'
Oath Act, 21 MAss. L. Q. No. 3, 61 (1936). For a constitutional discussion, see Gardner
and Post, The Constitutional Questions Raised by the Flag Salute and Teachers' Oath
Acts in Massachusetts, 16 B. U. L. Rxv. 803 (1936). By 1940 some 21 states had enacted
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The reaction to these moves was not long in coming. The Bar
Association of the City of New York protested the expulsion of the
Socialist Assemblymen and issued a memorial, written principally by
Charles Evans Hughes, later Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, strongly condemning the action of the legislature. Most of the
victims of the Palmer raids were released and the charges against them
dropped. The fever of the post-w-r years slowly ebbed. In 1923
Governor Smith signed the repeal of the Lusk Anti-Sedition statutes."
The country seemed to take to heart, at least for the time being, the
words of Justice Holmes reaffirming the American tradition:
"But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good de-
sired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market . .. ," ̂
It is in the light of this background that one must consider the cur-
rent programs and proposals to maintain a constant and intensive
check on the loyalty of all government employees. The specific issues
raised by the loyalty check are particularly significant for a number of
reasons. '
The problem is important, first, because of the number of persons.
involved. During the war the civilian payroll of the Federal Govern-
ment included over 3,000,000 employees; it is now somewhat over
2,000,000. To this number must be added 3,400,000 state and local
government employees. Together with their families these civil serv-
ants represent a substantial segment of the population. Post-war
reductions have now ceased and the number of government workers is
again on the increase. With the development of government owned
plants for the production of atomic energy, not to mention the pos-
sibility of nationalization of certain basic industries, the numbers in-
volved would be even larger. Furthermore the loyalty program di-
rectly affects many thousands of employees of private employers
operating under government contract.
Second, the standard set by the Government in this area has an in-
calculable effect upon the attitude of the country as a whole. Calm and
legislation requiring special oaths of loyalty from teachers. The statutes are collected in
A .. xcCAx Cvir LIBERms U ioN, THE GAG Ox TEACING 62-3 (1940).
19. Governor Smith pointed out that the laws were "repugnant to the fundamentals
of American democracy. Under the laws repealed, teachers, in order to ePxercise their
honorable calling, were in effect compelled to hold opinions deemed by a State officer con-
sistent with loyalty.. ." SyrrH, PouBc PAPXEMs 292 (1923).
20. Dissenting in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). Generally on
the history of civil liberties in the United States see CHAzEE, op. cit. .mpra note 11; Amn-
cAN Cwn. LiBERTiEs UmoN, ANNuAL RrxoRTs (1921-1948) ; The Coinslftntiolal Right to
Advocate Political, Social and Economic Change, 7 LAw GumD. REv. 57 (1947).
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intelligent action by government sets a healthy example. Witch-
hunts officially sponsored must breed imitations throughout the nation.
In a period of rising tension the government has a special obligation to
hold firm to a reasoned course in the best tradition of political de-
mocracy.
Third, the issue posed is one that goes deep into the foundations of
political freedom in a modern industrial state. The political theory of
our founding fathers predicated freedom of political institutions upon
a groundwork of economic freedom. The vast accumulations of capital
which have marked the growth of modern industry have largely re-
moved this underpinning of economic independence. Hence the basic
problem of modern democracy is to preserve political independence
for large masses of citizens who do not have a source of strength in the
ownership of small units of productive enterprise. This problem is
particularly acute in the case of the government employee, who is
peculiarly lacking in economic independence. Establishment of a firm
foundation of political freedom for the government worker would
constitute a significant advance toward solution of the broader under-
lying issue.
Finally, the loyalty program must be considered in its effect upon
the morale and efficiency of the government service. The govern-
ment bureaucracy is an indispensable tool in the modern world and
the quality of its performance becomes more and more vital to the
welfare of all. Forces are constantly at work in any large organization
seeking to dull, to ossify, to strait-jacket its activity. Only a thoughtful
and continuous effort can prevent government bureaucracy from
degenerating to a moribund level where it becomes incapable of han-
dling the novel and complicated matters with which it must deal. Our
government has the exacting task of recruiting competent men and
women and the equally difficult task of retaining the services of its
ablest officials. A loyalty program which gives rise to fear and tin-
certainty places a premium upon conformity and mediocrity. It will
determine, as much as any single element, the capacity of government
to function as a vigorous, effective force in modern society.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT LOYALTY PROGRAM
Impact of the House Committee on Un-American Activities
The most important element in the development of our present
policy on employee loyalty has been the House Committee on Un-
American Activities. It is necessary, therefore, to trace the influence
of this Committee in some detail.
From its inception in 1938 the Committee, particularly through its
first chairman, Congressman Dies, preached to Congress, the Pres-
ident, and the general public the necessity for ridding the government
[Vol. 58: 1
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of "subversive" employees. At frequent intervals Dies warned of the
"Trojan horse" tactics of Communists and "subversives" in the
government service; also a source of danger were the "bureaucrats,"
"crackpots," "internationalists" and "anti-parliamentarians." 21 Dies
asserted, and soon convinced the majority of his associates in the
House, that disloyal employees were endangering the entire govern-
mental structure. At first the executive agencies refused to dismiss
employees charged with disloyalty by the Dies Committee. The
consensus in the Administration was that the Committee's standards
for determining loyalty were vague and uncertain, that its procedures
were unfair, and that the central purpose of the Committee was to
discredit the New Deal. Over the years, however, the Committee was
to be largely successful in forcing its premises and standards of loyalty
upon the executive arm of the Government.
During the first two years of the Committee's existence, Dies es-
tablished the basic elements of his attack: the doctrine of guilt by
association, unsupported charges against highly placed Government
officers, denial of the opportunity to rebut published accusations and
repeated public assertions that there was a mass infiltration into the
government by "subversives." At its hearings in October 1938, in-
volving Communist activities in Detroit, the Committee first utilized
the doctrine of guilt by association. Teachers in the school system were
exposed for having attended public meetings sponsored by alleged
Communist "front" organizations. 22 In November of the same year,
Dies demanded the resignation of Secretaries Ickes and Perkins and
Works Progress Administrator Hopkins on the ground that they were
exponents of a philosophy of "class hatred." .23 Similar criticism was
levelled at lesser figures in the Government.24
21. See, e.g., OGDEx, THE Dias Comn 57, 59, 60, 87, 90, 91, 92, 157, 224, 231, 240,
246, 248, 251, 260, 270, 271 (1945); GELLEmmAN, M ntm= Dins, 94, 103, 104, 151, 165, 184,
185, 214, 222, 243, 244, 245, 250-4 (1944). In the main Dies concentrated his criticism on
alleged Communist or Communist-influenced employees.
22. Hearings before a Special Committe on Un-American Acities on H.R. 2S2, 75th
Cong., 3rd Sess. 1297 et seq. (1938) (hereafter cited as Hearings on Un-Amcrican Ac-
tizities).
23. Dies: "Such resignation would restore ... confidence in government." N.Y.
Times, Nov. 25, 1938, p. 3, col. 6-7.
24. E.g., Aubrey Williams, at that time W.P.A. Deputy Administrator, was attacked
for saying, "I am not so sure that class warfare is not all right." Hearings on Un-Amcri-
can Act ivties, 2427-9 (1938). Williams' version of his statement was: "I stated class var-
fare is a fait accompli-something that is already here-something not involving force. I
meant such things as collective bargaining, dashes of groups of employee and employer,
or one industrial group against another." N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1938, p. 15, col. 1.
Congressman Mason, a member of the Committee, attacked a projected series of
forums as being organized by a Communist front organization. He listed the following
Government officials as sponsors: William 0. Douglas and Jerome Frank, S.E.C. Commis-
sioners; Edwin S. Smith, N.L.T.B. member; Corrington Gill, Ass't W.P.. Administra-
tor; Nathan R. Margold, Solicitor of the Dept. of Interior. Ibid. In accordance vith
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To support his claim that the Government was in imminent danger,
Dies, in October 1939, released to the press a list of over 500 federal
employees who were charged with being members of the American
League for Peace and Democracy. 5 It was later established that many
of those on the list had never belonged to the organization.2 1 Since the
denials and defenses were not as widely publicized as the charges made
by Dies, the popular impression largely remained that the Federal
Government was saturated with subversive agents in the guise of
loyal employees. No opportunity was ever given the accused employees
to appear before the Committee and answer its charges. 7 President
Roosevelt characterized the publication of the list as a "sordid pro-
cedure." Dies' defense was scarcely responsive; he asserted that his
Committee had clearly established, a year prior to publication of the
list, that the League was a Communist front and that government
workers who had not taken the opportunity to resign in the interven-
ing period ought to be exposed.29 Some seven months later Congress-
man Van Zandt criticized the President for not having removed any of
the "exposed" employees."
That the motivation of the attack was primarily political was
clearly shown by the statement of Congressman J. Parnell Thomas,
then a member and subsequently chairman of the Committee, em-
general Committee practice neither Williams nor those named as sponsors of the "subver-
sive" forum series were given an opportunity to explain or defend themselves against the
accusations.
25. Hearings on Un-American Activities, 6403 et seq. (1939).
26. Congressman Dempsey: "The Dies Committe made no effort to ascertain whether
or not a single person named on that list actually was a member .... " 85 Cong. Ree,
1033 (1939). Congressman Mason, in rebuttal: "It is too bad an innocent person will be
hurt, but that is not the fault of the Dies Committee." Id. at 1053.
27. "... . [The] Committee had become, more than anything else, a denunciatory
agency. Dies seemed to be attempting to inaugurate a system whereby a federal employee
could be dismissed without the least opportunity to defend himself." OGDEn, op. Cit. supra
note 21, at 249. For a recent critical analysis of the Committee's procedure in another area
of its activity, see Gellhorn, Report on a Report of the House Colnniittcc on Un-Americau
Activities, 60 HARv. L. IEv. 1193 (1947).
28. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1939, p. 1, col. 7.
29. Hearings on Un-American Activities 6403-4 (1939). Dies, in a radio speech, re-
iterated his position: "I know . . . there are hundreds, yes thousands, of members of the
Communist-controlled organizations scattered throughout the departments and agencies of
our Federal Government and nothing will deter me from apprising the American people of
this fact." N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1939, p. 27, col. 1.
30. ". . . [T]he Federal Treasury should not be supporting directly hundreds of or-
ganized sympathizers and supporters of international revolutionary Communism," N.Y.
Times, June 10, 1940, p. 8, col. 2. The technique of making unsupported charges of dis-
loyalty against federal employees, followed by attacks on the Administration for not dis-
missing the victims, was to be used repeatedly in the ensuing years by the Committee and
its supporters.
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phasizing the Committee's intention to extirpate the "fifth column"
from the public service:
"In some respects it [the fifth column] is s nonymous to the New
Deal, so the surest way to removing the fifth column from our
shores is to remove the New Deal from the seat of government." 3,
This political motivation was further demonstrated by the fact that
the Committee directed its efforts mainly against the more controver-
sial agencies of the New Deal. Thus hearings were held on Communist
penetration into the T.V.A. and resulted in the allegation that twelve
(minor) employees out of 3,500 employed by the Authority were
Communists. 2 Without offering evidence which might be scrutinized,
the Committee's 1940 Report to the House claimed that investigation
had revealed an "alarming penetration by the Communist Party into
the ranks of . . . governmental agencies." 11 Congressman Voorhis, a
member of the Committee, strongly objected to such a charge as "not
supported by evidence," 34 but reasoned rebuttal again was to prove
unavailing in the face of the Committee's assertions and accusations.
Fortunately for the Committee, its charges were in harmony Vith the
editorial position of a majority of the press and hence were rarely sub-
jected to effective critical analysis.
In 1941 the Committee, its life extended for another year by the
House,35 renewed and intensified its charges. As part of an indirect
attack on the OPA Dies demanded the discharge of Price Administrator
Leon Henderson and a number of his aides, asserting that they were
either members of Communist-dominated organizations or infected
with "un-American" v-iews. He also strenuously criticized the Fed-
eral Communications Commission for appointing Goodwin Watson;
Watson was alleged to be a member of numerous "front organizations
31. Ibid.
32. Hearings on Un-Aincrican Act Hvties 655-745 (in emecutive session) (1940).
33. 86 Cong. Rec. 579 (1940).
34.... "[T]he old charge about there being large numbers of Communists employed
by our Government has been reiterated again today. Such a charge is not supported by
evidence before the Committee, nor should such a loose charge ever be made by anyone
until he is ready to be specific and to name names and give his evidence." Id. at 53.
35. 87 Cong. Rec. 899 (1941).
36. Henderson was accused of being a member of "five Communist-controlled organi-
zations." Congressman Dies failed to name the organizations at the time, but later he
charged Henderson with heading the Washington Branch of the Spanish Refugee Relief
Campaign. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1941, p. 1, col. 1. One of Henderson's aides, Robert A.
Brady, was held suspect for having written TrnE SPmrr A:D STaucMrM o, FAscas x
(1937), sections of which Dies held to be "un-American." Another aide, Mildred . Brady,
was charged with having been an editor on the magazine FRmAw. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8,
1941, p. 1, col. 1. On January 15, 1942 Dies was able to point with pride to the decision of
the Civil Service Commission which had recommended both Bradys for dismissal. 8S Cong.
Rec. 408 (1942). It was the first time that the Committee had succeeded in causing em-
ployees to be removed from the federal service.
HeinOnline -- 58 Yale L. J. 11 1948-1949
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of the Communist party" and to have written "numerous articles in
praise of the Soviet way of life." 3 In addition Dies sent a list of 1,121
persons in federal posts to the Attorney General charging that they
were either "Communists or affiliates of subversive organizations."
In a letter accompanying the list he urged the need for "appropriate
action":
"The retention on the Federal payroll of several thousand per-
sons who, to put the matter mildly, have strong leanings toward
Moscow -will confirm the widely held suspicion that a large and in-
fluential sector of official Washington is utilizing the national
emergency for undermining the American system of democratic
government." 13
To insure a thorough investigation of this and other groups of
alleged subversives, Congress appropriated $100,000 and directed a
check by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 9 Additional measures
were threatened if the executive branch continued in its failure to act
against subversives in the Government service.40
In September 1942 the Attorney General reported back to Congress
on the results of the FBI investigation of the 1,121 alleged "sub-
versives." 41 With most of the investigations completed, the evidence
uncovered by the FBI had resulted in the dismissal of two employees
and the taking of disciplinary action against one other.4 2 The Attorney
General and his Interdepartmental Committee on Investigations took
sharp issue with the Un-American Activities Committee, asserting
that "sweeping charges of disloyalty in the federal service have not
been substantiated," and that the FBI investigation "should not be
continued as a broad personnel inquiry." 43 Dies rejoined by asserting
again the validity of his charges and accusing the Attorney General of
using a Congressional appropriation to discredit his Committee.
44
37. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1941, p. 8, col. 6-7. The F.C.C., making a vigorous defense of
Watson, refused to discharge him. See infra note 51.
38. N. Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1941, p. 1. col. 3.
39. Department of Justice Appropriation Act, 1942, 55 STAT. 289 (1941).
40. See speech by Congressman Ford, 87 CONG. REc. 7543 (1941). See also H. R. Rep.
No. 1 of the Special Comm. on Un-American Activities, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1941),
recommending legislation to deny Governmental employment to any person "who has been
and is now active in any political organization which is found to be under the control and
guidance of a foreign government."
41. H. R. Doc. No. 833, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942). The Document consists of a let-
ter of transmittal by the Attorney General, the FBI report, and the report of the Attorney
General's Interdepartmental Committee on Investigations.
42. Id. at 14-16.
43. Id. at 27. Subsequent reports on the results of the FBI investigation were sub-
mitted in January and April 1943. H. R. Does. No. 51 and 162, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
.(1943). For a further discussion of all these reports see infra pp. 54-5.
44. 88 Cong. Rec. App. 3231-3 (1942).
[Vol. $8: 1
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Following another renewal of the life of his Committee in January
1943 Dies continued his attacks. In a long speech on the floor of
Congress he publicly denounced 38 Federal employees, giving their
salaries and "subversive affiliations." .. The cumulative effect of
tolling off one suspected employee after another was to impress on
his Congressional auditors a picture of a government loaded with
"subversives" in key positions. It was essential, he argued, to cleanse
the government of all such "subversives." -1 To that end a motion
was offered to eliminate the salaries of the accused 38 by amending a
current appropriation bill. 47 This was felt to be an effective device for
by-passing an uncooperative executive. After extended debate the
motion was defeated, primarily on the ground that it would be unfair
to dismiss the named employees without giving them a hearing.43 In-
stead, the House delegated to a sub-committee of the Appropriations
Committee responsibility to hear and make a determination as to the
"subversive" nature of each of the accused employees."
Hearings by this sub-committee, headed by Congressman Kerr, were
held in secret. The accused were denied the right to counsel and were
afforded no particulars of the charges against them. They were not
permitted to produce witnesses, to cross-examine their accusers, or to
use compulsory process. The sub-committee found that three of the
accused 38-Robert Morse Lovett, Goodwin B. Watson and William
E. Dodd, Jr.-were sufficiently suspect to warrant dismissal. 9 This
finding was reached in the face of vigorous affirmation by the employ-
ing agencies of the loyalty of the accused.6 ' In spite of strong opposi-
tion from both the Senate and the President the House succeeded in
attaching a rider to the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act forbid-
ding the payment of compensation for any government position to the
three officials found by the sub-committee to have been "subversive." 52
Three years later the Supreme Court struck down this action as a bill
of attainder.53
Following the end of the war the Committee on Un-American Activi-
ties, now under a new chairman, returned to the offensive. Shortly
45. 89 Cong. Rec. 479-84 (1943).
46. Id. at 485.
47. Id. at 645.
48. Id. at 656.
49. Id. at 734 et seq.
50. Id. at 4581 ct seq. (1943).
51. See Report of the F.C.C. refusing to discharge Watson and Dodd, printed in
full in 89 Cong. Rec. 4588 et seq. (1943), and defense of Lovett made by Sec. Ickhes before
the Senate Appropriations Committee, May 20, 1943 (Dept. of Interior Press Release).
52. 57 STAT. 450 (1943). For an historical and legal analysis of the rider, see
Schuman, "Bill of Attainder" in the Seventy-Eighth Congress, 37 An. Po. Sc. R= 819
(1943).
53. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
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after V-J Day the Committee demanded that President Truman di-
rect certain of the war agencies to turn over their complete personnel
files to it. 4 In the early part of 1947 the Committee again reported to
Congress that Communists were "entrenched in government." " It
recommended as a remedial measure the establishment of an inde-
pendent commission with authority to discharge any Government
employee "whose loyalty to the United States is found to be in doubt. '"'
The Development of Legislative and Executive
Policy From the Hatch Act to the Loyalty Order
Under the spurs of the Committee on Un-American Activities a new
legislative and executive policy on employee loyalty was gradually
developed. The first concrete action by Congress came in the Hatch
Act, passed in August 1939. Section 9A of this legislation provided:
"(1) It shall be unlawful for any person employed in any capac-
ity by any agency of the Federal Government, whose compensa-
tion, or any part thereof, is paid from funds authorized or appro-
priated by any act of Congress, to have membership in any political
party or organization which advocates the overthrow of~our con-
stitutional form of government in the United States.
"(2) Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be
immediately removed from the position or office held by him, and
thereafter no part of the funds appropriated by any act of Congress
for such position or office shall be used to pay the compensation of
such person." 17
The following year the Civil Service Commission, in Departmental
Circular No. 222 issued to all federal employing agencies, stated:
"The Civil Service Commission has implemented Section 9A of
the Hatch Act by ruling that as a matter of official policy, .t will not
certify to any department or agency the name of any person when
it has been established that he is a member of the Communist
Party, the German Bund, or any other Communist, Naz,, or Fascist
organization." 8
54. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1945, p. 1. col. 6. Similar pressures on the executive
branch were now being exerted by other committees. Thus in April 1946, following
testimony of Congressman May that the intelligence unit of the State Department had
been hiring employees with "pro-Soviet sympathies," the House Appropriations Committee
voted to deprive the unit of its entire appropriation. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1946, p. 21,
col. 1.
55. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1947, p. 2, col. 2.
56. Ibid. For a full account of the proposal see N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1947, p. 14, col. 2.
57. 53 STAT. 1147, 1148 (1939), 18 U.S.C. § 61 i (1946).
58. Issued June 20, 1940. The ruling was based in part on the parallel action of Con-
gress in prohibiting work on relief projects to aliens, Communists and any member of a
Nazi Bund organization. Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, 54 STAT. 620 (1941).
Shortly afterwards, in the Selective Service Act of September 16, 1940, Congress in-
cluded a provision stating it to be "the expressed policy of the Congress that whenever a
['Col.$8: 1
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Beginning in 1941 Congress began the practice of attaching to all
appropriation acts a provision specifying that no part of the funds
appropriated should
"be used to pay the salary or vages of any person who advocates,
or who is a member of an organization that advocates, the over-
throw of the Government of the United States by force or vio-
lence." 11
The Hatch Act and these appropriation acts constituted, until
issuance of the Loyalty Order in March 1947, the major legal frame-
work upon which the loyalty program, so far as it affected the bulkc of
employees already in Government service, was predicated.c" Under
these provisions, as well as under Civil Service regulations, final
decision as to whether an employee should be dismissed rested with
the employing agency. Originally investigations of employees were
made by the employing agency or by the FBI at the request of the
employing agency. Attitudes and procedures of the employing agencies
in applying the statutory provisions naturally differed.
A higher degree of centralization in the investigative process and
increased uniformity of standards for removal by the various employ-
ing agencies were made necessary through the action of Congress in
vacancy is caused in the employment rolls of any business or industry by reason of induc-
tion into the service of the United States of any employee... such vacancy shall not b2
filled by any person who is a member of the Communist Party or the German-American
Bund." 54 STAT. S90 (1940) 50 U.S.C App. § 308 (i) (1946). See infra note 232.
59. First incorporated in 55 STXT. 5, 6 (1941). Similar provisions have appeared in
all subsequent appropriation acts. H.R. Rep. No. 616, M0th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947).
Earlier, in 1939, Congress attached a rider to the District of Columbia Appropriations
Act, which provided that no salary should be paid to any teacher "teaching or advocating
communism." The rider was repealed two years later. BUNTnx, LmERrv A--D Lruai :c
59 (1942).
60. In Departmental Circular No. 222, op. cit. supra note 58, the Civil Service Com-
mission advised the employing agencies that they were entitled to dismiss employees on
disloyalty charges under Rule XII, Section 1 of the Civil Service Regulations, authoriz-
ing removal "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Rule XII is
in turn based on the Lloyd-La Follette Act, 37 STAT. 555 (1912), 5 U.S.C. 652 (1946).
Departmental Circular No. 222 was the first time the Civil Service Commission correlated
loyalty and efficiency. In at least one case an employee charged with being a leader in
organizations dominated by Communists and accepting the Party's discipline wmas removed
by the Secretary of Labor under this provision. Matter of Miller (opinion of Secretary of
Labor, Aug. 1, 1941). Likewise the provision adopted by the Civil Service Commission
in its War Service Regulations, infra note 68, authorized removal of employees already in
Government service. On the whole, however, the employing agencies and the interdepart-
mental coordinating committees seem to have operated primarily under the Hatch Act and
appropriation acts. See infra note 81.
For discussion of the provisions relating to applicants for federal employment, to
transfers within the Government, and to employees in the so-called "sensitive" agencies,
see infra pp. 17-18.
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June 1941 in appropriating $100,000 for the use of the FBI. 1 That
agency was directed to investigate employees "who are members of
subversive organizations or advocate the overthrow of the Federal
Government." 12 Shortly afterwards the Attorney General instructed
the FBI to commence investigations without notice to the employing
agency upon receipt of "information or complaints showing reasonable
grounds for taking action." 63 As before, FBI reports were submitted
to the employing agency for such action as it thought required by the
statutory provisions.
In April 1942 the Attorney General appointed his Interdepartmental
Committee on Investigations, consisting of representatives of the
Department of Justice and four other agencies. The function of this
committee was to advise and assist the FBI in its investigations and
the employing agencies in their administration of the statutory require-
ments.14 As already pointed out, this committee in September 1942
filed a report, endorsed by the Attorney General, urging discontin-
uance of any "broad personnel inquiry" and the restriction of in-
vestigations "to those instances in which there is substantial reason for
suspecting that there has been a violation of law requiring prosecution
or dismissal from the federal service." 6
By Executive Order 9300, issued February 5, 1943, the President
replaced the Attorney General's Committee with a new Interdepart-
mental Committee on Employee Investigations."6 This committee,
like its predecessor, was designed to serve as a policy-making, co-
6rdinating and advisory agency on all matters relating to "subversive"
activities of federal employees. It continued to function until pro-
mulgation of the Loyalty Order in March 1947.
Both the Attorney General's and the President's Committees,
operating under the Hatch Act and appropriation acts, employed the
same basic standard for determining the issue of dismissal from
Government service. An employee was held to come within the ban of
the statutes only if (1) he was a member of an organization advocating
the overthrow of the Government by force or violence, or (2) he per-
sonally advocated the use of force or violence to change the form of
government."
61. Supra note 39.
62. 55 STAT. 292 (1941). The following year Congress appropriated an additional
$200,000 for the same purpose, adding the words "by force" after "overthrow of the Fed-
eral Government." 56 STAT. 482 (1942).
63. Letter from the Attorney General, H.R. Doc. No. 833, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1942).
64. Id. at 1-2, 12,23-6.
65. Id. at 26-8. See supra note 41.
66. 8 FED. REG. 1701 (1943).
67. See Report of the President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, p. 7;
Report to the Honorable Francis Biddle, Attorney General of the United States, from
[Vol. 58: I
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Meanwhile a more elastic standard-one more in harmony with the
views of the Un-American Activities Committee-was promulgated
for testing the loyalty of applicants for Government employment. In
March 1942 the Civil Service Commission, with the approval of the
President, issued Var Service Regulations providing that an applicant
would be denied clearance by the Civil Service Commission where
there existed "a reasonable doubt as to his loyalty to the Government
of the United States." 11 Under this formula the Commission decided
all questions of loyalty with respect to millions of employees entering
federal service during the war years. 9
A different standard was likewise established by legislation for
certain so-called "sensitive agencies." As early as June 1940 Congress
authorized the War and Navy Departments and the Coast Guard to
remove an employee summarily when such "immediate removal is, in
the opinion of the Secretary concerned, warranted by the demands of
national security." 70 Similar authority was extended to the State
Department by the MN cCarran rider, passed in July 1946, providing
that the Secretary of State "may, in his absolute discretion . . .
terminate the employment of any officer or employee . . . whenever
he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests
of the United States." 71 Under these provisions the "sensitive agen-
cies" were enabled to discharge an employee, apart from any question
as to his loyalty in terms of the Hatch Act, the normal appropriation
the Interdepartmental Committee on Investigations, H.R. Doc. No. 833, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 19 (1942); Interdepartmental Committee on Employee Investigations, General
Memorandum No. 6 (Sept. 1, 1943), quoted in 47 CoL L. Rnv. 1172-3 (1947). The num-
ber of employees discharged under these statutes is discussed infra pp. 54-6.
68. 7 FED. REG. 7723, § 182(c) (7) (1942). This applied also to Civil Service clear-
ance of transfers within the Government. The Regulations were apparently applicable
also to employees with permanent status, but, as noted supra note 60, the interdepartmental
committees and the employing agencies seem to have relied upon the Hatch Act and
appropriation provisions.
69. The War Service Regulations applied only to applicants subject to Civil Service
clearance, but these included all but a small proportion of the total number employed. A
frequent practice was for the Commission to give clearance subject to a subsequent loyalty
check. Thus an individual would be employed on a probational basis, often for some
period of time, pending Civil Service investigation and decision on the loyalty issue. For
further discussion of the standard employed by the Commission and the results of its
application see infra pp. 44 and 46.
70. 54 STAT. 679, 713 (1940), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1156 (1946). This removal power
was extended for the duration of the war, 56 STAT. 1053 (1942), 5 U.S.C. § 652 (1946),
and is still in effect.
71. Pub. L. 490, 79th Cong., approved July 5, 1946; 60 STAr. 453; extended by Pub.
L. 166, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. approved July 8, 1947; further extended until June 30, 1949,
by Pub. L. 597, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. approved June 3, 1948. Similar authority was given
to the Central Intelligence Agency by Pub. L. 253, E0th Cong., 1st Sess. approved July
26, 1947.
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acts, or the War Service Regulations, on the ground that he consti-
tuted "a security risk." 72
With the end of the war, pressures from Congress to remove "sub-
versive" employees from government service redoubled. On July 2,
1946, the House Civil Service Committee appointed a sub-committee
to make an investigation "with respect to employee loyalty and
employment policies and practices in the Government of the United
States." 73 The subcommittee conducted rapid-fire hearings and filed
its report on July 20, 1946. The report 'acknowledged that "the
length of the committee's hearing prevented it from making a thorough
and exhaustive inquiry" and that "Congress has not thoroughly studied
the problem." 74 It nevertheless criticized certain aspects of the
existing situation, including the difference in standards employed by
the President's Interdepartmental Committee and the Civil Service
Commission, the lack of uniform standards and procedures in use by
the various. agencies, and other "existing inadequacies of protection
afforded to this Government from disloyal persons employed or to be
employed." " It added significantly:
"The reason for comparatively few decisions of eligibility on
loyalty grounds resulting in the actual removal of employees from
Government service should be given study and the reason there-
fore clearly stated."76
The sub-committee concluded that there was "immediate necessity
for certain action" and recommended that a commission be established,
composed of officials from the Government agencies with the most
experienced investigating staffs, to make a study of existing legislation
and procedures and present to Congress "a complete and unified
program that will give adequate protection to our Government
against individuals whose primary loyalty is to governments other than
our own." 77 The Republican member of the sub-committee, Congress-
man Rees, filed a supplemental report, considerably more critical of the
Administration's program, in which he urged that a "full and complete
investigation," with recommendations for action, be undertaken by the
House Civil Service Commission.78
72. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 provided that, "except as authorized by the
Commission in case of emergency, no individual shall be employed by the Commission
until the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall have made an investigation and report
to the Commission on the character, associations, and loyalty of such individual." 60
STAT. 766 (1946), 42 U.S.C. 1810 (1946).
73. COMAMITrEE ON THE CIVIL SERVICE, REPORT or INVESTIGATION wiTH RESPECT To
EMPLOYEE LOYALTY AND EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1946).
74. Id. at 1, 6.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Ibid.
77. Id. at 7.
78. Id. at 8-9.
[Vol, 58, 1
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The report was a blunt threat to the executive that, unless a stricter
and more productive loyalty program was immediately instituted,
Congress would undertake to do the job itself. The Administration
was subjected to additional pressures in the ensuing election campaign
in which the Republican party made a major issue of the alleged
existence of "subversive elements" in the federal service.
Following the election, which resulted in substantial Republican
gains, President Truman accepted the recommendation of the July
report and created a Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty. '
This Commission was directed to make a full study of the problem and
to recommend specific action.
The Report of the Temporary Commission, released by the President
in March 1947, criticized sharply the adequacy of the Hatch Act and
appropriation provisions, saying:
"These laws served successfully to proscribe persons whose loyal-
ties adhered to our recognized enemies in time of war, but in their
practical application failed to encompass other subverters." G'
And again:
"Although these efforts to prevent disloyal persons from either
obtaining or retaiping Government employment were well in-
tended, they were ineffective in dealing with subversive activities
which employ subterfuge, propaganda, infiltration and decep-
tion." 82
The Commission concluded that "the narrow limitations of the
present statutory standards generally used for determining disloyalty,
render it prudent to provide additional and more flexible criteria." 83
The Commission also found that "existing security procedures in the
Executive Branch of the government" do not "furnish adequate
protection against the employment or continuance in employment of
disloyal or subversive persons." ' It therefore recommended a
comprehensive, affirmative program for assuring protection against
such dangers.
The recommendations of the Commission were incorporated in
79. See comment of Carroll Reece, Chairman of the Republican National Committee,
infra note 87.
80. Exec. Order No. 9806, 11 Fmu. RG. 13863 (1946). The Commission consisted
of representatives from the Civil Service Commission, the Department of Justice, and the
Treasury, State, War and Navy Departments, as recommended in the July report. It
will be noted that the first three are agencies possessing large professional investigating
staffs, and that the last three are so-called "sensitive" agencies.
81. REoRT OF TnE PRnsnmri's TFmProRRY Com.ussio21 oz; EI.PLOvEE Lo ALTY 4
(1947).
82. Id. at 7.
83. Id. at 30.
84. Id. at 25.
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Executive Order 9835, known as the Loyalty Order, issued March 22,
1947.88 In October the State Department published an elaborate
regulation embodying a statement of standards and procedures for
eliminating "security risks" under the McCarran rider."
Publication of the Commission's Report, promulgation of the
Loyalty Order, and issuance of the State Department regulation,
completed the turnabout of the Administration's policy. Starting with
resistance to Congressional pressure, gradually changing to a policy of
acquiescence in Congressional views, the Administration had now
shifted to complete acceptance of the position that a stricter, better
cobrdinated, aggressive program for dealing with "subversive elements"
was needed."
This Administration program is analyzed in the succeeding section.
Meanwhile developments following adoption of the new program
require brief review.
Developments Following Adoption of the Loyalty Order
Despite promulgation of the Administration's new loyalty program
the Republican majority in the House of Representatives continued to
press for legislation. In June of 1947 a sub-committee of the I-louse
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service held hearings on the Rees
bill, which embodied in substance the Loyalty Order. 8 The bill was
reported favorably and was passed by the House in July. 9 The
Administration opposed the bill, primarily upon the ground that legis-
lation was unnecessary in view of the Executive Order. As stated by
Congressman Sabath, one of the chief Administration supporters:
"The President's Executive Order stole the Republican thunder.
This bill is merely a belated effort of the Republicans to get back in
the groove of their Red-baiting campaign." 80
85. 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947), hereafter cited as E.O. 9835.
86. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1947, p. 8, col. 4.
87. The acceptance by the Administration of the legislative policy on loyalty was
noted in a number of statements made by Republican leaders upon issuance of the Loyalty
Order. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1947, p. 48, col. 4. E.g., Carrol Reece: "I am glad the
President, however belatedly, has adopted this important part of the program supported
by the Republican party and its candidates in the 1946 campaign." House Speaker Martin:
"... [I]t is good to see that he has finally awakened to the truth of what we have been
telling him for the last few years." Representative Mundt: "The President's program is
almost precisely that which the House Committee on Un-American activities has been
advocating for at least four years." See also statement of Congressman Rees taking
credit for compelling issuance of Executive Order 9835. Hearings Before Comnillce
m Post Office and Civil Service on H.R. 3588, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1947).
88. Hearings Before Committee on Post Office and Civil Service on H.R. 3588, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
89. H.R. Rep. No. 616, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); 93 Cong. Rec. 8979 (1947).
See infra pp. 58-9.
90. 93 Cong. Rec. 8943 (1947). For the Administration viewpoint see also Hearings,
op. cit. supra note 88, at 15-67; 93 Cong. Rec. 8942 et seq. (1947).
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The Senate took no action on the Rees bill.
In the spring of 1948 the Committee on Un-American Activities
reported out the so-called Mundt bill, "to protect the United States
against un-American and subversive activities." "I One section of this
bill made it unlawful for any member of "a communist political
organization" to "hold any non-elective office or employment under
the United States," and for any officer or employee of the United
States "to appoint or employ" any individual "knowing or believing
that such individual is a member of a communist political organi-
zation." 92 The Mundt bill passed the House, over Administration
opposition, but did not come to a vote in the Senate. 3
In other legislation Congress supported, and extended, the prin-
ciples of the Administration's loyalty program. The Foreign Assistance
Act of 1948, establishing a program of economic aid to Europe, in-
cluded a provision that no individual could be employed in the ad-
ministration of the program unless he had been "investigated as to
loyalty and security by the Federal Bureau of Investigation" and
unless the head of the employing agency certified that, "after full
consideration of such report, he believes such individual is loyal to the
United States, its Constitution, and form of government, and is not
now and has never been a member of any organization advocating
contrary views." 94
In July of 1948 President Truman, at the close of the Democratic
Party Convention, announced that a special session of Congress
would be called to act upon various legislative proposals. As the
special session got under way two Congressional committees opened a
series of hearings which were to prove the most spectacular and con-
troversial of any that had been held.
The principal evidence before the Committee on Un-American
Activities, in the first phase of its hearings, was given by two former
members of the Communist Party. One of these, Whittaker Chambers,
testified that from 1934 until 1937 he had been in contact vith a group
91. H.R. 5852, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1943); H.R. Rep. No. 1844, S.th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1948).
92. Sec. 6. The term "communist political organization" was defined as "any or-
ganization in the United States having some, but not necessarily all, of the ordinary and
usual characteristics of a political party, with respect to which, having regard to some or
all [of various enumerated considerations] . . . it is reasonable to conclude (i) that it is
under the control of such foreign government or foreign governmental or political or-
ganization, or (ii) that it is one of the principal instrumentalities utilized by the world
communist movement in carrying out its objectives." Sec. 3(3).
93. The House debate is recorded at 94 Cong. Rec. 6256-6302 (May 19, 1948, tem-
porary copy).
94. § 110(c), 16 L.W. 43, 46 (April 6, 1943). It will be noted that the disqualifica-
tion for past activity in effect embodies a principle of perpetual guilt. For legislation
extending the removal power of the "sensitive agencies" see mspra note 71.
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of Government employees who were clandestine members of the
Communist Party. He named 9 individuals, some of whom had held
important federal posts. Chambers made no charge of espionage or
other unlawful activity. 5 The other witness, Miss Elizabeth Bentley,
testified that she had been courier for a group of federal employees,
most of them members of the Communist Party, who had carried on
espionage in behalf of the Soviet Union during the early forties until
1945. Miss Bentley named 30 employees, some of whom had likewise
held high positions. 6 The Committee also heard other testimony
designed to corroborate the Chambers and Bentley charges."1
Only two of the individuals named were still employed by the Govern-
ment at the time of the hearings, and these had already been sus-
pended." All the former government employees called before the
Committee-a total of 19-denied that they had engaged in espionage
or other unlawful activity; 9 of them likewise denied being members of
or affiliated with the Communist Party; 9 refused to answer questions
relating to Communist membership or associations on constitutional
grounds, including the right to protection against self-incrimination."0
None of the accused had opportunity to question or cross-examine
his accusers.100
The accusations of both Chambers and Miss Bentley had been made
to the FBI some years before and had been investigated by that
organization. 10 All the evidence indicating violation of law had been
presented to a federal grand jury in New York prior to the Com-
mittee's hearings; the grand jury, after an inquiry of some 14 months,
had not returned any indictment. 102
95. According to Chambers, the purpose of the underground group "was not primarily
espionage. Its original purpose was the Communist infiltration of the American Govern-
ment. But espionage was certainly one of its eventual objectives." N.Y. Times, Aug. 4,
1948, p. 1, col. 1, p. 3, col. 5.
96. N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1948, p. 1, col. 4.
97. N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1948, p. 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1948, p. 1, col, 4.
In addition to corroborating the testimony of Chambers and Bentley, Louis F. Budenz,
former Communist Party official, charged that "the Russian fifth column!' had placed
"perhaps thousands" of its members in federal positions. N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1948, p.
1, col. 1. The Committee's summary of the testimony is set forth in its Interim Report
on Hearings Regarding Communist Espionage in the United States Government, Aug.
28, 1948 (Committee Print) pp. 4-10. See also Straight, Editorial: THal by Congress,
119 New Republic No. 7. p. 6 (Aug. 16, 1948).
98. Statements of President Truman, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1948, p. 1, col. 8; N.Y.
Times, Aug. 20, 1948, p. 1, col. 2.
99. N.Y. Times for the following dates: Aug. 1, p. 3, cols. 4-5; Aug. 5, p. 1, col. 8;
Aug. 6, p. 1, col. 8; Aug. 10, p. 1, col. 6; Aug. 11, p. 3, col. 2; Aug. 13, p. 2, col. 2; Aug.
14, p. 1, col. 5; Aug. 21, p. 1, col. 4; Interim Report, supra note 97.
100. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1948, p. 2, col. 5; N.Y. Star, Aug. 26, 1948, p. 5, col. 1.
101. Statements of President Truman, supra note 98; reiterated by Attorney General
Clark, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1948, p. 20, col. 3; see also Interim Report, supra note
97, at pp. 7-8.
102. Ibid. This grand jury had indicted 12 leaders of the Communist Party for violation
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On August 28 the Committee issued an Interim Report in which it
stated:
"(1) It is now definitely established that during the late war and
since then, there have been numerous Communist espionage rings
at work in our executive agencies which have worked with and
through the American Communist party and its agents to relay to
Russia vital information essential to our national defense and secu-
rity. Russian Communists have worked hand in hand vith Amer-
ican Communists in these espionage activities.
"(2) It is established beyond doubt that there is grave need for
vigorous, persistent and courageous continued investigation to
determine the identity of those guilty of past offenses, the methods
employed in the past and at present to move carefully selected
Communists and their sympathizers into key positions of govern-
ment, and to break up all Communist espionage conspiracies and
activities prevailing at this time." 103
A second phase of the Committee's hearings related to alleged war-
time espionage involving the development of atomic energy. Hearings
were held in secret, the Committee giving as its reason the fear of
disclosing information vital to national security. On September 28
the Committee issued a report, together with certain excerpts from the
hearings.10 4 The Committee asserted that "during the war, diplomatic
representatives of the Russian Government in the United States
organized and directed several espionage groups made up of American
Communists" and that these groups succeeded in obtaining and trans-
mitting to Russia "secret information concerning the atomic bomb."
The Committee could not "accurately evaluate the importance or
volume" of the data conveyed to Russia but stated that some of it was
"vital" and "has been and will be of assistance to the Russians." 10
The report called for the indictment of 5 persons, tvo of whom were
of the Alien Registration Act. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1948, p. 1, col. 8; N.Y. Times,
Aug. 23, 1948, p. 5, col. 4. For discussion of this indictment see infra p. 64.
103. Interim Report, supra note 97, at pp. 13-14; N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1948, p. 3, col. 2.
The Report also stated: "It is also true that in many instances the crimes of treason
and espionage are so difficult to punish by conviction because of technical devices and the
necessity of so tightly defining these crimes, that if near trcason and "tirual cspio:age,
and "cold-war treason or espionage" are to be safeguarded against it is imperative that
not only must the power of public opinion be marshaled against these disloyal and self-
serving practices but legislation must be enacted which will provide appropriate punish-
ment for these specific direlictions. To do less than that is to deny to the people generally
the protection and security they have a right to expect from alert public officials." (p. 3)
(Italics supplied).
104. Report on Soviet Espionage Activities in Connection with the Atom Bomb, Sept.
28, 1948 (Committee Print) ; Excerpts from Hearings Regarding Investigation of Com-
munist Activities in Connection with The Atom Bomb, Sept. 9, 14 and 16, 1948. The
full text of the report is printed in N. Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1948, pp. 23 and 29.
105. Report, mtpra note 104, at p. 1.
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scientists associated with the Manhattan Engineering District Project,
the army operation that had developed the atomic bomb. The Com-
mittee charged that all the facts revealed by it had long been known to
President Roosevelt and President Truman and attacked the failure of
the Administration to bring any criminal prosecution. It added that
its investigation would continue and that its report "tells only a very
small part of the complete story of Russian espionage activities against
the United States during the war." 00
Meanwhile a sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Expendi-
tures in the Executive Departments, under the chairmanship of
Senator Ferguson, had been conducting an investigation into the
operation of the Administration's loyalty program. In a report issued
September 4 this sub-committee severely criticized the program on
grounds, among others, of delay in making investigations, ambi-
guities in policy directives, and a tendency to "minimize charges"
lodged against employees." 7 "Only the naive could be satisfied with
our present loyalty program," the sub-committee declared, urging
immediate measures to improve "what to date has been a lagging and
uncertain effort." 10s
The activities of both committees were flamboyantly reported in the
nation's press. 109 In addition, certain Committee members made a
practice of releasing information concerning evidence expected from
witnesses at future hearings, or given at secret hearings, thus creating
great confusion as to what facts had actually been the subject of
sworn testimony." 0 All in all the public once again received the
impression that the Federal Government was honeycombed with
Communist espionage agents.
Perceiving the political implications of this situation, the Adminis-
tration reverted to its previous policy of counter-attack. On August
6 President Truman denounced the Chambers-Bentley hearings as a
"red herring," "designed to detract public attention from the snubbing
by the Republican-controlled extra session of his program to curb in-
flation," and asserted that the only "Communist spy ring" operating
in Washington "was in Congressman Mundt's mind." "I In a formal
106. Ibid.
107. Investigations Sub-committee of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments, Investigation of Federal Employees Loyalty Program, Sen. Rep. No. 1775,
80th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 21-2.
108. Id. at 2.
109. For one account of the character of the reporting see Liebling, The Wayward
Press, 24 The New Yorker No. 27, p. 51 (Aug. 28, 1948).
110. See, e.g., N.Y. Star, Aug. 5, 1948, p. 4, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1948, p. 1,
col. 6.
111. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1948, p. 1, col. 8. The quotations are from the N.Y. Times
report, not directly from the President. The rule in White House press conferences is
that statements of the President may be used with quotation marks only where specifically
authorized.
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statement the President, after pointing out that all the evidence
produced before the Committee had previously been presented to the
FBI and the grand jury, but found insufficient to justify an indictment,
declared:
"The public hearings now under way are serving no useful pur-
pose. On the contrary, they are doing irreparable harm to certain
persons, seriously impairing the morale of federal employees, and
undermining public confidence in the Government." 112
A week later the President reiterated his "red-herring" charge.
113
Subsequently he accused the Committee of infringing upon the Bill of
Rights and defended the operation of the Administration's loyalty
program.1
4
In similar vein Attorney General Clark challenged the Republicans
"to name any Communists now in the executive branch of the Federal
government." 15 Subsequently he charged the Ferguson sub-commit-
tee with making "a mass of incorrect and misleading statements,"
decried its "unfair and uninformed criticism," and answered each of
the charges made in the sub-committee's report."' The Attorney
General also denounced the atomic espionage report of the Committee
on Un-American Activities, asserting that the Department of Justice
would not "institute prosecutions to justify the publicity seekers":
"There is absolutely no competent proof here, so far as appears
from the report and excerpts of testimony quoted therein, of the
actual or attempted communication, delivery or transmittal of
information relating to the national defense to a foreign govern-
ment or to one of its representatives. That is required by Section 2
of the Espionage Act, which is quoted by the committee in making
its demand for prosecution. Hearsay testimony and committee
conclusions cannot be substituted for legal proof.
... these matters were carefully studied by the Criminal Divi-
112. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1948, p. 1, col. S.
113. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1948, p. 1, col. 5. The N.Y. Times dispatch stated: "The
President added today that he viewed it as being one of the strongest type you can smell:
114. N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1948, p. 1, col. 2. On September 2 the President repeated
the "red-herring" charge and, permitting direct quotation, declared that the accusation
that he was "protecting" Communists in the government was "just a plain lie out of the
whole cloth!" N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1948, p. 1, col. 1. In a major speech on September
28 the President attacked the Republican leaders as "thinking more about the November
election than about the welfare of the loyalty program." N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1948, p.
25, col. 1.
115. N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1948, p. 3S, col. 8. For a similar statement see N.Y. Times,
Sept. 19, 1948, p. 26, col. 1.
116. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1948, p. 14, col. 1. On September 23 Clark again accused
Senator Ferguson of making "reckless, misleading and inflammatory statements in his
attempt to win support in his political campaign." N. Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1948, p. 20,
col. 3.
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sion of the department on two separate occasions. In both instances
prosecution was found unwarranted. It has also been the consid-
ered judgment of two successive assistant attorneys general who
studied the facts available, independently and at different times,
that the evidence was insufficient for successful prosecution." M
In December Whittaker Chambers, reversing his earlier testimony,
charged that in 1937 and 1938 Alger Hiss, then a high official in the
State Department, had supplied him with "a fairly consistent flow" of
important secret documents taken from the State Department files
for delivery to an agent of the Soviet Union. He also accused Henry J.
Wadleigh, then an economist in the State Department, and William W.
Pigman, then a chemist in the Bureau of Standards, with furnishing
similar information. Chambers produced copies and microfilms of
several hundred documents, allegedly supplied by these sources, still
in his possession. Hiss and Pigman issued public denials; Wadleigh,
denying before the Un-American Activities Committee that he was or
had been a member of the Communist Party or had "followed the
program of the party," refused to answer questions relating to delivery
of information. The Committee in a formal statement asserted that
the discovery of the documents established that Soviet espionage "has
been amazingly successful for over ten years" and that the Administra-
tion's loyalty program "is inadequate to provide the type of security
needed." On December 15 the New York grand jury, acting on the
final day of its existence, returned an indictment against Hiss. The
indictment alleged that Hiss had committed perjury before the grand
jury in denying that he had transmitted numerous secret documents
to Chambers and in denying that he had seen Chambers in 1937 and
1938. Hiss pleaded not guilty. Thus the matter stands as this article
goes to press."'
The foregoing events make clear that the adoption of the Admin-
istration's loyalty program has not relieved the pressure from the
Committee on Un-American Activities or from proponents of more
severe measures. While the possibility of a more stringent and ag-
gressive loyalty program thus remains, we shall nevertheless con-
sider, as a basis for discussion, the Administration program in its
present form. We turn, therefore, to an analysis of that program."'
117. N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1948, p. 15, col. 2. For a detailed analysis of the Commit-
tee's report see the series of articles by I. F. Stone in N.Y. Star, Sept. 29, 30, Oct. 1, 3,
1948.
118. The summary in this paragraph is taken from reports in the New York Times
from December 4, 1948 through December 17, 1948. The Committee's statement is quoted
in full in N. Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1948, p. 24, col. 2; the indictment of Hiss is quoted in full
in N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1948, p. 3, col. 2.
119. There has been some tendency for state and local governments to institute loyalty
programs fashioned after the federal model. Such a program has been put in operation by
the County of Los Angeles. AMERICAN Civi. LiBRTrF.s UNION, OuR UNcERTAIN Lin.
mrms 17,26 (1948).
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III. THE LOYALTY PROGRAM
Existing Legislation
In order to understand the significance of the Administration's
loyalty program, it is necessary to review briefly the protective meas-
ures already available to the government at the time the program was
launched. Apart from the Hatch Act, the appropriation riders, and the
legislation relating to the "sensitive agencies," there existed a body of
statute and administrative law which afforded the government broad
authority to deal with "disloyal" employees.
Sabotage in the form of willful injury or destruction of any national
defense material, or the defective making of any national defense ma-
terial, is punishable as a criminal offense. 121 Likewise, theft of, injury
to or depredation against any property of the United States is punish-
able.
121
The espionage statutes provide penalties not only for the intentional
communication to a foreign power of information relating to national
defense, to the injury of the United States or advantage of a foreign
power, but also for willful communication of such information to any
person not entitled to receive it and for gross negligence in allowing
such information to be delivered to any one in violation of trust or to
be lost, stolen, abstracted or destroyed. 2 2 The Atomic Energy Act
of 1946 includes a series of carefully prepared provisions designed to
control the dissemination of data relating to atomic energy where
disclosure would adversely affect the common defense and security'
3
Treason consists of levying war against the United States or giving
aid and comfort to its enemies; concealment of treason is also subject
to punishment. 24 In addition, correspondence or intercourse with
a foreign government, or counseling, advising or assisting in such
correspondence, with the intent to influence the conduct of such foreign
government in relation to any dispute with the United States or to
defeat the measures of the United States Government, would subject
an employee to criminal penalties.' 2
With respect to sedition, the Alien Registration Act makes it an
offense "to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the
duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroy-
ing any government in the United States by force or violence;" or,
120. 54 STAT. 1220-1 (1940), 50 U.S.C. §§ 104-6 (1946). Other provisions of the
same character apply to .ar materials in time of war, 40 STAT. 534 (191S), as amended,
50 U.S.C. §§ 101-3 (1946), and also to trespass upon, injury or destruction of fortifica-
tions or harbor-defense systems, 30 STA&T. 717 (1S9S), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 96 (1946).
121. 35 STAT. 1095 (1909), as amended, IS U.S.C. § 82 (1946).
122. 40 STAT. 217-8 (1917), 50 U.S.C. §§31-2 (1946). See also 40 ST,-T. 219 (1917),
50 U.S.C. §33 (1946); 40 ST.T. 226, 230 (1917), 18 U.S.C. §9S (1946).
123. 60 STAT. 766 (1946), 40 U.S.C.A. 1810 (Supp. 1947).
124. 35 STAT. 1088 (1909), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1946).
125. 35 STAT. 1088 (1909), 18 U.S.C. § 5 (1946).
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knowing its purposes, to organize, join or affiliate with any society or
group having such objectives.'
A conspiracy to engage in any of the foregoing acts is punishable
under the general conspiracy statute and, in some cases, under specific
conspiracy provisions. 1
27
Under the McCormack Act any individual acting as agent for a
foreign principal must register with the Attorney General.128 This
would include any person who collects information for, or reports it to,
a foreign principal. The Voorhis Act requires every organization,
including an organization subject to foreign control, which aims wholly
or in part to control by force or overthrow the government, to file a
registration statement with the Attorney General including, among
other data, the name and address of every officer and contributor. 12
In addition to these criminal statutes the government possesses
broad powers to dismiss or discipline employees for incompetence,
insubordination, failure to follow established policy, or other infraction
of office rules. The great bulk of Federal employees are under the
civil service system and, subject to certain limitations on discharge
for religious or political reasons, may be removed "for such cause as
will promote the efficiency of the service." 130 Where the civil service
laws are not applicable, the executive power of removal for normal
administrative reasons is virtually unlimited.' 3
126. 54 STAT. 671 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 10 (1946), applied in Dunne v. United States,
138 F. 2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943). See also 35 STAT. 1088
(1909), 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1946) (inciting rebellion or insurrection); 35 STAT. 1089 (1909),
18 U.S.C. § 7 (1946) (recruiting for service against the United States); 54 STAT. 670
(1940), 18 U.S.C. § 9 (1946) (undermining the loyalty, morale or discipline of the armed
forces).
127. 35 STAT. 1096 (1909), 18 U.S.C. § 88 (1946); 54 STAT. 671 (1940), 18 U.S.C.
§ 11 (1946); 40 STAT. 219 (1917), 50 U.S.C. § 34 (1946).
128. 40 STAT. 226 (1917), 22 U.S.C. §601 (1946), and 56 STAT. 248-58 (1942), 22
U.S.C. § 611-21 (1946).
129. 54 STAT. 670-1 (1940), 18 U.S.C. §§9-11 (1946).
In general see Gibbons, Recent Legislative Attempts to Curb Subversive Activitlies
in the United States, 10 GEO. WAsr. L. Rnv. 104 (1941); Note, Restraints on Anerican
Comimnilst Activities, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 381 (1948). For comparable state legislation
see Groner, State Control of Subversive Activities in the United States, 9 FED. BAR J. 61
(1947).
130. 37 STAT. 555 (1912), 5 U.S.C. § 652 (1946). For the political and religious
limitations see supra note 13. With respect to the procedure for removal see infra
note 360.
131. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Removal of top quasi-judicial
officers is subject to some degree of legislative control. Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); cf. Morgan v. T.V.A., 115 F. 2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940),
cert. denied 312 U.S. 701 (1941). An employee whose appointment is delegated by Con-
gress to inferior executive officers is likewise subject to removal for reasons specified by
the legislature. United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886) ; Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 160-1 (1926). See generally Note, Constitutional Limitations on Political
Discrimination in Public Employment, 60 HAxv. L. REv. 779 (1947); Note, Restrictions
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Measures directed specifically at "disloyalty" among Federal
employees are significant because they have been superimposed upon
this existing body of statutory and executive authority and are
designed to achieve further purposes.
The Loyalty Order
Executive Order 9835 has a threefold purpose. It establishes the
standard for testing qualification for government emplo3ment. It
sets up administrative machinery to operate the program. And it
prescribes the procedure by which decisions on loyalty are to be made.
Standard. The standard for refusing employment or removing from
employment is simply that
"on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that
the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United
States." (Pt. V. Sec. 1.)
The Order then goes on to provide:
"Activities and associations of an applicant or employee which
may be considered in connection with the determination of dis-
loyalty may include one or more of the following:
a. Sabotage, espionage, or attempts or preparations therefor, or
knowingly associating with spies or saboteurs;
b. Treason or sedition or advocacy thereof;
c. Advocacy of revolution or force or violence to alter the consti-
tutional form of government of the United States;
d. Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person, under cir-
cumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the United States,
of documents or information of a confidential or non-public
character obtained by the person making the disclosure as a re-
sult of his employment by the Government of the United States;
on the Cizil Rights of Federal Employees, 47 COL. L. RE:v. 1161 (1947). These limitations
on executive powers of removal are of no practical significance in connection with the
problems discussed in this article. For constitutional limitations growing out of the First
Amendment and the due process clause, see infra pp. 79-94.
In addition other statutory provisions are applicable to Federal employees. Se, eg.,
35 STAT. 1095 (1909), as amended 18 U.S.C. 80 (1946) (statute penalizing false state-
ments made to government agencies), which was the basis of prosecution in United
States v. Marzani, 71 F. Supp. 615 (D.C. D.C. 1947), aff'd 168 F2d 133 (1948), aff'd by
an equally divided Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1948, p. 45, col. 4; accord, United
States v. Schneider, 45 F. Supp. 848 (D.C. Wisc. 1942). But cf. United States v. Hautau,
43 F. Supp. 507 (D.C. N.J. 1942).
The oath of office required of all Federal Employees is:
'I, A B, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I
will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely,
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faith-
fully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me
God." 23 STAT. 22 (1884), 5 U.S.C. § 16 (1946).
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e. Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise
acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in
preference to the interest of the United States;
f. Membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association with
any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement,
group or combination of persons, designated by the Attorney
General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as
having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the com-
mission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their
rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking
to alter the form of government of the United States by uncon-
stitutional means." (Pt. V. Sec. 2.)
Administration. The Order provides that "there shall be a loyalty
investigation of every person entering the civilian employment" of the
Federal government. (Pt. I, Sec. 1.) This investigation shall be made
with the aid of "all available pertinent sources of information," in-
cluding the files of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
(Pt. I, Sec. 3.) Whenever "derogatory information with respect to
loyalty of an applicant is revealed," or on request of the employing
agency, "a full field investigation shall be conducted." (Pt. I, Sec. 4.)
As to individuals already employed by the government the Order
makes the head of each employing agency "personally responsible for
an effective program to assure that disloyal civilian officers or
employees are not retained in employment." (Pt. II, Sec. 1.) Every
agency" head is required to submit to the FBI the names and identify-
ing materials of all incumbent employees. (Pt. VI, Sec. 1.) The FBI
is directed to check these names against its records and to notify the
employing agency of any substantial evidence indicating disloyal
activity or association. (Ibid.) The employing agency, upon receipt
of the FBI report, may request further investigation if, from the data
in the report, this seems advisable. (Pt. VI, Sec. 1.) In practice, if
the preliminary investigation turns up unfavorable information the
FBI apparently proceeds with further inquiry upon its own initiative.'
And the FBI also investigates on its own motion "upon receipt of a
complaint indicating disloyal activities." 133
Although the Order authorizes investigations to be made by the
Civil Service Commission or by the employing agency (Pt. I, Sec. 1), the
President has announced that all investigations shall be conducted by
the FBI.' In submitting its report, the FBI may refuse to disclose
"the names of confidential informants." (Pt. IV, Sec. 2.)
The Civil Service Commission is directed to maintain a "central
132. Statement of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, N.Y. Herald
Tribune, Nov. 16, 1947, p. 1, col. 2.
133. Ibid.
134. Statement of President Truman, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1947, p. 2, col. 2.
[Vol. 58: 1
HeinOnline -- 58 Yale L. J. 30 1948-1949
1948] LOYALTY AMONG GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 31
master index" of all persons regarding whom loyalty investigations
have been made. (Pt. III, Sec. 2.) Each agency is required to main-
tain "a staff specially trained in security techniques" and "an effective
security control system." (Pt. IV, Sec. 3.)
Procedure. The final decision with respect to loyalty rests with the
employing agency or, in the case of applicants entering the compet-
itive service, with the Civil Service Commission. (Pt. II, Sec. 1;
Pt. I, Sec. 1.) The initial decision is made by a loyalty board of
three or more representatives of the agency or of the Commission and
is based upon the results of the investigation. (Pt. II, Sec. 2.) If
the decision is adverse, the subject is served with a written notice
setting forth the charges "as specifically and completely as, in the
discretion of the .. .agency, security considerations permit." (Pt.
II, Sec. 2(b).) The individual is given the right to reply in writing to
the charges and is also entitled to an "administrative hearing" before
the loyalty board at which he may appear "personally, accompanied
by counsel or representative of his own choosing, and present evidence
on his own behalf, through witnesses or by affidavit." (Tbid.)
The recommendation of the loyalty board, if adverse, may be
appealed to the head of the agency, in the case of an employee, or to
the Commission by an applicant. (Pt. II, Sec. 3.) Further appeal
may be taken to the Loyalty Review Board set up in the Commission
(Pt. II, Sec. 3), and the agency or Commission may refer cases to the
Board on its own motion. (Pt. III, Sec. 1.) Decisions of the Loyalty
Review Board are technically only advisory but in practice are binding
upon the employing agency and the Commission.' An employee may
be suspended at any time pending final determination. (Pt. II, Sec. 4.)
No provision is made for judicial review.
The Loyalty Review Board is empowered to make rules and regu-
lations "to implement statutes and Executive orders relating to
employee loyalty" and it has general authority to "coordinate the
employee policies and procedures of the several departments and
agencies." (Pt. III, Sec. 1(b) and (c).)
The Department of Justice is directed to refer to the Loyalty
Review Board, which in turn disseminates the information to all
agencies, the name of each organization or group which, "after
appropriate investigation and determination," the Attorney General
designates as "totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive" or
otherwise within the terms of subsection f quoted above. (Pt. III,
Sec. 3.) No provision is made for hearing or similar procedure prior
to this designation.
The Order is inapplicable to persons summarily removed under
135. Pt. II, Sec. 3; Pt. III, Sec. 1; Statement of President Truman, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 15, 1947, p. 2, col. 2.
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existing or future statutes providing for such removal. (Pt. VI,
Sec. 3.) 138
Administration of Program to Date
Shortly after issuing the Loyalty Order, the President submitted to
Congress a request for an appropriation of $24,900,000 for adminis-
tration of the program."' Of this amount $16,160,000 was earmarked
for the Civil Service Commission and $8,740,000 for the FBI. Congress
eventually appropriated $11,000,000, of which $7,500,000 went to the
FBI and $3,500,000 to the Commission.' For the following fiscal
year, ending June 30, 1949, the appropriation was $6,606,000.11
In November 1947 the Civil Service Commission announced the
appointment of a group of prominent citizens to serve on the Loyalty
Review Board.141 In December the Board issued a statement of
general policy and a series of regulations. 141 At about the same time
the Attorney General, without hearing or other formal procedure,
made public a list of more than 80 organizations which he had trans-
mitted to the Loyalty Review Board as falling within the terms of
subsection f.142 Subsequently the Attorney General submitted sup-
plemental lists, also without notice or hearing, bringing the total
number of designated groups up to 123.141
Meanwhile, all employees subject to the Loyalty Order were in-
structed to answer questionnaires calling for various background data. 144
The completed questionnaires, together with the employees' finger-
prints were forwarded to the FBI for the preliminary check required
by the Order. As of the middle of September, 1948, the FBI had
checked virtually all employees subject to the Order. It had found
"no derogatory information" concerning 2,110,521 employees and had
instituted full investigations of the remaining 6,344. Of these latter
136. The Rees Bill, passed by the House in July, supra p. 20, is substantially sim-
ilar to Executive Order 9835, much of the language being identical. It differs fron the
Order in (1) establishing the Loyalty Review Board as an independent agency rather
than in the Civil Service Commission; (2) centralizing decisions on loyalty in the Loyalty
Review Board and subordinate boards; (3) providing for somewhat different types of in-
vestigations.
137. White House Release, May 9, 1947.
138. Report of the Investigations Subcommittee on Expenditures, Investigalots of
Federal Employees Loyalty Program, Sax. REP. No. 1775, 80th Cong. 2d Sess. 5 (1948).
139. Ibid.
140. Press Release, Nov. 7, 1947; N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1947, p. 1, col. 2.
141. Statement by Seth Richardson, Chairman, Loyalty Review Board; Statement of
Loyalty Review Board; Regulations, 13 FED. REG. 253 et seq. (1947),
142. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1947, p. 1, col. 4; PM, Dec. 5, 1947, p. 7, col. 1.
143. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1948, p. 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1948, p. 22, col. 1.
144. Standard Form 84, promulgated Aug. 4, 1947, by Civil Service Commission. The
United Public Workers, C.I.O., protested vigorously because this form requires dis-
closure of union membership. PM, Sept. 5, 1947, p. 3, col. 2.
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cases, 619 employees had resigned during the course of the investiga-
tion, 44 were found to be no longer in government employment, and
923 investigations had not been completed. The remaining 4758 cases
were referred to the Civil Service Commission and the employing
agencies for adjudication.
145
Figures released by the Civil Service Commission show the dis-
position, as of September 18, 1948, of 4390 of the cases referred by the
FBI for adjudication. Some 2648 of these were still pending decision
and 1747 had been processed. Of the latter there had been determina-
tions favorable to the employee in 1281 cases, unfavorable determina-
tions in 86 cases and the matter closed for other reasons (apparently
resignation) in 380 cases. Of the 86 unfavorable determinations, 36
had been appealed to the agency head. Of these 36 appeals, in 15 the
loyalty board's decision had been sustained, in 6 reversed, and 15 were
still pending. The Loyalty Review Board itself had received 24 appeals
(including requests by the Civil Service Commission for advisory
opinions) and had decided 10 of them. Out of the 10 the Loyalty
Review Board sustained the decision in 6, reversed in 2, and rendered
2 advisory opinions.'46
The "Sensitive Agencies"
The Loyalty Order, as previously noted, exempts from its provisions
the employees of "sensitive agencies" where special legislation au-
thorizes summary removal. 147 Consequently these agencies-the State
Department, the National Defense Department, the Coast Guard and
the Central Intelligence Agency-are authorized to operate under
separate standards and procedures. The Atomic Energy Commission
is likewise governed by special legislative provision." s
On October 7, 1947 the State Department issued regulations, under
the McCarran rider, providing that the Department "will immediately
terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Depart-
ment of State or of the foreign service who is deemed to constitute a
security risk."' 4  "Security risk" was defined in some detail, as were
the "factors" which were to be taken into account in making the deter-
145. These figures were released by the FBI, as reported in the New York Times,
Sept 12, 1948, p. 56, col. 4.
146. These figures are from a mimeographed release issued by the Civil Service
Commission. The discrepancy betveen the total referrals (4390) and the sum of pending
and processed cases (4395) is not explained.
For a critical account of the administration of the loyalty program up to September
1948 see Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Expenditures in the Exec i'e
Departments, Investigation of Federal Employees Loyalty Progran, Sr-;. REP. No. 1775,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
147. Supra pp. 17-18.
148. Supra note 72.
149. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1947, p. 8, col. 4.
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mination.'5 0 Among the "factors" were "written evidences or oral
150. "C. As used herein an officer or employee constitutes a security risk when he falls
into one or more of the following categories: when he is-
1. A person who engages in, supports or advocates treason, subversion, or sedition,
or who is a member of, affiliated with, or in sympathetic association with the Communist,
Nazi or Fascist parties, or of any foreign or domestic party, organization, movement,
group or combination of persons which seeks to alter the form of government of the
United States by unconstitutional means or whose policy is to advocate or approve the
commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights tinder the Con-
stitution of the United States; or a person who consistently believes in or supports the
ideologies and policies of such a party, organization, movement, group or combination of
persons.
2. A person who is engaged in espionage or who is acting directly or indirectly under
the instructions of any foreign government; or who deliberately performs his duties, or
otherwise acts to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests
of the United States.
3. A person who has knowingly divulged classified information without authority
and with the knowledge or with reasonable grounds for the knowledge or belief that it
will be transmitted to agencies of a foreign government, or who is so consistently irre-
sponsible in the handling of classified information as to compel the conclusion of extreme
lack of care or judgment.
4. A person who has habitual or close association with persons believed to be in cate-
gories 1 or 2 above to an extent which would justify the conclusion that he might through
such association voluntarily or involuntarily divulge classified information without au-
thority.
5. A person who has such basic weakness of character or lack of judgment as reason-
ably to justify the fear that he might be led into any course of action specified above.
D. In the determination of the question whether a person is a security risk the fol-
lowing factors, among others, will be taken into account together with such mitigating
circumstances as may exist.
1. Participation in one or more of the parties or organizations referred to above, or
in organizations which are "fronts" for, or are controlled by, such party or organization,
either by membership therein, taking part in its executive direction or control, contribution
of funds thereto, attendance at meetings, employment thereby, registration to vote as a
member of such a party, or signature of petition to elect a member of such a party, to
public office or to accomplish any other purpose supported by such a party; or written
evidences or oral expressions by speeches or otherwise, of political, economic or social
views ;
2. Service in the Government or armed forces of enemy countries, or other voluntary
activities in support of foreign Governments;
3. Violations of security regulations;
4. Voluntary association with persons in categories C (1) or C(2)
5. Habitual drunkenness, sexual perversion, moral turpitude, financial responsibility
or criminal record.
In weighing the evidence on any charges that a person constitutes risk the following
considerations will obtaii:
2. There will be no presumption of truth in favor of statements of the witnesses in
the absence of positive evidence indicating a change, both in course of action and convic-
tion, by clear, overt and unequivocal acts.
2. There will be no presumption of truth in favor or statements of the witnesses In
any hearing on security risk, but their statements will be weighed with all the other
evidence before the hearing board, and the conclusion will be drawn by the board.
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expressions by speeches or otherwise, or political, economic or social
views." The regulations set forth relevant procedures."'
On May 20, 1948, the Atomic Energy Commission announced an
interim procedure for local security boards, but failed to clarify the
criteria for judgment.
1 - 2
Standards and procedures employed by the other "sensitive"
agencies have not been officially published.
Characteristics of the Loyalty Program
From the foregoing account the basic characteristics of the Admin-
istration's loyalty program emerge:
(1) The criteria for disqualification from government service are
designed to secure-in a degree not clearly defined-additional protec-
tion to government operations beyond that afforded by existing penal
statutes on treason, sedition, espionage and the like, and beyond that
afforded by customary rules of office discipline. In securing this protec-
tion the criteria are intended-again in a degree not clearly defined-to
reach well beyond the limits of the Hatch Act and the appropriation
riders.
(2) Machinery is created for maintaining a far-flung, intimate and
continuous check over the activities of all Federal employees.
(3) The procedure of the program, while superior in some respects to
prior procedures, falls far short of providing the safeguards established
by the Administrative Procedure Act for other types of administrative
proceedings.
Any attempt to study or appraise the loyalty program faces at the
outset an almost insurmountable barrier. That is the difficulty or
impossibility of obtaining information with regard to the character of
decisions being rendered under the program. Hearings of the loyalty
boards are not public and transcripts are available, if at all, only to
the employee under investigation. Access to the transcript is of little
use in any event because it does not reveal much of the evidence upon
which the loyalty board rests its decision, the government's evidence
3. If a reasonable doubt edsts as to whether the person falls into one of the catego-
ries listed in Paragraph I C, the department will be given the benefit of the doubt, and
the person -will be deemed a security risk." N. Y. Times Oct. 8, 1947, p. 8, cols. 5-6.
151. See infra pp. 101-2.
152. The announcement merely noted that the Atomic Energy Act required an FBI
investigation and report to the Atomic Energy Commission "on the character, assoca-
tions and loyalty of each employee of the Commission, and also on each employee of
Commission contractors or licensees who is to have access to restricted data." 4 Buut. ow
THE ATomnc ScmmsTs 193 (1948). For a newspaper account of standards and pro-
cedures employed by the National Military Establishment in considering the loyalty of em-
ployees of private contractors engaged in government work, see N.Y. Star Oct. 22, 1948,
p. 1, col 5.
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remaining largely undisclosed in the boards' files. Decisions of the
loyalty boards consist solely of the final conclusion reached; there are
no findings of fact, no analysis of the evidence, no statement of reasons.
Nor are the decisions made public. It is seldom that one encounters in
public affairs such a blanket of darkness as covers the operation of the
loyalty program.
Despite the impossibility of subjecting actual loyalty decisions to
critical analysis there are various aspects of the program which are
open to scrutiny. An underlying problem arises out of the vagueness
of the term "disloyalty." Our first inquiry therefore must deal with
the standards for determining disloyalty. In the following section, an
attempt is made to analyze the criteria of disloyalty formerly and
presently employed and to suggest a more specific set of possible stand-
ards, some or all of which might be adopted in a loyalty program.
Clarification of the criteria of loyalty is but a beginning step. Other
features of a loyalty program must be considered. Hence Part V
reviews the evidence relating to the actual danger from disloyal
employees under existing conditions, and Part VI considers the
practical administration of a loyalty program. With these factors in
mind it becomes possible to discuss the constitutional limitations
upon the criteria of disloyalty. This is done in Part VII.
In Part VIII we take up questions of procedure, including the con-
stitutional issues, and in Part IX we summarize the experience of
certain foreign countries in dealing with loyalty issues. The final
section attempts to evaluate all the foregoing and to state our con-
clusions.
IV. CRITERIA OF DISLOYALTY
Our first inquiry then is, what is meant by "loyalty" as applied
to the relationship between an individual and his government. This
is a matter that has received more attention from philosophers than
from lawyers.
In popular usage "loyalty" is a term of the broadest abstraction,
-uncertain and shifting in its meaning. Under American political
traditions "loyalty" plainly does not demand unthinking and un-
questioning acquiescence in the policies of the sovereign. On the
contrary it surely embraces a wide area of disagreement. But just
where does disagreement that is "loyal" pass over into disagreement
that is "disloyal"? There is no simple answer.
Throughout our political history, as we have seen, the term "dis-
loyalty" has been used primarily as an epithet. Like the word "radical"
at the turn of the century, and the word "Bolshevik" in the 1920's, it
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has been hurled against the new, the unknown and the feared. Its
content has been emotional, rather than rational.13
Popular and historical usuage is therefore no guide when the term
"loyalty" is employed in a legal context-in legislation or in an ex-
ecutive order. Probably it would be better to dispense with the con-
cept entirely for legal purposes. The real problem is to decide what
dangers the government faces from the conduct or character of its
employees and what measures should be taken to safeguard the
interests of all concerned. But if the issue is to be framed in terms of
"disloyalty" then precise criteria of "disloyalty" must be formulated
which will give specific, even if arbitrary, meaning to that term.
Before attempting to suggest such criteria, it is important to examine
the efforts made in the Loyalty Order and elsewhere to clarify the
concept of "disloyalty."
The Loyalty Order
, One of the striking features of the Loyalty Order is that it does not
define "disloyalty." Under the Order the right of a person to become
or to remain a Federal employee turns upon a legal finding as to whether
"reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is dis-
loyal to the Government of the United States." Despite the contro-
versy that had raged for the previous ten years over the meaning of
"disloyal," draftsmen of the Order preferred to use the word without
definition.
The Order does set forth "activities and associations" which "may
be considered in connection with the determination of disloyalty."
But this list of "activities and associations" is in no sense intended to
be inclusive.154 And the crucial categories in the list are scarcely more
precise than the term "disloyalty" itself.
The first three groups of "activities" are sabotage, espionage,
treason, sedition, and advocacy of revolution, force or violence to alter
the constitutional form of government. These terms have received
some measure of judicial interpretation. As pointed out above,
however, such conduct is in the main punishable under existing penal
153. Nor have the scientists supplied a definite meaning for "loyalty." Prof. Harold
D. Lasswell, in a statement to the authors, puts the matter thus: "The term loyalty does not
figure as a key word in most tentbooks and treatises on the psychology of ssciety. This
is to be attributed in part to the spread of such expressions as 'identifications' from the
vocabulary of clinical psychology into neighboring fields. It is also to be e.xplained by
the reluctance of social psychologists to employ for serious scientific purposes any word
that has become sentimentalized in popular usage."
154. This has been confirmed in statements of the President and the Loyalty Review
Board, both pointing out that "membership, affiliation or sympathetic association is simply
one piece of evidence which may or may not be helpful in arriving at a conclusion....:
Statement of President Truman, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1947, p. 2, col. 3; Regulations for
the Operations of the Loyalty Review Board § 11, 13 FED. Rr. 253 (1943).
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statutes. Refusal of government employment or dismissal from govern-
ment employment is hardly a satisfactory method of dealing with
matters of. this kind, It is hard to believe that Executive Order 9835
was seriously intended as a method of penalizing such activity.
The same may be said of the fourth category--disclosure of con-
fidential documents or information obtained as a result of government
employment. Violation of office rules against disclosure is a valid
ground for discharge, and has always been so considered, whether it
involves a question of loyalty or not. The elaborate machinery of the
Executive Order is scarcely necessary to invoke penalties against such
action; nor was it conceived for that purpose.
There remain two categories which are designed to afford additional
protection to the government, extending beyond existing statutory
and administrative authority. These provisions constitute the heart of
the loyalty program. The fifth category is "performing or attempting
to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interest of
another government in preference to the interests of the United States."
How this criterion should be applied is altogether unclear. Would the
transfer of 50 destroyers to Great Britain in 1940 serve the interests of
that country in preference to the United States? Many people thought
it" did. What about military aid to Greece or Turkey? Or economic
aid to Russia? Does not every issue of foreign policy raise a question
as to the interest of the United States in relation to foreign countries,
and does not the answer turn upon a complicated political judgment as
to which people may differ in good faith? Nothing is said about motive
or intent. Is this meant to be the touchstone? If so, just what is the
requisite evil intent? And how is it to be shown or proved?
The sixth category is equally ambiguous:
"Membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association
with any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement,
group or combination of persons, designated by the Attorney Gen-
eral as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having
adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts
of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the
Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of
government of the United States by unconstitutional means."
The key words in this crucial category are not further defined and
have, of course, no settled meaning. Funk & Wagnall's New Standard
Dictionary defines "totalitarian" as "all-embracing, as a government
so organized as to be dominated by one political party, power, or or-
ganization." The American College Dictionary definition is "pertain-
ing to a centralized form of government in which those in control grant
neither recognition nor tolerance to parties of differing opinion."
Presumably the term would include an organization advocating a
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form of government based upon a single party system. Beyond this,
its interpretation is a matter of speculation. The term as used in
American political parlance has countless shades of meaning. Thus the
New Deal has frequently been described as "totalitarian." '
The terms "fascist" and "communist" would clearly apply to a
limited number of organizations such as the German-American Bund
and the Communist Party. But beyond this narrow area the words
lose all meaning. Political writers are far from agreement as to the
fundamental characteristics of fascism and communism. It is often
said that there is no difference between the two systems, a view which
would make the use of both words mere repetition. Even if there were
agreement on the basic meaning of fascism or communism, the difficult
question of whether any particular organization is in fact "fascist" or
19communist" remains to be answered. Here, also, the terms have
been used on the American political scene with a broad and shifting
meaning.'
The most ambiguous of all the terms is "subversive." Funk &
Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary defines "subversive" as "tending
to subvert; militating strongly against something specified; destructive;
subversionary." And its definition of "subvert" is "to overthrow from
or as from the foundation; utterly destroy; bring to ruin." A good share
of normal political opposition could be brought within this definition.
In common political usage the word "subversive" usually carries the
implication of illegal methods. As used in the Order, however, the
term must mean more than "advocating or approving the commission
of acts of force or violence" or "seeking to alter the form of government
of the United States by unconstitutional means," for these activities
are listed as separate and independent factors evidencing disloyalty.
Presumably, therefore, the term was intended to add something to the
normal concept of illegal method. But just what?
Repeated use of the word has, of course, not served to clarify its
meaning. The President's Temporary Commission on Employee
Loyalty, in its report which laid the basis for Executive Order 9835,
consistently refers to "subversive or disloyal" employees, thus attrib-
uting to "subversive" some meaning other than disloyal.1 7 The
Committee on Un-American Activities repeatedly branded various
155. See, e.g., Hoovra, AM EMCAN IDEA LS vmsus THE Nmw DEL. (1936); Hoao,
THE CHAU.ENGE To Lmmvrv (1934); Mathews and Shallcross, Must Aincrica Go
Fascist? 169 HAPERs 1 (1934); Sokolsky, America Drifts Toward Fascin, 32 Am
'ME~cuzR- 257 (1934). At the 1948 Republican Convention ex-President Hoover at-
tacked the "totalitarian liberals" and characterized the New Deal as "totalitarian econom-
ics." N.Y. Times, June 23, 1948, p. 8, col. 5.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Hautau, 43 F. Supp. 507 (D.C. N.J. 1942).
157. REPORT OF THE Pr.EswExTns TEn.roRMy Comusxssoi ozir ES-FLoE- LoEALr 23,
24,25 (1947).
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New Deal personalities and policies as "subversive." 1"8 On the other
hand, President Truman, in a formal message to Congress on the Rent
Control Extension Act, described the activities of the real estate lobby
as "subversive." 159 And Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt recently described
the attack of the Un-American Activities Committee on Dr. Edward
U. Condon, head of the Bureau of Standards, as "really subversive in
its effect." 160 Mr. Justice Jackson, when Attorney General, accu-
rately summed up the situation:
"Activities which seem helpful or benevolent to wage earners,
persons on relief, or those who are disadvantaged in the struggle
for existence may be regarded as 'subversive' by those whose prop-
erty interests might be affected thereby. Those who are in office
are apt to regard as 'subversive' the activities of any of those who
would bring about a change of administration. Some of our sound-
est constitutional doctrines were once punished as 'subversive.' " 16
The other provisions of subdivision f also leave undecided im-
portant questions of interpretation. The Attorney General is author-
ized to designate any combination of persons who have "adopted
a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or
violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the
United States." Does this include those state Democratic parties whose
leaders openly or covertly suggest the use of violence to prevent Negro
citizens from voting? 162 Would the whole Democratic party be tainted
by the activities of certain of its local organizations? And what about
advocacy of force or violence as a purely defensive measure? What of
the phrase "seeking to alter the form of government of the United
States by unconstitutional means"? Does this embrace an organization
advocating Federal anti-poll tax legislation if the Attorney General
considers such legislation unconstitutional?
For the agency loyalty boards and the Loyalty Review Board,
as distinct from the Attorney General, these ambiguities are com-
158. See supra pp. 9-14.
159. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1947, p. 20, col. 8.
160. My Day, March 9, 1948.
161. Speech to Conference of United States Attorneys, April 1, 1940. For a further
discussion of the lack of meaning in the term "subversive" see Judge Clark's dissent In
United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 94-5 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 68 Sup. Ct.
609 (1948) ; and Judge Edgerton's dissent in Barsky v. United States, 167 F,2d 241, 260-3
(D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied 16 U.S.L. Week 3340 (1948). See also Note, Consltla-
tional Limitations on the Un-American Activities Committee, 47 COL. L. Rav. 416, 419-22
(1947).
162. E.g.: "White supremacy will be maintained in our primaries. Let the chips fall
where they may !" Speach of Governor of South Carolina, quoted in Ehnore v. Rice, 72
F. Supp. 516, 520 (D.C. S.C. 1947), aff'd., 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denlied, 68
Sup. Ct. 905 (1948). See also REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COOMMITTEE ON CIVIL RI0I1TS
-To SECURE THESE RIGaTs 35-40 (1947); Note, Negro Disenfranchisement-A Chal-
lenge to the Coonstitution, 47 COL. L. REv. 76, 78-80 (1947).
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pounded. The Attorney General transmits to the loyalty boards a list
of the organizations he has proscribed. The loyalty boards must then
consider membership in, affiliation with, or sympathetic association
with these organizations "in connection with the determination of
disloyalty." But how is the loyalty board to evaluate this evidence
if it does not know the criteria by which the Attorney General has
reached his decision? A statement of findings made by the Attorney
General or the reasons for his action might be helpful, but no provision
for such procedure is made in the Order and, with the exception of a
letter dealing with the Communist Party, no such findings or rationale
have been forthcoming. 16 3
"Membership" in a proscribed organization raises an issue more
susceptible of definite proof. Proof of "affiliation" is less simple,
although the Supreme Court has laid down a working rule for such
determinations in the Bridges case.' But what is "sympathetic
association," and how is it to be shown? The term is wholly novel in
American law. Does it include normal social contacts with members of
proscribed organizations? Professional or scientific association? Busi-
ness dealings? Are the relatives of a member of a proscribed organiza-
tion its sympathetic associates? Does the term outlaw all united fronts
which include "subversive" groups? And how far back does the taint
of association run?
The Loyalty Review Board realizes that it is operating under an
almost unlimited charter. While it has not undertaken to define
"disloyalty" it has attempted to narrow the area of ambiguity by a
statement issued in connection with the promulgation of its initial
regulations:
"Advocacy of whatever change in the form of government or the
economic system of the United States, or both, however far-reach-
ing such change may be, is not disloyalty, unless that advocacy is
coupled with the advocacy or approval, either singly or in concert
with others, of the use of unconstitutional means to effect such
change." 165
This is not an unreasonable stand. Yet difficulties remain. On
its face the Board's statement seems to confine the criteria for determin-
ing disloyalty to the last clause of subdivision f. Does the Board mean
that it is disregarding the other criteria of subdivision f and attrib-
uting no meaning to the categories "totalitarian," "communist,"
163. See infra note 430.
164. "Whether intermittent or repeated, the act or acts tending to prove 'affiliation'
must be of that quality which indicates an adherence to or a furtherance of the purpozes
or objectives of the proscribed organization as distinguished from mere cooperation vith it
in lawful activities. The act or acts must evidence a working alliance to bring the pro-
gram to fruition." Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 143-4 (1945).
165. Statement of Loyalty Review Board, issued Dec. 23, 1947.
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"fascist," "subversive" or "advocating or approving the commission
of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the
Constitution?" And was its statement meant as a mandate to the
Attorney General, whose' function it is to determine whether a partic-
ular organization or other combination falls within the proscriptions
of subdivision f? Moreover, the position of the Board is confused by
another attempt at definition in the same statement. This time the
Board introduces a new concept,-"'allegiance to some foreign power or
influence"--as a criterion of disloyalty:
". .. persons holding beliefs calling for a change in our form of
government through the use of force or other unconstitutional
means, who indicate these beliefs by association or conduct, and
persons who demonstrate their allegiance is primarily to some foreign
power or inluence, and that they desire to overthrow our Govern-
ment, have no constitutional or moral right to remain in, or enter
upon the service of our Nation." 116
The Board's use of the phrase "desire to overthrow our Government"
must be taken as meaning "desire to change by lawful means"; other-
wise it would be merely repetitive of the previous category of persons
"calling for a change . . . through the use of force or other unconstitu-
tional means." The Board must intend to say, then, that persons who
seek change in government through democratic methods but whose
"allegiance is primarily to some foreign power or influence" are dis-
loyal. But what does this mean? Would it include members of the
Roman Catholic Church whose leaders in the Vatican issue warnings
to Catholics not to vote for certain types of candidates? "I Would it
include a person whose philosophy of government is influenced by
British views of the separation of powers? Or by Keynes' economic
theories?
It seems evident, therefore, that neither the Loyalty Order nor the
Loyalty Review Board's interpretation of it thus far satisfactorily
answers the need for specific criteria of "disloyalty." 168
Other Attempts at Formulation of Criteria
The failure of the Loyalty Order to develop an understandable
definition of "disloyalty" or its cognate terms repeats the record of the
166. Id. at 10. Italics supplied.
167. See Associated Press dispatch from Vatican City, PM, March 4, 1948, p. 7, col, 1.
A recent series of articles concluded that there is a basic incompatibility and continuing
conflict between the institution of the Catholic Church and American democracy. Blan-
shard, The Catlholic Chturch and Democracy, 116 NATION 601, 630 (1948).
168. -For further discussion of the looseness of terms such as those used in the Loy-
alty Order, see Note, 47 COL. L. REv. 1161; letter from Dean Griswold and Profs. Chafee,
Katz and Scott of the Harvard Law School, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1947, § 4, p. 8, col. 5;
AMERICAN CrVIL LIBERTIES UNI6N, STATEMENT ON LOYALTY TESTS FOR FEDERAL EM-
PLOYMENT, adopted by Board of Directors, Apr. 7, 1947.
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various committees, commissions, agencies and individuals who have
devoted their time and attention to the problem.
The Committee on Un-American Activities has never formulated
any consistent or meaningful definition of "Un-American," "sub-
versive," or similar terms either in connection with the qualifications
that should be demanded of government employees or for other
purposes. 6' Invariably the Committee uses the terms in an oppro-
brious sense, to characterize political activity or views to which the
Committee, or its chairman, is opposed. 170
In 1943 the Kerr Committee was entrusted with the function of
determining whether the 38 Federal employees named by the Dies
Committee were "subversive to the Government." "I This Com-
mittee undertook what the Dies Committee had never seriously
attempted-to define the term "subversive activity." Its definition
was:
"Subversive activity . . .derives from conduct intentionally
destructive of or inimical to the Government of the United States-
that which seeks to undermine its institutions, or to distort its func-
tions, or to impede its projects, or to lessen its efforts, the ulti-
mate end being to overturn it all." 172
On its face this definition would embrace any opposition to the
status quo, regardless of methods employed, subject perhaps to the
final qualification "the ultimate end being to overturn it all." How
much of a limitation this was meant to be is not clear. The Com-
mittee's first, and only, application of the standard was to three
typical New Dealers, Lovett, Watson and Dodd. 73 So little impressed
was the Supreme Court with the Committee's definition that in the
Lovett case the majority opinion quoted the Committee's test but
consistently used the word "subversive" in quotation marks.1
4
The Civil Service Commission, which was responsible for originat-
169. Recognizing the absence of controlling standards, the Committee in 1945 sought
definitions of "Un-American" from prominent Americans, but accepted none that were
offered. N.Y. Times, Afar. 31, 1945, p. 32, col. 4. For a recital of various amorphous
criteria which the Committee has used at different times to define the scope of its in-
vestigations, see Note, Constitutional Limitations onl the Un-Ancrican Jctities Con-
wittee, 47 COL. L. REv. 416, 422-3 (1947). On July 18, 1946, the Chief Counsel of the
Committee stated that it "has adopted no definition of subversive or Un-American ac-
tivities. . . " Ibid., n. 63.
170. "... Dies and his committee feel that 'Americanism' requires the preservation
of the status quo, and label as 'Un-American' whatever seems to threaten the status quo
no matter how constitutional be the means whereby it is proposed." GELL Z!A 3 arlin
Dies 141 (1944). See supra pp. 8-14.
171. H. P. Rns. 105, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., S9 CONG. REc. 734, 742 (1943). See Mira
p. 13.
172. H.R. REP. No. 448, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1943).
173. See supra p. 13.
174. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
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ing the standard of "reasonable doubt as to . . . loyalty to the
Government" in 1942 and which decided some thousands of cases in
subsequent years on the basis of this formula, has likewise never
promulgated any clear definition of the term "loyalty." In 1943 the
Commission, after a leak to the press had occurred, made public its
instructions to investigators on this matter:
"The Commission, on the basis of its experience in handling thou-
sands of these cases, has developed certain policy standards. It is of
primary importance to record the fact that the Civil Service Com-
mission will not consider charges against persons who are found
merely to possess a progressive interest in seeking changes in the
country's economic and political structure but who adhere firmly to
the principle that such changes are only to be brought about
through orderly democratic processes.
"On the other side of the picture, there have evolved certain
fairly well-defined categories, where, assuming adequate evidence,
a negative conclusion follows. Typical of these latter categories are
the following:
"Persons who have advocated revolution or the use of force, if
necessary, in order to bring about political or economic changes.
"Persons whose association with organizations in agreement with
the attitudes and policies of the Nazis, Fascists, or Communists, has
been such as to indicate sympathy with the programs of the Nazis,
Fascists, or Communists.
"Persons who have expressed a desire to see the Axis Nations
emerge as the victor in the present conflict.
"Persons whose record shows that they are more concerned with
the success or failure of a foreign government or a foreign political
system than with the welfare of the United States Government.
"It is clear, of course, that tied up with the last point mentioned
above is the whole question of communism. In connection with the
handling of these cases, the Commission has issued the following in-
structions to its staff:
"A good definition of a Communist is 'one who has followed the
Communist Party line through one or more changes.' The Com-
munist Party line is the policy advocated by the various factions of
the [C]omintern. It is the policy of preserving and protecting the
Soviet Union by whatever means are determined by its leaders." 171
Plainly the standard of "sympathy with the programs of the Nazis,
Fascists or Communists" is limitless in application. Equally inclusive
is the definition of a Communist, which would embrace anyone who
changed his mind as to the character of the war after Germany's at-
tack on Russia in June 1941.176 This test would include such a well-
175. 89 CONG. REc. 10254 (1943). The full instructions are reprinted at 89 Coo,
REc. 10253-5 (1943).
176. See COMMITTEE ON CIVIL SERVICE, REPORT Or NvEsTIGATION WITH RtSPECT TO
EMPLOYEE LOYALTY AND EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN THE GOVERNMENT OF TE UNITED
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known figure as Chester Bowles, formerly OPA Administrator.ln The
Commission's test would also include literally millions of Americans,
for within three weeks of the Nazi attack on Russia 8 percent of the
American people changed their attitude from one of non-participation
to a desire to aid in the war against Germany.",'
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has also dealt with the issue of
loyalty in the course of numerous investigations of government em-
ployees. But it has conceived its function as that of gathering facts
rather than drawing conclusions and hence has never officially formu-
lated criteria of loyalty.179 Nor has the Attorney General undertaken
publicly to define "disloyalty" or other similar terms.
The Attorney General's and the President's Interdepartmental
Committees, as already noted, did adopt restricted and rather clear
cut definitions under the Hatch Act and appropriation riders."'0 These
definitions were ignored by the Civil Service Commission and swept
into discard by the Loyalty Order.
STATES, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946). The Civil Service Commission employed this
test in the case of Morton Friedman. See Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 159 F2d 22, cert.
denied, 330 U.S. 848 (1947) ; reh'g denied, 331 U.S. 865 (1947).
177. Bowles supported the America First position until Germany's attack on Russia.
"Until 1941 I thought of it [Hitlerism] as a passing phase, a local middle-European phe-
nomenon, a bad answer to prolonged economic misery. When Hitler invaded Russia,
although I am certainly no Communist, I realized that here vwas proof that it was more
than an ordinary clash of old world powers." P.M.%. Sunday Magazine, Oct. 20, 1946, p.
16. Similar considerations motivated Judge Jerome Frank to advocate United States
participation in the war immediately after the fall of France, while George Wharton
Pepper was moved to change his anti-war position by the spectacle of Britain standing
alone against the Nazis. See FRANK, IF 'MEN wma ANGELs 332 n. (1942); Pn'pio,
PHILADELPHiA LAwYER 272-3 (1944). Conceivably, these citizens could be condemned
for following a "French Party Line" or a "British Party Line."
178. See Gallup Poll appearing in the Washington Post, July 11, 1941.
179. "The FBI does not make policy, recommendations, conclusions or rulings based
upon our investigations. The FBI, since I became its Director in 1924, has adhered
strictly to the premise that it is a fact-finding agency." Statement of J. Edgar Hoover,
reprinted in ANDnaws, VAsHiGTo, IcH HuNt 93 (1948). The truth is, of course,
that in deciding what facts to report the FBI makes constant judgments of relevancy.
See infra pp. 101-4.
In testimony before the Un-American Activities Committee Mr. Hoover did under-
take to give 14 "easy tests" by which to detect a Communist "front" organization. Typi-
cal of these tests are the first three: "1. Does the group espouse the cause of American-
ism or the cause of Soviet Russia? 2. Does the organization feature as speakers at its
meetings known Communist sympathizers or fellow travellers? 3. Does the organization
shift when the party line shifts?" Other tests were "Does the organization receive con-
sistent favorable mention in Communist publications?" "Have outstanding leaders in
public life openly renounced affiliation with the organization?" "Does the organization
have a consistent record of support of the American viewpoint over the years?" 3cnace
of Commnnism, Statement of J. Edgar Hoover before Committee on Un-American Ac-
tivities, SEN. Doe. No. 26, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1947). The tests are reprinted in
full in 47 CoL. L. REv. 1161, 1172 (1947).
180. Supra pp. 14-16.
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The President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty was
directed, among its other functions, to study the entire problem of
"standards." I"' It recommended adoption of the criterion embodied
in the Loyalty Order, but made no effort to analyze or explain its
meaning. Similarly the House Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service, after hearings, reported out the Rees bill containing identical
language. 82 But again there was no effort made to explain the crite-
rion. In the debate on the floor of the House opposition members re-
peatedly pointed out the lack of 'clarity in the standards of loyalty.'83
Nothing in the speeches of proponents of the bill served to achieve
greater precision.
8 4
The State Department, in its regulations already mentioned, estab-
lished an elaborate definition of "security risk." "8I Although parts of
this definition are specific, many of the terms-such as "subversion,"
action "to serve the interests of another government," and the like-
are hopelessly vague. And the total effect of the definition is so broad
and far-reaching as to include virtually any meaning with which the
administrator of its provisions might care to endow it.
Nor have the courts thus far succeeded in filling the gaps left by the
legislative and executive branches. Only one case raising the precise
issue of "disloyalty" as a disqualification for government employment
has reached the judiciary. In that case-Friedman v. Schwellenbach--
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia took the position
that it was "not concerned here with the question as to whether Fried-
man was in fact disloyal," holding that the Civil Service Commission's
181. Exec. Order No. 9806, 11 FED. REG. 13863 (1946).
182. H. R. REP. 616, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
183. 93 CONG. Rac. 8942-9 (1947).
184. Two other bills dealing with "disloyal" or "subversive" government employees
have received some attention. The Thomas bill, H.R. 2275, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946),
made no effort to define these terms. The Hobbs bill, H.R. 1103, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1946), included the following definition:
"Sec. 4. That the phrase 'subversive of the Government of the United States'
as used in this Act shall mean any act or conduct, membership, or association, or
advocacy of principle or doctrine inimical to the Government of the United States
or the tendency of which is to undermine any of the institutions or to distort any
of the functions or to impede any of the projects or to lessen any of the efforts of
the Government of the United States; whether any such subversive influence ex-
erted or sought to be exerted be open or direct or subtle or indirect, whether such
subversive activity may have been spoken or written words or by acts or con-
duct, and whether or not such subversive activity produced subversive result,"
This definition is based on that of the Kerr Committee, supra note 172, but omits the
final qualification. It would obviously include virtually all political opposition to the
status quo.
185. Supra note 150.
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finding on that point was conclusive.1 5 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari.187
Finally, none of the unofficial commentators on the problem have
thus far come forth with a satisfactory answer. The usual approach
has been to accept the customary generalization that "disloyal" in-
dividuals are not qualified for government service. But the underlying
premises of this statement have never been adequately explored."' 3
This use of sweeping and undefined standards in loyalty cases carries
with it grave dangers. The history of the Alien and Sedition Acts and
of the Espionage Act in the first world war period abundantly demon-
strates the abuses inherent in broad legislation restricting freedom of
political expression, particularly in times of internal stress.1EJ There is
evidence in the loyalty program of a similar tendency for the term
"loyalty" to degenerate into a rigid authoritarian concept. The
absence of definite criteria inevitably results in the use of the word
in its vague popular sense, as an epithet indicating political disagree-
ment. Hence "loyalty" comes more and more to mean simply ad-
herence, in action and thought, to the conventional premises under-
lying the status quo. This tendency has been described by Henry
Steele Commager:
"What is the new loyalty? It is, above all, conformity. It is the
uncritical and unquestioning acceptance of America as it is-the
political institutions, the social relationships, the economic prac-
tices. It rejects inquiry into the race question or socialized medi-
186. 159 F2d 22, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
187. 67 Sup. Ct. 979 (1947) ; rch'g denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 1302 (1947), Black and Doug-
las, JJ., dissenting. In Schneiderman v. U.S., 320 U.S. 118 (1947), the Supreme Court
considered a somewhat analogous problem,-whether a naturalization certificate could h2
set aside subsequently upon the ground that the individual, a member of the predecessor
to the Communist Party at the time of his naturalization, vas not at that time "attached
to the principles of the Constitution of the United States." The Court divided sharply
upon the meaning of this phrase. For tests employed in earlier denaturalization pro-
ceedings, see cases collected in 1S A.L.R. 1185 (1922) ; 75 L.Ed. 1316 (1931). See also
Whznan v. United States, 17 U.S.L. Week 3165 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1948).
ISS. See Cushman, The President's Loyalty Purge, 36 Sum- Gmnmc 233 (1947);
A,-znlcAN CIVIL LBERTIs O UNoN, STATEENT ox LOYALTY Tzsrs ro.% FED M-A. Ei-
PLOirYmENT, adopted by Board of Directors April 7, 1947; The Constitutional Right to
Advocate Political, Social and Economic Changc-As; Essential of American Democracy,
7 LAw GUILD REV. 47 (1947); To SECURE THEsE PIGTs-RE ORT OF TrIM PrsIzDET's
CosMt= ON CIVIL RIGHTs 49-51 (1947); Kaplan, Loyalty Reziew of Federal En:-
ployees, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 437 (1948). Cf. Note, 47 CoL L. REv. 1161, 1170 (1947).
189. CHIAFEE, Frm SPEzcH nz THE U.rrED STArs, 36-282 (1941); references cited
supra notes 2 and 16. Compare with the Loyalty Order the provision of the Alien Act:
"... it shall be lawful for the President of the United States at any time during the
continuance of this act, to order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace
and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are con-
cerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government thereof, to
depart out of the territory of the United States... 2' 1 STAT. 570-1 (1793).
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cine, or public housing, or into the wisdom or validity of our foreign
policy. It regards as particularly heinous any challenge to what is
called 'the system of private enterprise,' identifying that system
with Americanism. It abandons evolution, it repudiates the once
popular concept of progress, and regards America as a finished
product, perfect and complete." 90
The broader, the more fruitful, the dynamic aspects of loyalty have
tended to become submerged. Again Professor Commager writes with
eloquence of this other view of loyalty:
"It is a tradition, an ideal, and a principle. It is a willingness to
subordinate every private advantage for the larger good. It is an
appreciation of the rich and diverse contributions that can come
from the most varied sources. It is allegiance to the traditions that
have guided our greatest statesmen and inspired our most eloquent
poets-the traditions of freedom, equality, democracy, tolerance,
the tradition of the higher law, of experimentation, co-operation,
and pluralism. It is a realization that America was born of revolt,
flourished on dissent, became great through experimentation." "I
Is it possible then to develop a concept of loyalty in government
service that will embrace the positive and living aspects of the idea,
that will avoid corruption in day-to-day application, that will ad-
equately protect the legitimate interests of the government, that will
serve as a useful tool of the law?
Possible Criteria of Disloyalty
Any attempt to establish more precisely the criteria of disloyalty
must start with an analysis of the dangers which the government faces
from the conduct or beliefs of its employees, stated in relation to the
concrete political struggles of the day. What is it that sponsors of the
loyalty program are seeking to guard against? What specific actions on
the part of government employees do they fear will endanger the opera-
tion of government? What beliefs or sympathies or traits of character
in government workers do they feel must be eliminated or avoided?
Once this analysis has been made it becomes possible to formulate
definite criteria which could be employed as a basis for disqualification
from government service.
Examination of the efforts thus far made to exclude or remove cer-
tain individuals from the government service seems to indicate that the
dangers from which protection is sought break down into the following
categories: (1) unauthorized disclosure of information; (2) physical
190. Commager, Who is Loyal to America, 195 HARPER's MAGAZINE 193, 195 (1947).
For examples of the tendency described by Commager see infra pp. 68-75.
191. Id. at 198. See also Boyd, Subversive of What?, ATL. MONTHLY, Aug., 1948,
p. 19; Merriam, Some Aspects of Loyalty, 8 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 81 (1948).
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sabotage; (3) participation in a conspiracy to change or overthrow the
government by violent or illegal methods; (4) making official decisions
under direction of a foreign country or group; (5) attempting to bring
about changes in governmental policy or in the form of government by
methods not involving violence or illegality.
Unauthorized Disclosure of Information. The danger that govern-
ment employees will reveal confidential or secret information, obtained
in the course of their employment, has come to be a matter of major
concern within the past decade. The problem has its roots in the
nature of modern total war. Military strength has come more and
more to depend upon the development of new and increasingly lethal
weapons fashioned originally in scientific laboratories and brought into
practical use through engineering methods of mass production. Atomic
bombs, radar and rockets as used in the past war, and the guided mis-
siles, atomic clouds and bacteria destined for use in the next conflict,
are among the more spectacular examples. As a result, those charged
with our military security have thought it necessary to take increas-
ingly drastic steps to prevent information with respect to such develop-
ments from reaching potential enemies. The fact that the attempt to
stop the dissemination of such information in itself retards and en-
dangers scientific progress, and that much of the advantage possessed
by any nation rests upon its technological and productive capacity
rather than upon strict "secrets" of invention, complicates but does
not eliminate the problem.1
92
Furthermore, under conditions of present day warfare, military
intelligence requires the accumulation of information with respect to
every aspect of the economic, social, political and psychological life of
the potential enemy. Modem intelligence methods are based upon
the piecing together of isolated scraps of knowledge about every
conceivable feature of life in the opposing nation.'93 Hence, even the
most innocuous information acquired by government employees
becomes a potential source of danger if transmitted to enemy agents, or
to other persons through whom it may reach the enemy.
The possibility that government employees may disclose information
of value to a potential enemy has strongly influenced the course of
development of the Federal loyalty program. Disclosures in connec-
tion with the Canadian spy ring have been repeatedly cited as proof of
the reality of the danger. 9 4 The President's Temporary Commission
on Employee Loyalty, as well as Congressional reports and debates,
192. For an excellent discussion of this issue in connection with the development of
atomic energy, see NEwMAsN AND MILLEa, THP CO=TROL oF ATowc Ei;r-zy c. 10
(1948).
193. See PxETF, THE FutuRE oF ANinucAN SEc=n" IN iNCEn C. 5, esp. 73-85
(1946).
194. See mtpra pp. 58-9.
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have stressed the importance of strict safeguards at this point in our
defenses. And the Chambers-Hiss hearings of the Committee on Un-
American Activities have, of course, presented the issue in dramatic
form. 19
5
A loyalty program designed to meet this danger could conceivably
encompass a variety of measures.: First there is the necessity of up-
rooting actual espionage activity. This involves the elimination from
government service of out-and-out foreign agents or of any person who
deliberately conveys information to such an agent. A second step
might be the removal of persons who have inadvertently disclosed
important information without any intention of harming the United
States. Subsequent steps take us into the area of prevention through
a process of advance screening. Thus it is possible to undertake the
elimination of employees who are members of organizations, or
associate with other persons, of such a character as to give rise to the
inference that they may intentionally or inadvertently disclose infor-
mation to individuals through whom it will reach a foreign power.
Similarly, it is possible to attempt the elimination of employees who
hold beliefs or opinions from which an inference may be drawn that
such persons are likely to disclose information.
Methods of accomplishing these various results, as we shall see,
necessarily entail different problems of administration.
Sabotage. The danger of sabotage-in the sense of willful physical
destruction of property-is significant only in a period of acute internal
crisis or war. While certain Congressmen have expressed fear of
sabotage from disloyal government employees, 19 this danger has not
figured prominently in most discussions of the loyalty program.
Participation in a Conspiracy to Change or Overthrow the Government
by Violent or Illegal Means. The danger from this source is considered
to arise primarily from the activities of the Communist Party,-a
question which is discussed at a later point. Here we simply undertake
an analysis of the various measures which might be taken to protect
the government against such a danger.
Obviously the most direct way of dealing with a conspiracy to
overthrow the government by violent or illegal means is through
criminal prosecution of the members of the conspiracy, whether in
government service or out. 97 Apart from criminal action, it is possible
to develop various tests which might be employed to eliminate from
government service persons who are or might become associated, in a
direct or remote degree, with such a conspiracy. Possible tests of
disqualification might be:
195. See supra p. 26.
196. See, e.g., speech by House Speaker Mdrtin at the 1948 Republican Convention,
N.Y. Times, June 23, 1948, p. 10, col. 3.
197. For the applicable statutes see supra pp. 27-9.
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(1) Personal advocacy of or belief in the overthrow or change of
government by violent or other illegal means.
(2) Membership, open or concealed, in an organization which
advocates the overthrow or change of government by violent or
other illegal means.
(3) Membership in an organization which includes, to a greater
or lesser degree, members of a conspiratorial organization, or per-
sons who personally advocate or believe in the overthrow or change
of government by violent or illegal means.
(4) Personal advocacy of or belief in all or some of the program
of the conspiratorial organization but not in the policy of violence
or illegal method.
(5) Personal advocacy or beliefs of a character from which the
inference may be drawn that such person may at a later date be-
come a member or support a conspiratorial organization.
(6) Association with any of the organizations or persons in-
cluded in the foregoing.
Acting Under Direction of a Foreign Power. A recurrent theme in
discussions of the loyalty program is the danger to the government of
retaining in its service individuals who "owe allegiance to a foreign
power" or "act in the interest of a foreign power." Except in the case
of a paid agent of a foreign power, reduction of these generalities to
concrete terms is a baffling problem.
The issue today centers partly around the influence of "foreign
ideologies" upon individuals, but the chief concern is with the relation-
ship of individuals to organizations or organized movements. Here
again the principal source of danger is considered to be the Communist
Party. There are, however, other international organizations which
include among their membership American citizens who support
programs of a political nature that may have been shaped in large
measure by non-American members. These would include such or-
ganizations as the Roman Catholic Church, the World Zionist Congress,
the World Federation of Trade Unions, the world organization of
Socialist parties, and international cartels. In so far as the policies of
such organizations affect political matters, it is possible that some dan-
ger to the United States government would arise from employees who
were members of these organizations or supported their programs.
The tests which might conceivably be used in determining dis-
qualification for government employment can be stated as follows:
(1) Membership in a political organization whose major policies
are directed by an organization or group operating outside the
United States.
(2) Membership in a similar organization, primarily non-political
in character, but which participates to some extent in political
matters.
(3) Membership in a political organization having any affiliation
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with an organization or group operating outside the United States,
or which adheres to policies originated or developed by an organiza-
tion or group operating outside the United States.
(4) Personal advocacy of or belief in all or some of the program
of a political organization operating outside the United States.
(5) Personal advdcacy of or belief in policies or views originating
or developed by individuals or groups outside the United States.
(6) Associations with any of the organizations or persons in-
cluded in the foregoing.
Attempting to Bring about Changes in Governmental Policies or Organi-
zation by Methods Not Involving Violence or Illegality. Many of the
persons characterized as "disloyal" or "subversive" in the past ten
years have done no more than to advocate changes in government
policy or organization through legal methods. 9 The Committee on
Un-American Activities, as well as others, have regarded such in-
dividuals as constituting a serious threat to our government. But the
Civil Service Commission and the Loyalty Review Board, among
others, have acknowledged that any possible danger from this source
does not justify disqualification from government employment.'
The latter proposition seems unassailable. We therefore make no
attempt to suggest possible criteria of disloyalty based upon these
grounds.
Variations in the Nature of the Employment. Up to this point it has
been assumed that the criteria for determining eligibility for govern-
ment employment are equally applicable to all employees regardless of
the nature of the positions they hold. Proper account must be taken,
however, of the differences between various kinds of government em-
ployment. This involves consideration of variations between the func-
tions of the different agencies as well as between different jobs within
the same agency.
Conclusion as to Criteria
This analysis of possible criteria of disloyalty by no means removes
all the ambiguities. But it does reduce the problem to more manageable
proportions. The decision as to which, if any, of the possible criteria
should be employed in a loyalty program turns upon the factors now
to be considered-the actual extent of the danger, practical results of
administration, constitutional limitations, and the procedures avail-
able.
The foregoing analysis, moreover, serves to clarify the basic objec-
198. See sopra pp. 9-14. Criticism of existing social conditions has frequently resulted
in the dismissal of public school teachers on grounds of disloyalty. See, e.g., BUNnNa,
LIBERTY AND LEARNING Ch. IV (1942) ; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHAT Fim-
DomS IN NEV YORK ScHooLs (1931).
199. See mipra pp. 41 and 44.
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tives of the Administration's program. We have seen that existing
legislation, apart from any, loyalty measures, affords the government
protection against certain dangers, including conduct constituting
treason, espionage, sabotage, sedition and the like. And the normal
procedures for disciplining government workers provide a potent
weapon not only for protection against action in violation of statute
but for all cases of incompetence, insubordination, violation of agency
rules and similar matters. These legislative and administrative powers
operate by way of punishment, taking effect after an overt act has been
committed. They also operate as a deterrent, of course, in the same
manner as any criminal or penal provision of law.
The Administration's loyalty program is based essentially upon
another approach. It seeks to avoid any danger by screening out in
advance individuals who might in the future be guilty of dangerous
conduct. It is thus more in the nature of a licensing system,-an at-
tempt to eliminate, prior to any overt action, persons who are con-
ceived to have dangerous tendencies. In the phrase of President
Truman it is designed to weed out the "potentially disloyal." -
V. How GREAT IS THE AcTuAL DANGER
How extensive and how threatening are the actual dangers from
which the government seeks to protect itself through the loyalty pro-
gram? Is there substantial danger of disruption of government opera-
tions through espionage or sabotage? Is there a serious conspiracy
within the government to overthrow it by force or violence, or is there
likelihood that one will develop? How dangerous is the possibility that
government decisions will be made by employees acting under direction
of a foreign power?
Unfortunately satisfactory evidence bearing on these questions is not
readily available. No comprehensive and objective study of the
problems has yet been made public. And the failure to define con-
cretely what is meant by "disloyalty" has so obscured the issues as to
make impossible a clear appraisal of such results and conclusions as
have been announced. Reserving for the moment the narrower ques-
tion as to the presence of Communist Party members in government
service, let us examine the available data.
The House Committee on Un-American Activities has been the
major sources of contention that the dangers are widespread and imme-
diate. But the essential meaninglessness of the words "subversive,"
"Un-American" and "disloyal," customarily used by the Committee to
describe those whom it accuses, renders its generalizations worth-
less. The untrustworthiness of the Committee is well illustrated by the
episode, already referred to, in which it submitted the names of 1121
200. Statement of President Truman, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1947, p. 2, col. 2.
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Federal employees to the Attorney General as proof of an "influx of
subversive elements into official Washington." 201 After a full check by
the FBI the evidence was found to justify the dismissal of only a hand-
ful of the total stigmatized by the Committee. With such a record it
becomes impossible to accept the sweeping assertions of the Un-Ameri-
can Activities Committee as well founded. 212 The recent disclosures
of the Committee with respect to specific acts of espionage are con-
sidered subsequently.
Some light is thrown upon the danger from mass infiltration of "dis-
loyal" employees by the additional investigations of 2175 Federal
employees conducted by the FBI pursuant to the appropriation acts
under which it checked the Dies list. This was a more carefully se-
lected group, based upon information "developed by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation from other sources." 203 Reporting in April,
1943, the FBI disclosed that it had determined without field investi-
gation that the complaints "were definitely unsubstantiated and
obviously nebulous .in character" in the case of 537 employees, and
that it had made investigations and reported to the employing agencies
in 1638 cases. Of these the employing agencies discharged 43 employees
and took other "administrative action" against 39.204
Reporting on the results of the FBI investigations under this ap-
propriation, the Attorney General's Interdepartmental Committee on
Investigations reached the following conclusion:
"Upon review of experience with the project to date, however, we
conclude that it should not be continued as a broad personnel in-
quiry. Results achieved have been utterly disproportionate to re-
sources expended. Sweeping charges of disloyalty in the Federal
service have not been substantiated. The futility and harmful
character of a broad personnel inquiry have been too amply demon-
strated. We respectfully urge that the project be reorganized
201. Quoted in Letter from the Attorney General, H.R. Doc. No. 833, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1942). See supra p. 12.
202. This conclusion is fully confirmed in an analysis made by Prof. Walter Gellhorn
of a more recent report of the Committee. Gellhorn, Report on a Report of the House
Commdttee on Un-American Activities, 60 HARV. L. REv. 1193 (1947). See also State-
ment of the Board of Directors of the American Civil Liberties Union, Jan. 20, 1947,
quoted in Gellhorn, op. cit. at 1234; Note, Constitutional Limitations on the U-A meri-
cat; Activities Committee, 47 COL. L. REv. 418 et seq (1947) ; 00N, TH DiEs CoU-
miTmEE (1945); GELLERMAIN, MARTiN DiEs (1944); Dickinson, Political Subvcrsives:
An Appraisal of Recent Experience and Forecast of Things to Come, 2 REcoRD OF Til;
AssociATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CiTY OF NEW YORK, 350, 360 (1947).
203. Letter from the Attorney General, H.R. Doc. No. 162, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1943).
204. Id. at 4-5. No replies had been received from the employing agencies in the
case of 156.
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promptly to exclude all but matters clearly pertinent to the -vital
problem of internal security." 11
The Committee therefore recommended:
"That hereafter investigations of Federal employees be re-
stricted to those instances in which there is substantial reason for
suspecting that there has been a violation of law requiring prosecu-
tion or dismissal from the Federal service." -'-3
The data is obscure as to the number of employees dismissed on
loyalty grounds by employing agencies in the period following the gen-
eral FBI investigation. However, the President's Temporary Com-
mission on Employee Loyalty does give figures showing the total num-
ber discharged as a result of FBI investigations during the four years
from July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1946. Some 6,193 cases were referred to
the FBI for investigation during this period. These cases were disposed
of as follows:
No longer employed by Federal Government 1906
Investigation disclosed complaints "totally unfounded" 1114
Discharged by employing agency 101
Employing agencies did not consider facts required any
action 2785
Administrative action by employing agency, other than
discharge 75
Resigned while investigation in progress 21
Still under consideration by employing agency 122
Investigation not completed by FBI 69
Total 6193' :'
These figures, it will be noted, include the investigations conducted
by the FBI in the courses of its general survey just discussed.
The President's Commission also reported the results of cases con-
sidered by the President's Interdepartmental Committee. Out of 729
cases handled from February 5, 1944 to December 2, 1946, some 24 re-
sulted in dismissals and 3 in other disciplinary action. :o These cases
included some or all of the FBI cases, though the extent of overlapping
is not revealed.
205. Letter from the Attorney General, H. P. Doc. No. 833, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-7
(1942).
206. Id. at 28.
207. REPoRr OF THE PRnsinmN's TirPoR.ARY Co ismssio:z o EMaovEss LoYALTY
16-17 (1947). These figures do not show the number dismissed by employing agencies
without an FBI investigation. It is unlikely that this number is large. Substantially the
same figures, bringing the record up to December 1, 1947, are given in Mr. J. Edgar
Hoover's testimony before the House Appropriations Committee. Hearings on Depart-
wient of Justice Appropriation Bill, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 244-5 (1947).
208. Id. at 20.
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It is thus apparent that the dismissals which took place prior to
Executive Order 9835, under the standards of the Hatch Act and the
routine appropriation acts, revealed a very small incidence of "dis-
loyalty."
Meanwhile the Civil Service Commission had been screening appli-
cants for government employment on loyalty grounds. Following the
adoption of the W"ar Service Regulations in 1942 the Commission
judged the qualification of an applicant by the formula of "reasonable
doubt as to his loyalty." In the period from July 1, 1940 through
March 31, 1947, the Civil Service Commission placed 7,000,000 em-
ployees in Federal service, conducting loyalty investigations of 395,000.
Of these it held 1313 ineligible on loyalty grounds, of whom 714 were
rated ineligible "because they were either Communists or followers
of the Communists Party line. ' 29 The absence of a clear definition of
the standard used by the Civil Service Commission makes evaluation
of these figures difficult.10
Throughout this period the War and Navy Departments, and later
the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission and a few
other agencies, operated under the much stricter standards of the
special legislation authorizing discharge of "security risks." The
number of dismissals by these agencies seems to have been substantially
greater. Thus the Civil Service Commission reported in July and
August 1947 that the government had discharged 831 as "disloyal"
in the 9 months from July 1, 1946 to March 31, 1947; of these, some
760 were dismissed by the War Department, 23 by the Navy and 20
by the State Department.21' Again in the absence of more precise
209. Hearings before Committee on Post Office and Cizil Service on H.R. 3,S88, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1947). The same figures, broken down by years, were given by the
Civil Service Commission to the House Appropriations Committee. Hearings before
Sub-Committee of Committee on Appropriations on the Independent Offices Appropriation
Bill for 9,18, 1134-5 (1948). Figures for a slightly earlier period are given in the REoRr OF
THE PEsmEFNT's TEmPORARY ComMIssioN ON EmpLOYEE LOYALTY 17-19 (1947). The
only major divergence in the two sets of figures is that the President's Commission estimates
the number of placements at 9,600,000.
210. Of the many determinations made by the Civil Service Commission the only
available official record, from which a judgment can be made as to the justification for
the finding of disloyalty, is in the case of Morton Friedman, reviewed in Friedman v.
Schwellenbach, 159 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 838, 865 (1947), dis-
cussed supra pp. 46-7. It should be noted that in this case two government agencies by
which Friedman was employed-the Office for Emergency Management and the War
Manpower Commission-as well as the Civil Service Commission's own Board of Appeals
and Review disagreed with the conclusion of the Civil Service Commission and recom-
mended that Friedman be retained in government service. Brief for Appellant, pp. 5-10.
211. New York Times, July 18, 1947, p. 1, col. 2; Aug, 15, 1947, p. 8, col. 5. The
War Department figures were said to be an "estimate." Out of 54 agencies covered in
the report, 46 had not discharged any employees on grounds of disloyalty. Three agencies,
including the Atomic Energy Commission, were not included, During the same period
the agencies reporting had denied employment to 73 persons for reasons of disloyalty.
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standards one is unable to judge to what extent dismissals were
justified.
The President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty,
which was entrusted with the task of studying the entire problem of
employee loyalty, made some attempt to appraise the actual degree of
danger from "subversive or disloyal" employees in government service.
Unfortunately its findings in this regard are sketchy and inconclusive.
The Commission initiated its inquiry by addressing letters to the
FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence
Division of the War Department, requesting, among other things,
information on "the extent to which the subversive or disloyal em-
ployee constitutes a problem in, or a threat to, the federal service." 212
While it also requested other information from 50 other government
agencies, it did not ask for data from them on this subject. In addi-
tion, the Attorney General, the Assistant Director of the FBI, and the
Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Employee Inves-
tigations testified before the Commission. The reports of the three
intelligence agencies and the testimony of the above witnesses were
attached as exhibits to the original report sent to the President, but
were not issued to the public and are not available for public scrutiny.
The Report as issued merely states that the information contained in
the three reports "indicates that these three intelligence services rec-
ognize the existence of a threat within the government service to the
internal security of the United States by reason of the employment of
subversive persons." 213
In summarizing its conclusions the Report gives its judgment of
the danger as follows:
"While the Commission believes that the employment of dis-
loyal or subversive persons presents more than a speculative
threat to our system of government, it is unable, based on the
facts presented to it, to state with any degree of certainty how far
reaching that threat is. Certainly, the recent Canadian Espionage
expose, the Communist Party Line activities of some of the leaders
and some of the members of a government employee organization,
and current disclosures of disloyal employees provide sufficient
evidence to convince a fairminded person that a threat exists." 214
And the Report concludes:
"The Commission is convinced that the combination of these
two means [counter-espionage and a loyalty program] provides our
212. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT's TEmPORARY ConussIoN oi EPLowym LOYALTY
10-11 (1947).
213. Id. at 12.
214. Id. at 21.
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best protection from a danger which can develop into a real threat to
our national security." 21' (Italics supplied)
The Congressional committees which considered legislation to
establish a loyalty program likewise failed to give any concrete data
revealing the extent of the danger against which the proposed legis-
lation is directed. The sub-committee of the House Civil Service
Committee, whose report prodded the President into appointing his
Temporary Commission, "limited the scope of the investigation to an
inquiry into the practices, -procedures and standards" employed by the
various government agencies in screening and investigating the
loyalty of government employees.21 Although it stated that "tes-
timony submitted during the hearings is sufficient to indicate the
immediate necessity for certain action and to warrant further study
and inquiry into the problem," it gave no substantiating details.217
The Rees sub-committee, which held hearings on the Rees bill and
reported it to the House, provided no enlightenment. Its hearings
disclosed nothing new and its report merely stated:
"The committee devoted much study to the problem of dis-
loyalty among Federal employees and regret such legislation is
necessary. However, that such legislation is required has been
shown the American people in recent reports of the Royal Canadian
Commission, the President's Committee on Loyalty, and the
House Committee on Civil Service in the Seventy-ninth Con-
gress. In view of these developments, and in consideration of the
facts and circumstances outlined in such widely recognized and
highly regarded reports, it is important that the problem be faced
realistically." 21S
Thus, apart from the dismissals already discussed, the principal
evidence of danger publicly advanced by sponsors of the loyalty
program was the Report of the Royal Commission upon the Canadian
spy ring 219 and the "Communist Party Line activities of some of the
215. Id. at 23.
216. H. R. REP. OF INVESTIGATION WITH RESPECT TO EMPLOYEE LOYALTY AND EM-
PLOYMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATtS, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1946).
217. Id. at 5. The sub-committee also stated that "Congress has not thoroughly
studied the problem or provided well directed and adequate legislation." Id. at 6. The
hearings conducted by the sub-committee, on which its report is based, have not been
printed.
218. H.R. REP. No. 616, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947). The reference to the "Presi-
dent's Committee on Loyalty" is to the President's Temporary Commission, and the
reference to the report of the "House Committee on Civil Service" is to the sub-com-
mittee -report, op. cit. stpra note 216. The debate in the House on the Rees Bill pro-
vided no additional information.
219. THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION, To INVESTIGATE THE FAcTs RELATING
TO AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE COMMUNICATION BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS
AND OTHER PERSONS IN POSITIONS OF TRUST OF SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL INFOIMATION
TO AGENTS OF A FOREIGN POwER (1946).
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leaders and some of the members of a government employee organ-
ization." The Canadian report undoubtedly supports the need for
professional counter-espionage activity; but whether it establishes the
necessity for a comprehensive loyalty program affecting all government
employees is questionable. The Canadian Government has not con-
cluded from its experience that such a program is appropriate or de-
sirable. 22 As to the "government employee organization," further
details have not been made public. No such organization has appeared
upon the list of groups designated by the Attorney General as falling
within subsection f of the Loyalty Order.
The fact seems to be that the authors of the loyalty prograrn were
proceeding upon the basic assumption that the presence in the govern-
ment of a single "disloyal" person constituted a serious danger. The
President's Temporary Commission, after confessing its inability to
appraise the threat, emphasized in its statement of conclusions:
"The presence within the government of any disloyal or sub-
versive persons, or the attempt by any such persons to obtain
government employment, presents a problem of such importance
that it must be dealt with vigorously and effectively." 221 (Italics
in original.)
The same position was taken in the preamble to Executive Order
9835 and in the preamble to the Rees bill:
"Whereas, although the loyalty of by far the over-whelning
majority of all Government employees is beyond question, the
presence within the government service of any disloyal or subver-
sive person constitutes a threat to our democratic processes." 22
(Italics supplied.)
The same point was stressed in the House Committee Report and in
the debate on the Rees bill.
223
220. See DAwson, THE Go-=Enr OF CANADA 294-312 (1947). A more limited
program has recently been established in Canada. On June 23, 1948 the New York Times
reported that the Canadian Minister of Justice announced to the House of Commons that
no Communists or Fascists would be allowed to hold ary position of trust in the Canadian
Civil Service. An interdepartmental panel ,;as set up to advise on methods of carrying
out inquiries. Shortly before this announcement the Department of Defense and E.Eternal
Affairs and the National Research Council ("sensitive agencies" in American parlance)
had circulated questionnaires to their employees seeking information bearing ,n loyalty.
N. Y. Times, June 23, 1948, p. 5, col. 5.
221. REPORT OF THE PREimws'S TEMTORARY COn.ISSION ON E M.u iovu LoYxALT 23
(1947).
222. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947). The preamble of the Rees till
makes the same statement except that the concluding phrase is "a threat to our security
and democratic processes."
223. H.R. REP. No. 616, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947); 93 Coimo. Rrc. 9132 (1947).
See also testimony of Attorney General Clark, Hearings before Sub-comnmttee on Legis-
lation of the Committee on Un-American Activities on H.R. 4422 and H.R. 4581, 80th
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It is thus apparent that the framers of the loyalty program did not
feel that any widespread or extensive danger need be shown. They
acted upon the premise that the existence of even an isolated disloyal
element constituted a menace sufficient to justify the measures taken.
Nor have the results of the Administration's program thus far re-
vealed any widespread problem. Out of 2,116,865 employees checked
by the FBI, in only 6344 cases was any evidence of "disloyalty" dis-
closed requiring further investigation. While many of these cases are
still pending, of the 1747 thus far processed by the loyalty boards the
employee was exonerated in 1281, the case closed for other reasons in
380, and the employee found disloyal in only 86. Of this latter figure 6
cases were reversed by the agency head and 2 more by the Loyalty
Review Board. Other appeals are pending. Apart from resignations,
some of which undoubtedly averted adverse decisions, the net result
is that out of a check of more than 2,000,000 employees about 200 to
250 will have been found "disloyal." Since the records and decisions
in these cases have not been made public the grounds for determina-
tion of "disloyalty" cannot be subjected to critical analysis.
224
With regard to the specific danger of espionage, the recent disclosure
that numerous documents were copied or removed from the State
Department, together with the indictment of Alger Hiss for perjury,
furnish tangible proof that the danger from this quarter is real. It is
important, however, that the problem be viewed with calmness and
in proper perspective. It may be assumed that all the major nations
of the world are the objects of similar efforts of espionage, some of
which are undoubtedly successful. Certainly the extreme and hysteri-
cal pronouncements of the Committee on Un-American Activities,
such as that "there have been numerous Communist espionage rings
at work in our executive agencies," are scarcely borne out by the facts
thus far revealed. 225 All the evidence presented by the Committee at
the Chambers-Bentley hearings, apart from the actual production of
documents in December, had been thoroughly investigated by the FBI
and submitted to a Federal grand jury, which found it insufficient to
return an indictment. Similarly all the evidence revealed by the Com-
mittee with regard to atomic energy had been known to the Adminis-
Cong., 2nd Sess. 18 (1948); J. Edgar Hoover: "One disloyal local, county, state or
Federal employee can do an irreparable harm by acts of disloyalty or by indoctrinating
others with a Marxian philosophy.' Newsweek, June 9, 1947, p. 31, col. 2.
224. "... . the Loyalty Review Board does not publish its decisions and its decisions
in particular cases cannot be made available." Communication to the authors from the
Loyalty Review Board, Oct. 20, 1948.
225. Supra pp. 21-6. The Committee's statement on the production of the State Depart-
ment documents was: "In our opinion this conspiracy comprises one of the most serious,
if not the most serious series of treasonable activities which has been launched against the
Government in the history of America." N.Y.Times, Dec. 15, 1948, p. 24, col. 4.
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tration for several years, again with no indictment forthcoming.2-' o
Even allowing for laxity or incompetence on the part of enforcement
officials it can hardly be maintained that the situation represents cause
for widespread alarm.
22 1
In any event the question remains whether a comprehensive loyalty
program is the most effective or desirable method of coping with the
danger of espionage. Consideration of this issue must be postponed
to a later point.
The Communist Party
The most troublesome aspect of the whole problem of assessing the
danger to government service from "disloyal" employees arises out of
the existence and activities of the Communist Party. Proponents of a
strict loyalty program take the position that the Communist Party is
a world-wide conspiracy to overthrow non-communist governments by
force and violence, and that the Communist Party of the United
States is a part of this conspiracy. They also assert that the Communist
Party of the United States operates under instructions, direct or in-
direct, of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. Thus it is argued that
the existence in government service of Communist Party members
presents a serious danger in that such persons (1) are members of a
conspiracy aiming at the overthrow of the government by illegal
methods, (2) "owe allegiance to a foreign power," (3) provide infor-
mation for transmission to the S6-viet Union, and (4) are prepared, if
it will serve the Soviet Union, to engage in sabotage or obstruction.
It is also urged that membership in the Communist Party is fre-
quently concealed and difficult to establish, and that there exist on the
fringes of the Communist movement individuals and organizations
that subscribe to some or all of its tenets without directly participat-
ing in Communist Party activities. Hence it is asserted that a govern-
ment employee who advocates all or some of the Communist Party
policies or believes in them, or belongs to an organization that does,
represents a danger almost as serious as an actual Party member.
The facts with respect to the activities, motives and objectives of the
Communist Party in the United States are not easy of exact determina-
tion. The Party does not now openly advocate overthrow of the
government by illegal means; on the contrary it asserts its adherence
to peaceful and democratic methods.22 1 Its constitution expressly
226. Supra pp. 23-6.
227. In November 1947, J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, said: ... [T]his na-
tion came through the war with no enemy-directed acts of sabotage. The enemy espionage
efforts were thwarted... "' N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 16, 1947, p. 45, col. 3. For a
similar statement by President Truman see N. Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1948, p. 25, col 1.
228. See DENNIs, Is CoImuzNMsm Uzz-A.:mERxcux? (1947); FosTE , AnIucAz. TnAz
Umoxismx (1947). For collection of the evidence tending to show past adherence to
violent methods see Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 11S (1943).
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provides that "adherence to or participation in the activities of any
clique, group, circle, faction or party which conspires or acts to subvert,
weaken or overthrow any or all institutions of American democracy,
whereby the majority of the American people can maintain their right
to determine their destinies in any degree, shall be punished by imme-
diate expulsion." 229 Nor does the Party admit to taking instructions
from abroad.23
On the other hand Congress and various of its Committees have fre-
quently taken the position that the Communist party of the United
States does constitute a conspiracy to overthrow the government by
illegal means, and is in fact the agent of a foreign power. The first
legislation based on this theory was the Emergency Relief Act of 1941,
which expressly prohibited relief employment to any "Communist"
or "member of any Nazi Bund organization. "231 Since then several
statutes, including the Taft-Hartley Act, have expressly imposed re-
strictions on members of the Communist Party upon similar grounds.2 "'
229. Constitution of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. Art. IX, § 2 (1945). See
also Preamble and Art. II, § 1.
230. Statement of William Z. Foster, Chairman of the Communist Party of the
United States, in ANDREWS, WASHINGTON WITCH HUNT 163, 202-3 (1948). In general
on the tactics and objectives of the Communist Party see O'NEAL AND WARNER, AMERI-
CAN COMMUNISM (1947); Moore, The Communist Party of the U.S.A. An Analysts of
a Social Movement, 39 Am. POL. Sc. REV. 31 (1945); Ward, The Communist Party and
the Ballot, 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 286 (1941); GITLOW, I CoNFESS (1940); BRWOWnR,
COMMUNISM, IN THE UNITED STATES (1935); FOSTER, TOWARD SOVIET AMERICA (1932);
H.R. REP. 209, COMaMITTE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, The Comttinist Party of the
United States as an Agent of a Foreign Power, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) ; H,R. REP.
1920, COMMITTEz ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, REPORT ON THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
THE UNITED STATES As AN ADVOCATE OF OVERTHROW OF GOVERNMENT BY FORCE AND
VIOLENCE, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H.R. Doc. No. 619, CoM Mirr ON FOREIN
AFFAIRS, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
See also Ellis, American Civil Rights in a Revohltionary Age-The Problem of Loyalty,
109 FORUM 193 (1948); Wechsler, How to Rid the Government of Communilsts, 195
HARPER's 438 (1947); Nevins, What is a Communist? How Cats You Spot Him? N.Y.
Times Magazine Section, May 2, 1948, p. 9.
231. H. J. Res. 544, June 26, 1940, Sec. 15 (f), 54 STAT. 611, 620. The Act did not
expressly find that the Communist Party advocates overthrow of the government by Il-
legal means, but this was clearly the basis of Congressional action. The provision was
declared invalid in United States v. Schneider, 45 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Wis. 1942).
232. Selective Service Act of September 16, 1940, 54 STAT, 892, 50 U.S.C. § 308 (1)
(see Justice Black's concurring opinion in Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 495-8
(1945), pointing out that such restrictions were unconstitutional as a bill of attainder) ;
Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 143, 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (Supp. July, 1947). The Taft-Hart-
ley provision has been held constitutional in National Maritime Union v. Herzog, 78
F. Supp. 146 (D.C..1948), aff'd as to §§ 159(f) and 159(g), 334 U.S. 854 (1948) ; Whole-
sale Workers Union v. Douds, 22 LAB. REL. REP. (Lab. Rel. Ref. Man.) 2276 (S.D.N.Y.
1948); Inland Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 22 LAB. REL. REP. (Lab.
Rel. Ref. Man.) 2506 (7th Cir. 1948). Cf. Oil Worlkers International Union v. Elliott,
73 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Tex. 1947). See also Note, Constitutionality of the Taft-Hartlcy
Non-Communist Affidavit Provision, 48 COL. L. REV. 253 (1948).
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The Committee on Un-American Actxities has consistently and vig-
orously urged this position..233 And the Mundt Bill, recently passed by
the House, contains a legislative finding to this effect.-34
The executive branch of the government has often made the same
determination. In 1940 the Civil Serice Commission ruled that mem-
bership in the Communist party or "any other Communist . . . or-
ganization" disqualified an indixidual from employment under Section
9A of the Hatch Act. 235 Similar rulings followed from the Attorney
General, 211 the Attorney General's Interdepartmental Committee on
Investigations, 237 and the President's Interdepartmental Committee
on Employee Investigations. 23 The President's Temporary Commis-
sion on Employee Loyalty agreed with this view. -23 The Department
of Justice recently initiated a series of deportation cases based upon
the same premise.2 -0 And the Communist Party was designated by
the Attorney General as an organization falling within the ban of
Executive Order 9835.21
Until recently the Department of Justice had made no effort to
prosecute the Communist Party or its members under the Alien Regis-
tration Act of 1940, the McCormack Act or the Voorhis Act.2 2 In
233. "The Communist movement is, in fact, a world-vde revolutionary political
movement, whose purpose is by treachery, deceit, infiltration, espionage, sabotage, ter-
rorism, and any other means, legal or illegal, to establish a Communist totalitarian
dictatorship in the United States, and all other countries of the world which will he
subservient to the master conspirators in Moscow." Rroar OF SUn-Con*= .cx o-;
LEGISLATION OF THE C0313nTTEE ON UN,-AMIERmCAN AcrIITrIES o:: Proros. Lr.isLEAb:I
To CONTROL SuavmslvF CommumINsT Acrnms IN rTHE UxrraD STATES 1-2 (1948).
See also the reports of the committees cited supra note 230.
234. H.R. 5852, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., passed the House May 19, 1948. See supra
p. 21.
235. Departmental Circular No. 222, issued June 20, 1940, supra p. 14.
236. Letter from the Attorney General, H.R. Doec. No. 833, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 19
(1942).
237. Id. at 20.
238. See Letter of Attorney General Clark to Loyalty Review Board, PM[, Dec. 5,
1947, p. 7.
239. REPORT OF THE PREsrDENT's TEmoRAREY Comuissmx ON EmpLoY-,E LOYALTY 21,
24 (1947).
240. Testimony of Attorney General Clark in Hearings before Sub-Commillee on
Legislation of the Committee on Un-American Actiitles on HR. 4422 and HR. 45S1,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1948). During the months February through May of 1943 the
Justice Department arrested more than 100 alleged alien Communists for deportation.
PMf, June 2, 1948, p. 9, col. 5. See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
241. PM, Dec. 5, 1947, p. 7, col. 1. See also Letter from Attorney General Clar!:
to the Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1943, p. 12, col. 5.
For the FBI view see Menace of Communism, Statement of J. Edgar Hoover bafore the
Committee on Un-American Activities, SEN. Doc. No. 26, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 26,
1947).
242. See supra pp. 27-8.
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July of 1948, however, the government obtained an indictment from a
Federal grand jury in New York charging 12 top officials in the Com-
munist Party with conspiracy in violation of the Alien Registration
Act. The indictment alleged that the defendants conspired "to organize
as the Communist Party of the United States a society, group and
assembly of persons who teach and advocate the overthrow and de-
struction of the Government of the United States by force and violence,
and knowingly and wilfully to advocate and teach the duty and neces-
sity of overthrowing and destroying the Government of the United
States by force and violence." 243 It is to be noted that the indictment
is limited to teaching and advocating overthrow of the government by
force and violence, and makes no charge of the actual use of force or
violence.
The Supreme Court has never squarely decided whether an adequate
factual basis exists to support the repeated legislative and executive
determinations as to the nature of the Communist Party. 244 Ulti-
mately the Court must make this decision. 241 Meanwhile, in view of
243. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1948, p. 1, col. S.
244. The nearest approach to a ruling on the issue has been in Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943). In that case the government sued to cancel Schneiderman's
certificate of citizenship, granted 12 years before, on the ground that Schnelderman was
not "attached to the principles of the Constitution" at the time of his naturalization. The
government contended, among other things, that Schneiderman had been a member of the
Communist Party (then called the Workers Party) and that the Communist Party ad-
vocated overthrow of the government by force and violence. The District Court upheld
the government on this point and cancelled the certificate. The Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. In its decision the Court examined the evidence
which the government had produced to show that the Communist Party advocated the
use of force and violence up to 1927, the date of naturalization, and refused to find the
evidence sufficient to support the government's position. However, the Court also refused
to decide "what interpretation of the Party's attitude toward force and violence is the
most probable on the basis of the present record" (Id. at 158). It rested its decision on the
narrow ground that where two interpretations were possible the courts will not cancel a
certificate of citizenship "by imputing the reprehensible interpretation to a member of the
organization in the absence of overt acts indicating that such was his interpretation" (1d.
at 158-9). See also Kessler v. Stecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939) ; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S,
135 (1945).
The decisions of the lower Federal courts-most of them upholding administrative
findings that the Communist Party advocates overthrow of the government by force and
violence-are cbllected in the Schneiderman opinion, 320 U.S. 147-8, and in H.R. R:',
No. 1920, COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, REPORT ON THE COIMUNIST PARit
OF THE UNITED STATES AS AN ADVOCATE OF OVERTHROW OF GOVERNMENT Dy FORCE AND
VIOLENCE, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 138-44 (1948). See also Note, Conslifutionalily of the
Taft-Hartley Non-Communist Affidavit Provision, 48 COL. L. REV. 253, 259-61; Note,
Restraints on American Communist Activities, 96 U. OF PA. L. REV. 381 (1948).
245. Conceivably the factual basis necessary to support legislative or executive ac-
tion might depend upon the type of action involved. Thus proof rcquired to justify a
withdrawal of naturalization, legislation removing the Communist Party from the ballot;
or making membership therein illegal, might be greater than that required to sustain
[Vol. S8: 1
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the consistent position of Congress and the Administration, we will
assume for purposes of this article that the views of these branches of
government with respect to the aims of the Communist Party are
correct.
On this assumption the presence of Communist Party members in
government service would constitute a clear danger. The degree of the
danger depends, of course, upon the number present, the nature of the
positions held, and similar factors. Reliable information on these mat-
ters is, once again, difficult to obtain.
Since enactment of the Hatch Act in 1939 it has, of course, been
unlawful for members of the Communist Party to hold positions in the
executive branch of the government. It would be idle to speculate
about the dangers which might have developed in the absence of the
Hatch Act prohibition. We are concerned therefore with the evidence
disclosing the presence of Communist employees in the government in
spite of the Hatch Act. Was the danger so extensive as to require addi-
tional measures, such as those promulgated in the Loyalty Order?
Broad generalizations of the Committee on Un-Amuerican Activities,
such as that the Communist Party is "firmly entrenched in . . .the
Government," 246 are not supported by proof and, for reasons already
stated, are entitled to small credence..2 14 The principal evidence of a
detailed character emanating from the Committee came in the Cham-
bers-Bentley hearings. But the reliability of much of the Committee's
evidence is open to serious question. In any event all but two of the
persons mentioned were no longer in Federal employment at the time
of the hearings, and these tvo had been suspended.
2 41
In November 1947 J. Edgar Hoover stated:
"The Communist Party has long regarded infiltration of the
Government Service as a project carrying the highest priority.
They have sought to accomplish this under the guise of secrecy.
Several months ago high officials of the Party, recognizing the
growing sentiment against the Party and anticipating vigorous
protective action, issued instructions that Party members in the
Government and in other strategic positions were not to attend
Party organizational meetings. Informal social meetings which
could not be identified as Communist meetings were permitted.
Party members in the Government and in other strategic positions
were ordered to destroy their Party membership cards and under
no consideration were their names to be carried on Party rolls nor
disqualification from government Compare Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S.
118 (1943) with United States v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). See dissenting opinion of
Judge Prettyman in National Maritime Union v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146, 183 (D.C
1948).
246. H.R. REP. 209, op. cit. supra note 230, at 1.
247. See supra pp. 53-5.
248. See supra pp. 21-6.
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were they to be openly contacted by high Party functionaries. This
emphasis upon secrecy, it appears to me, is a confession on the part
of the Communists that they have something to conceal." 24
The inference from this statement is that a number of Communist
Party members still hold government positions, despite the FBI's
efforts to root them out. But Hoover does not tell how many Com-
munists he believes are in the government or how serious from a quan-
titative point of view he considers the danger to be. On the contrary
he falls back to the same position noted above,-that the existence of a
single Communist in the government is a serious menace:
"One person whose loyalty to the Communist cause exceeded his
loyalty to the United States properly placed could do irreparable
harm to our security and should there ever be another grave emer-
gency he could conceivably be responsible for the loss of American
lives." 210
Neither the Report of the President's Temporary Commission on
Employee Loyalty nor the other evidence summarized above reveals
the existence of widespread Communist infiltration.
211
Upon all the information available it seems reasonable to conclude
that the presence of Communists in Federal employment was not a
matter of serious proportions at the time of issuance of the Loyalty
Order.252
1 249. N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 16, 1947, p. 44, col. 3. For a similar statement sea
Menace of Communism, op. cit. supra note 241, at 8.
250. Ibid.
251. Dean Edwin D. Dickinson, who was closely connected with the loyalty activities
of the Department of Justice during the war period, writes: "Actually we have never
had many [Communists or genuine fellow travellers in the public service] and those whom
we have suffered have been with singularly few exceptions the small and inconsequential
fry of a rapidly expanding bureaucracy." Dickinson, Political Subversives: An Appraisal
of Recent Experience and Forecast of Things to Come, 2 REcORD OF THE ASSoCIATIoX OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 350, 357 (1947).
252. Attorney General Clark has repeatedly insisted that there are no Communists
in the government at the present time. Challenging his Republican critics during the
election campaign in the fall of 1948 to name any Communists in Federal employment,
he said:
"I pleaded with them for many months to do this; but at this time I have
not received one name from them. While highly paid investigators have used
millions of dollars of the people's money, as yet they have failed to uncover one
Communist presently working for the Federal Government." N.Y. Times, Sept.
19, 1948, p. 26, col. 1.
Shortly aftervards President Truman said:
"Our Government is not endangered by Communist infiltration. It has preserved
its integrity, and it will continue to preserve its integrity as long as I'm Presl-
dent." N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1948, p. 25, col. 1.
[Vol. 58. f
HeinOnline -- 58 Yale L. J. 66 1948-1949
1948] LOYALTY AMONG GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 67
VI. ADMiINISTRATIVE IMPLIcATIONS OF THE LOYALTY PROGRAM[
The administrative features of a loyalty program deserve careful
scrutiny. Even if the information were available, the impact of the
program could not be judged exclusively by an examination of those
cases where all formal procedures were completed and the employee
was finally cleared or dismissed from government service. Perhaps
even more significant is the day-to-day functioning of the elaborate
machinery out of which the formal results are eventually culled. This
involves a consideration of such matters as the size of the staff utilized
in the program, the character of the investigations made, the informal
and practical effects of the program's operation, the atmosphere en-
gendered, and the effect upon the morale of employees and upon the
efficient performance of government functions.
These administrative implications assume particular significance in
a program of the character now being pursued. Protection against
actual espionage, sabotage, the existence of an illegal underground
conspiracy, or the presence of employees who operate under instruc-
tions from a foreign power, requires one kind of operation. Such dan-
gers come, by and large, from a small number of persons who infiltrate
into key positions. They involve mostly the commission of overt acts,
subject to traditional methods of detection and proof. In general the
danger from these sources is most effectively met through a small
staff of highly trained counter-espionage agents or the adoption of
special clearance procedures as a condition of access to vital secret
information.
A different type of administration is needed to carry out a program
based upon eliminating from government service persons who have
committed none of these overt acts but who may do so in the future.
Detection of the "potentially disloyal" requires an initial screening and
continuous surveillance of all applicants and employees. It entails the
maintenance of a large investigative force which can obtain informa-
tion from all possible sources about the daily life and thoughts of
numerous individuals who depart in some way from the established
norm. 2
53
For administration of the Loyalty Order the President asked for a
budget of $24,900,000 for the first year; Congress allowed $11,000,000
253. Note the statement in the REPORT OF THE PREsrEN's TEv,.-Ay Cou-fxsslo:-
ox E,,PLOYEE LOYALTY 23 (1947): "Whatever their number [i.e., the "dislo-al group"],
the internal security of the government demands continuous screcning, scrutiny and sur-
veillance of present and prospective employees." To the same effect see testimony of
Arthur S. Flemming, then member of the Civil Service Commission, Hcarings before
Committee on Post Offce and Civil Serzice on H. R. 35S8, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 ct seq.
(1947) ; Statement of Seth AV. Richardson, Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 28, 1947, p. 28, col. 2.
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for the first year and $6,606,000 for the second.2 " This compares with
a budget of $2,991,000 for the National Labor Relations Board, with a
staff of 1033 employees; a budget of $5,560,000 for the Federal Com-
munications Commission, with a staff of 1422 employees; a budget of
$2,519,120 for the Federal Trade Commission, with a staff of 582 em-
ployees.
255
In addition the Loyalty Order stipulates that each government
agency "should develop and maintain, for the collection and analysis of
information relating to the loyalty of its employees and prospective
employees, a staff specially trained in security techniques." "I The
very existence of an investigating system of these proportions, main-
tained for inquiry into political expression, is cause for the gravest
concern.
The authority of the FBI to undertake an investigation is, for all
practical purposes, unlimited. Investigations may be commenced if
the preliminary check of any employee or applicant reveals "derog-
atory information." 257 Any agency may likewise request the FBI to
undertake the investigation of any applicant or employee.2 11 In addi-
tion the FBI investigates on its own motion in any case where it re-
ceives "information or a complaint which, if established, would come
within the Directive set forth in the President's Executive Order." 259
Adequate information concerning the investigative methods of the
FBI and other government intelligence services is not obtainable, Re-
ports are, of course, kept confidential. But certain facts are available
which illustrate the dangers inevitable in loyalty investigations.
An extreme example of the sort of information which the FBI, at
least during one period, considered worth assembling is furnished by
the famous letter addressed by J. Edgar Hoover to J. Warren Madden,
then Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board. The complete
letter is as follows:
"I wish to advise you information has been received by this
Bureau to the effect that Mr. [X], a field examiner connected with
the National Labor Relations Board at is known to have
radical tendencies leadinig toward Communism.
"It is further reported that [X] has studied anthropology and
has been affiliated with the National Labor Relations Board for
three years.
254. Supra p. 32.
255. THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERtNMENT FOR TEE FISCAL YEaR ENDING
JuNE 30, 1948, pp. 115-6, 89-90, 96-7 (1947).
256. Exec. Order 9835, Pt. IV, Sec. 3, 12 FED. REG. 1935, 1938 (1947).
257. See supra notes 138, 139.
258. Exec. Order 9835, Pt. I, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947). See also testimony of J. Edgar
Hoover before House Appropriations Committee, Hearings on Department of Justice At-
propriation Bill, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 248-9 (1947).
259. Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 16, 1947, p. 42, col. 3.
[Vol. 58: 1
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"It was also reported that [X] visited Mexico City, Mexico, to
observe the presidential election in that country, in July, 1940.
"The above information is submitted for your consideration and
whatever action you deem appropriate.
(s) J. Edgar Hoover"
More recent examples of information considered relevant by the
FBI, though not involving government employees, have been fur-
nished by Commissioner Clifford J. Durr of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission:
"It therefore seems to me that it is of little help to the Commis-
sion to be informed that an applicant was, in 1944, at the height of
the war, reported by an unidentified source as being in contact
with another unidentified individual 'who was suspected of possible
pro-Russian activity'; or that the applicant was reported by an
unidentified informant to have been a visitor in the residence of
another individual who was reported by another unidentified
source to have been identified by still another unidentified source
with Communistic activities; or that it has been reported by an
unidentified source that several members of the Board of Directors
of an organization with which the applicant is connected have been
reported by another unidentified source as being associated with the
Communist movement; . . .or that another unidentified source
has described such organization 'as a Communist infiltrated and/or
influenced organization'; or that another organization politically
active in support of the Democratic presidential nominee 'has
been reportedly subjected to Communist infiltration'; . . . or
that an unidentified 'reliable source' has provided a reprint of an
article written by the applicant and originally carried in the New
Republic, which article 'is reported to be an indictment of anti-
labor radio broadcasts, including news commentators and sponsors
of such programs'; . .. or that the applicant has been reported
by an unidentified source to have been a member of the committee
to greet the late president of a large labor union; or that an appli-
cant spoke at a testimonial dinner for the retiring president of a
lawyers' organization; or that the applicant spoke on a forum on
American-Russian Cultural Exchange sponsored by Phi Beta
Kappa." 261
In another case, known personally to one of the authors, the FBI
260. Letter dated Nov. 14, 1940. Hearings Before the Special Conmnttce to Invstigate
the National Labor Relations Board, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., vol. 23, pp. 7296-7 (1940).
261. Statement of Clifford J. Durr, from minutes of Commission action on letter to
J. Edgar Hoover, Dec. 1, 1947, pp. 1-2 (mimeographed); reported in PM, DMc. 2,
1947, p. 4, coL 1-3. Commissioner Durr's statement xas made in connection with the
F.C.C.'s action in writing Hoover that the Commission desired to continue to receive
from the FBI "information concerning matters within the jurisdiction of the Commission."
Commissioner Jones also filed a separate statement tadng issue with Commissioner Durr
and charging that the material referred to by the latter was "completely out of context."
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report included a statement from the landlady of the subject under in-
vestigation asserting that the subject kept a number of books on
Russia next to his easy chair; and a statement from the subject's
doctor to the effect that the subject believed in socialized medicine.
A further indication of the same type of investigation appears in
the list of reasons given by the War Department for dismissal of one
of its employees:
"Mrs. [Y] lived for approximately ten months in a boarding
house at 1736 P Street, Northwest, from about October 1936 to
June 1937, and that her landlady's interest was aroused by her
frequent meetings held in her rooms.
"Later Mrs. [Y's] mailing address coincided with that of an
organization, some of the members of which are generally con-
sidered to have beliefs detrimental to the interests of National
Defense.
"Mrs. [Y] subsequently lived at 2106 F Street, Northwest, from
which place she was requested to move because she insisted upon
holding mixed meetings of radical groups of people in her apart-
ment.
"Mrs. [Y] then moved to 2316 F Street, Northwest, where she
lived for approximately ten months. She and the people living
with her were generally considered to be Communists by neighbors,
and they held mixed meetings of radical groups of people, dis-
tributed handbills, and possessed communistic literature.
"After this, Mrs. [Y] lived in a small apartment at 5410 Third
Street, Northwest, where she received communistic literature ad-
dressed to her and to other girls with whom she lived and who were
all considered by the neighbors to be communists." 22
An investigation of this character obviously has neither logic nor
limitb. It embraces not only membership and activity in organizations,
including labor unions, but private beliefs, reading habits, receipt of
mail, associations and personal affairs. According to persistent reports
investigators have asked such questions as: What newspapers do you
read? Do you read the New Republic? What do you think of Henry
Wallace? Did you contribute to the Spanish Loyalists? Did you ever
discuss the relative merits of the United States' and Russia's economic
and social systems? How do you feel about Russia's economic and
social systems? How do you feel about Russia and what she is doing
in the United Nations? Are you in favor of appeasement? Do you
think we should share the atomic bomb? Are you in favor of racial
segregation? Why were you divorced? Can you think of anything bad
to say about him? 263
262. Quoted in letter from Hugh Miller to Secretary of War Stimson, dated
March 3, 1941, issued by Washington Committee for Democratic Action.
263. The statements in this paragraph are based in part upon memoranda in the pos-
session of the authors prepared by employees immediately after investigation or hearing,
[Voi. 58: 1
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FBI methods include the use of paid informers.u-4 Persons making
statements are not under oath and are assured that their identity will
not be revealed.26 - The reports transmitted to the employing agency
usually refer to the source of information by symbols only. -  Although
the FBI denies that it taps telephones,2- 7 instances of that practice
have been reported and it is widely believed in Washington that many
telephones are in fact tapped.26 3 The FBI maintains files on numerous
individuals,269 and the Loyalty Order directs the Civil Service Com-
mission to keep a master index of all information obtained with respect
to Federal employees. 2 0
The FBI asserts that its investigators are carefully trained, that
they are instructed to get all the facts on both sides, that they are not
to inquire whether a Federal employee reads liberal or other publica-
tions, that they are directed to point out any personal bias of persons
giving information, and that they do not violate civil rights.2 ' Mr.
in part upon reports of Jerry Kluttz, in the Washington Post, quoted in Cushman, The
President's Loyalty Purge, 36 SuRvEY GRAPHIC 283, (1947) ; Ale.ander Uhl, PMf, Aug.
17, 1947, p. 2; Eugene Warner, Washington Times Herald, Nov. 22, 1940; Henry F.
Pringle, Snooping on the Potomac, SArTmD.Y EVENING Post, Jan. 15, 1944, pp. 9, 93-4;
Carroll Kilpatrick, Washington Worry-Go-Round, '48 MAGAzInE, March 1943, pp. 126-32.




267. Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, N.Y. Herald Tribune Nov. 16, 1947, p. 42, col. 4.
268. ".... telephone wires in the room of Harry Bridges in the Edison Hotel in New
York City, having interstate connections, were tapped by agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation from August 5, 1941, to August 22, 1941, so that communications by tele-
phone were intercepted and heard by agents of the FBI." Sears, In the Matter of Harry
Renton Bridges, Memorandum of Decision 183-4 (1941). See also Kilpatrick, op. cit.
supra note 263, at 127, 132; Richards, Is Your Phone Tapped?, N.Y. Star, Sept. 27, 26,
29, 30, and Oct. 1, 1948.
For criticisms of FBI methods in the past see CHAFE, FnEUOnr op" SeFr.ci I-: TH
UNrrE STArEs 204-18 (1941) ; 9 Int'l Jurid. Ass'n Bull. 97 (1941) ; S Int'l Jurid. Ass'n
Bull. 104 (1940) ; NATIONAL PopuLRa GovEtNm Tr Lr GuE, RErC=r ON TII ILLEGAL Ac-
TIVITIES OF THE U. S. DEPARTmE-NT OF JUSTICE (May 1920) ; Illegal Practices of the De-
partment of Justice, Hearings before the Sub-Cominittee of the Senate Judiciary Com-
nittee, 66th Cong., 3d Sess. (1921) ; Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 1920).
269. Statement of J. Edgar H{oover, Herald Tribune, Nov. 16, 1947, p. 43, col. 4.
Hoover testified before the House Appropriations Committee that the FBI files "include
everybody who had been involved in any activities of a subversive nature," or who "would
be potentially dangerous." Hearings on Department of Justice .4ppropriation Bill, 20th
Cong., 2d Sess. 248 (1947).
270. Exec. Order 9835, Pt. III, See. 2, 12 Fu. REG. 1935, 193S (1947). The Committee
on Un-American Activities maintains files on more than one million individuals and or-
ganizations. H.R. REP. No. 2748, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1943) ; see also H.R. Rm. No.
2742, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1947). See Sancton, Dossiers for the Millions, 167 NA-
ToN 336 (1948).
271. Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 16, 1947, pp. 42-3. For
instructions to Civil Service Commission investigators see 89 CONG. Rme. 1023-5 (1943).
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Hoover also states that "we always check on allegations of improper
conduct on the part of our agents." 272 And the Chairman of the
Loyalty Review Board has testified to "the general public confidence
in the Federal Bureau of Investigation." 213
Nevertheless, in large part the abuses revealed in the history of
loyalty investigations are inherent in the character of the enterprise.
The results sought-screening out of the "potentially disloyal"-
necessarily lead to the kind of questions asked and information col-
lected. The average FBI agent can hardly be expected to possess the
political education necessary to distinguish between "radicalism" and
"subversion"; he must be instructed to secure all scraps of information
available. The collection of gossip, rumor, and data on private affairs
becomes an inevitable part of the process. Errors and abuses are par-
ticularly difficult to weed out of secret investigations.
Furthermore one must take into account certain ineluctable laws of
large organizations. A sizable staff of investigators is prone to develop
aggressive methods and a prosecutor's bias. Efficiency ratings tend to
turn upon how much "derogatory information" a particular investiga-
tor uncovers. This sort of bias is even more likely to flourish where the
results of investigation are not subject to judicial scrutiny. Nor can
one normally expect to spend $11,000,000 in the Federal government
without some results to show for it, particularly when members of
Congress are clamoring for action. Thus there are constant pressures
created out of the very existence of the loyalty program driving toward
militant investigation and tangible results.
The dangers inherent in the investigating process are found also in
the proceedings before the loyalty boards. Again adequate information
is difficult to obtain. But the following charges filed against scientists
at the Oak Ridge atomic energy operation' suffice to illuminate the
problem:
"CASE I
"1. A former landlord of yours has reported that in 1943, after
you moved from the premises in which you had been residing cer-
tain magazines and pamphlets which may have been left on the
premises by you may have included a copy of the magazine New
Masses.
"2. A neighbor has stated that she believes (a close relative of
yours by marriage) is a Communist.
"3. (Another close relative by marriage) was reported in 1944 to
have been active on the Committee of the Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee. The Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com-
272. Ibid. But cf. Pringle, op.cit. supra note 263, at 94: "It is almost impossible, how-
ever, to get evidence on the misconduct or stupidity of their agents. Terrified employees
are not likely to come forward. The Hoover-Flemming strictures are repeatedly violated,"
273. Richardson statement, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1947, p. 28, col. 6.
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mittee is on the list of organizations designated by the Attorney-
General as subversive.
"4. (Still another close relative by marriage) is reported to
admit membership in the Camp, which organization
has been reported to have communistic connections.
"CASE II
"1. A person with whom you associated closely in the years
1943-47 said you were very enthusiastic about Russia and seemed
to be pro-Russian in your point of view." 274
Equally significant are the following extracts from a loyalty board
hearing involving a manual worker at a government navy yard:
Bd.: Have you ever belonged to or participated in the activities of
organizations, clubs, or associations which were or are sympa-
thetic to Communist doctrines?
M.: I don't know if this is sympathetic. I have belonged to the
C.I.O.
Bd.: Which branch?
M.: The local union in the Yard.
Bd.: In your recollection, do you recall ever discussing any topic
which might be sympathetic to Communist doctrine?
M.: Yes,
Bd.: Would you care to state what it was and who it was made to?
M.: I have been sick for years and so I have discussed what they
call nationalized medicine. I have been thinking about that
for a long time. I would like free medicine.
Bd.: Have you ever spoken favorably about the Russian form of
government?
M.: On that point, yes.
Bd.: I mean aside from that.
M.: No.
Bd.: Have you read any of Feuchtwanger?
M.: No.
Bd.: Howard Fast?
M.: I don't know him. Never heard of him.
Bd.: What kind of books did you get from them? [Literary Guild
Book Club]
M.: There was quite a few, mostly fiction.
Bd.: Do you recall any of the authors other than what I have men-
tioned? . ..
274. The Charges Prescnted in Oak Ridge Cases, 4 BuLL. oF Tim ATo.-c Scmr,"nsx
196 (1948). Similar charges against an employee of a private contractor are summarized
in N.Y. Star, Oct. 22, 1948, p. 1, col. 5, Oct. 24, 1948, p. 1, col. 1.
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Bd.: Your wife is a church-goer?
M.: That's right.
Bd.: I understand that you are a Protestant.
M.: Yes.
Bd.: Do either you or your wife have any relations who are sym-
pathetic to Communist doctrine?
M.: No. They are all religious-Roman Catholic. I am Protes-
tant and my daughter joined the Roman Catholic Church.
They are all religious.
Bd.: What do you think of the third party formed by Henry Wal-
lace?
M.: I don't know. I don't think there is anything to it. I don't
think it will ever become a party.
Bd.: He has some of the Democrats worried from what I read in the
newspapers.
M.: Well, I would vote for Truman any day, as long as you people
know that I am a Democrat.
Bd.: Have you ever discussed the Truman doctrine?
M.: Yes, a little bit.
Bd.: What do you think of it?
M.: Well, I went fifty-fifty on that. 275
Other questions included:
Do you think the political structure in Greece has improved since
that time?
What do you think of the Italian situation?
What do you think of Togliatti?
To what do you attribute the recent swing to the "left" in France?
Do you feel that Jacques Duclos or DeGaulle would offer France a
greater opportunity for recuperation?
Do you think the Soviet was justified in taking back that part of
Finland?
Do you think the recent election in Poland was democratic? 210
In another case the employee was asked by the loyalty board:
Is it true that you were present at a meeting of radicals in Madison
Sq. Garden during the war?
Have you ever associated with any employees who, because of
their political tendencies, might be considered Communist?
275. Transcript of hearing in the case of M-, before Brooklyn Navy Yard Loyalty
Board, February, 1948. M was found disloyal. His case is being appealed.
276. Ibid.
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Do you now have or were any of your relatives active in Com-
munist Party activities?
Which newspaper do you read?
Are you a member of the Progressive Citizens of America?
Have you attended any of their meetings?
Do you subscribe to their literature?
Did you ever attend any social affairs with your wifL--organizations
or associations where Communist Party doctrines were discussed?
Or liberal views were discussed?
Would you say that your wife has liberal political viewpoints? 217
The procedures employed by the loyalty boards, discussed in a subse-
quent section, contribute to the general effect of the program. Thus,
the refusal to inform an accused employee of the evidence against him
creates a pervading influence of secrecy and fear.
The administrative impact of the loyalty program is also directly
dependent, of course, upon the strictness with which the standards of
loyalty are applied in concrete cases. When employees are dismissed
on vague charges of membership in "front" organizations, association
with individuals or groups labelled "subversive," or advocacy of "sub-
versive ideas," the stories spread through the government service,
often in exaggerated form, and darken the atmosphere in which the
government employee lives and works. 8
It is necessary, also, to take into account the cases which are handled
on an informal basis without application of the formal standards or
procedures. In the administration of any law many, often most, deci-
277. Transcript of hearing in the case of R-, before the Brooklyn Navy Yard Loyalty
Board, December 1947. R vras found disloyal. His case is being appealed. For a news-
paper account of a hearing at which similar questions were asked see N.Y. Star, Oct. 24,
1948, p. 1, cal. 1.
278. Consider the effect on government employees of the discharge of tvo meientists
employed by the Atomic Energy Commission, as reported in 'Miller and Brown, Loyally
Procedures of the A.E.C., 4 Buu.EUm oF THE ATomic ScIENrlsTs 45 (1948) : "During
the procedure neither man was informed of the charges against him. The intimation w-as
made to one of the men that it might be 'associations' rather than loyalty. The intimation
,as made to the other man that in his case it might be 'character' rather than loyalty.
A representative of the A.E.C. is reported by one of the men to have elaborated on this
by stating in substance that the Commission was attempting to see into the future and
predict his actions in time of 'serious stress,' on the basis of his previous behavior, spe-
cifically in regard to his ability to keep important secrets."
Significant of the atmosphere in Washington was the resignation of John C. Virden,
Cleveland industrialist, from his position as head of the Office of Industry Cooperation
in the Department of Commerce after Congressional attack on the ground that his daugh-
ter was employed by Tass, the Soviet news agency. Virden and his daughter had had a
"complete break" some months before. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1948, p. 17, col. 7. Upan
receiving the support of the Secretary of Commerce and President Truman, Virden sub-
sequently ithdrew his resignation, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1948, p. 10, col. 5.
See also the accounts of the various Washington reporters cited sufra note 263;
Arnold, How Not to Get lnvestigatcd, 197 I-AhRP's 61 (1948).
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sions are made outside the scope of formal action. So tinder a loyalty
program, employees resign rather than submit to formal investigation,
are dismissed ostensibly on grounds other than loyalty, or are urged
to withdraw rather than risk formal dismissal.
270
The cumulative influence of all these factors bears heavily upon the
average government employee. He must, of course, avoid at all costs
activity which may bring him within the area of disqualification estab-
lished by the program. But more important, he must avoid even the
appearance or suspicion of such activity. He is acutely aware that an
FBI investigation can be initiated upon the basis of a complaint made
by any unfriendly or psychopathic acquaintance. He knows that such
an inquiry means probing among his friends, neighbors, enemies and
business acquaintances. And he knows also that any "derogatory in-
formation," not to say rumor and gossip, will be permanently re-
corded. 20 This may well mean that he will be the first to go at the next
tightening of the loyalty standards. Similarly, few government work-
ers want to take the risk of incurring a hearing before a loyalty board.
It involves time, energy, intense nervous strain and insecurity. More,
it leaves a stigma which even exoneration cannot entirely wipe out.
For these reasons the normal government worker, faced with such
conditions, avoids joining organizations, attending meetings, asso-
ciating with others, reading literature, or holding views that might be
considered questionable.2 x He shrinks from making unorthodox
proposals in his work or suggesting experimentation. He is under
constant pressure to conform to the conventional and safe. He is
placed in fear of exhibiting the very qualities most sought after by
competent administrators in private industry as well as in government.
Equal pressures play upon the employing officials. It is not ad-
visable to have too many subordinates who are under suspicion.
The total impact upon morale in the Federal service has been well
described by John Lord O'Brian, speaking out of his own experience:
"No one familiar with the administration of a government de-
partment, however, can doubt that the mere existence of any law
or order authorizing secret investigations will encourage suspicion,
distrust, gossip, malevolent talebearing, character assassination
and a general undermining of morale." 282
279. See, e.g., Loyalty Clearance Procedures in Research Laboratories, 4 BULL. OF Tin
ATo ic SCIENTISTS 111, 112 (1948).
280. An amusing illustration of the reaction to a government personnel investigation
is afforded by the anguished protests of Congressman Hoffman and Busbey to the news
that the Civil Service Commission files contained information about them. As a result
of their vigorous objection the Commission agreed to destroy these records. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 8, 1947, p. 8, col. 3.
281. See, e.g., New Republic, May 26, 1947, p. 30: "But the witch hunt is hotter now;
many government workers were afraid to attend a dinner of the Southern Conference
for Human Welfare a few weeks ago."
282. O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, 61 HARv. L. Rav. 592, 598
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Similarly the administration of a loyalty program has a profound
effect upon recruitment for government service. Under the Loyalty
Order any applicant whose name is listed unfavorably in the files of the
Committee on Un-American Activities is at once a suspect and subject
to an intensive FBI investigation. Applicants are also fully aware of
the possibility of running afoul of the program at any point in their
government career. Both factors discourage individuals of independent
and vigorous views from seeking or accepting positions in the govern-
ment.
Exclusion on an informal basis undoubtedly plays a particularly
significant role in the case of applicants. Where "derogatory infor-
mation" appears in an applicant's record, or where the FBI inves-
tigation reveals such information, there is a strong tendency for employ-
ing officials to drop the matter at that point without carrying the case
through the formal procedures.2 3 It is unlikely that there will be an
extensive use of the formal procedures in the case of prospective
employees. In effect this places a veto power on government employ-
ment in the hands of the FBI.
That these effects of a strict loyalty program are not illusory or
fictitious is attested by numerous reliable reporters of the Washington
scene, both within and without the government. One of the earliest to
call attention to the dangers was Attorney General Biddle, reporting
on the first comprehensive FBI investigation in 1942:
"It is inevitable that such sweeping investigations should take on
an appearance of inquisitorial action alien to our traditions. They
create disturbance and unrest, hurt esprit de corps, and produce a
feeling of uneasiness and insecurity. This impression is heightened
by the occasional complaint which has obviously been inspired by
the jealousy or malice of a fellow employee who knows that his
identity as an informant will remain undisclosed." -34
Henry F. Pringle, writing on the problem in 1944, concluded:
"The effect of all this on Washington nerves, drawn taut already
by congestion and shortages, has been catastrophic in some cases.
(1948). The intimate relationship between morale and discipline has been noted by lead-
ig students of public administration. See, e.g., MorsTmIN AIaRx (E.), E".a .,?s OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ch. 21 (1946); MOSHEsR AND KI NGSLY, PUDUc PE-so:;.NE.
AD.INISTRATION ch. 17 (1936). The Federal employee views the loyalty program as
part of the disciplinary process.
283. See, e.g., Kilpatrick, op. cit. supra note 263, at 127 ct seq.
284. Letter from the Attorney General, H.R. Doc. 033, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1942).
The Attorney General's Interdepartmental Committee reached the same ccnclusion: "The
nature and scope of the project have been such as to require a method of reporting in-
formation gathered from anonymous sources which is satisfactory neither to the employ-
ing departments or agencies, the employees investigated, nor to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation." Id. at 27.
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"The result has been that harassed and badgered employees
work less efficiently or resign in disgust. The Government is
denied men and women it sorely needs." 285
Congressman Sabath, during the debate on the Rees bill, charged
that "Federal employees are living now in an atmosphere of fear and
apprehension." 2s And Professor Robert E. Cushman, a close student
of government affairs, sounded the same warning shortly after pro-
mulgation of the Loyalty Order:
", . . there ip grave danger that the new program, even under
the most favorable circumstances, will have a shattering effect upon
the morale of the federal service. It will create an atmosphere of
constant surveillance and suspicion. Every vigorous, liberal-
minded employee, especially among these who associated them-
selves with the social philosophy of the New Deal, will have real
cause to worry whether suspicion is going to fall upon him." 287
The impact of the loyalty program has been particularly serious
among scientists employed by the government or on government
financed projects. The evidence is overwhelming that loyalty investi-
gations, both under the Administration's loyalty program and by the
Committee on Un-American Activities, have seriously impaired the
morale and effectiveness of government scientists and have driven many
of them from Federal service."'8
It is true that the Loyalty Order, in setting up uniform procedures
285. Pringle, op. cit. supra note 263, at 93.
286. 93 Cong. Rec. 8943 (1947).
287. Cushman, The President's Loyalty Purge, 36 Sunvy GRAPilIc 283, 284 (1947).
For similar statements as to the effect of the loyalty program see I. F. Stone, PM, July
2, 1947, p. 2, PM, Oct. 26, 1947, p. 20; Representative Kefauver, 93 CoNa. Rre. 8945
(1947) ; Hanson W. Baldwin, N.Y. Times Mar. 2, 1948, p. 8, col. 3; Kilpatrilk, op.eit,
supra note 263, at 132; Speech of Commissioner Clifford Durr of the F.C.C. before the
National Citizens Conference on Civil Liberties, April 14, 1948. But cf. Ellis, American
Civil Rights in a Revolutionary Age-The Problem of Loyalty, 109 FoRut 193 (1948);
Wechsler, How to Rid the Government of Communists, 195 HA'reR's 438 (1947).
288. Compton, Science Fears an Iron Curtain, 36 NATIoN's BUSINESS 47 (June 1948);
Engle, Fear in Our Laboratories, 166 NATION 63 (1948); Gehman, Oak Ridge Mlitch
Hunt, NEW REPUBLIC, July 5, 1948, p. 12; Star, Loyalty Investigations, A Poll of Atotmic
Scientists, 4 BULL. OF THE ATOMIc SCIENTIsTs 218 (1948); Loyalty Clearance Pro-
cedures in Research Laboratories, 4 BULL. OF THE ATomic SCIENTISTS 111 (1948) ; N.Y.
Times, Sept. 19, 1948, § 4, p. 7, col. 1; Deutch, Smears Drive A-Experts into Industry,
N.Y. Star, Sept. 16, 1948, p. 2, col. 1 ; speech of President Truman, Sept. 14, 1948, p, 1,
col. 1; How Far Should Military Censorship Extend, 4 BULL OF THE ATOMIC ScI:E4nST3
163 (1948) ; letter of 8 leading atomic scientists to President Truman, N.Y. Times, Sept.
7, 1948, p. 20, col. 2; PM, Apr. 23, 1948, p. 3, col. 1; letter of Dr. Condon to Joint Con-
gressional Committee on Atomic Energy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1948, p. 4, col. 2. For a
full account of the Condon case, see ANDREWvS, WASHINGTON WITch HUNT, Ch. 4 (1948).
The Committee on Secrecy and Clearance of the Federation of American Scientists has
collected 76 cases of allegedly unfair clearance proceedings. Some Individual Cases of
Clearance Procedures, 4 Bum. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 281 (1948).
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for determination of disloyalty, has been helpful in coordinating
policies and in removing some of the pressure from employing officials.I
Administration leaders have stated that government employees should
not "fear they are the objects of any 'witch hunt.'" " And the
Loyalty Review Board, so far as its actions have been made public,
seems to have operated with moderation. Nevertheless, the establish-
ment of broad standards of disloyalty in the Loyalty Order and by the
Issensitive" agencies, the creation of a large staff to administer the
loyalty program, the aggressive execution of the program at the lower
levels, the intensification of the international crisis, and allied causes
have more than offset such benefits as might accrue through the for-
malization of procedures and reassurances by top officials now in charge
of the program. All the evidence seems to show that the demoralizing
features of a loyalty check are present in the current program in acute
and dangerous form.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CRITERIA OF DISLOYALTY
Are there constitutional limitations within which a Federal loyalty
program must operate? If so, what are they? Here we are concerned
with possible limitations on the criteria for judging disqualification for
government service. In the succeeding section we consider constitu-
tional requirements in connection with the procedure by which de-
cisions on loyalty are made.
The present loyalty program is based upon the legal premise that
Federal employees are entitled to no constitutional protection. "...
[T]he Board is of the opinion," the Chairman of the Loyalty Review
Board has said, "that, legally, the Government is entitled to dis-
charge any employe for reasons which seem sufficient to the Govern-
ment, and without extending to such employe any hearing whatso-
ever." 01 And the Board in its own statement has reiterated: "No
person has an inherent or constitutional right to public employment;
public employment is a privilege, not a right." 02 The same view of
the constitutional question has been taken by Congressional sup-
porters of the Rees bill.
293
289. That considerable pressure remains is evident from the action of the Committee
on Un-American Activities in attempting to force the ouster of Dr. Edard U. C-ndon,
Director of the Bureau of Standards, despite his clearance by the agency loyalty board.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1948, p. 1, col. 4. See also Kluttz, Washington Post, Sept. 24, 1943:
"Frankly, the loyalty policy is in the hot cross-fire of partisan politics. It's difficult to
keep anything on an even keel vwhen that happens."
290. Statement of President Truman, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1947, p. 2; see also State-
ment of Seth Richardson, Chairman of Loyalty Review Board, N.Y. Times, De. 28,
1947, p. 28, col. 6.
291. Richardson, Aims and Proccdueres of Loyalty Rezvic- Board, N. Y. Times, DeM.
28, 1947, p. 28, col. 5.
292. Mimeographed statement of Loyalty ReNiew; Board, December 17, 1947, p. 3.
293. H. R. REP. No. 616, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947).
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This position seems to be based upon the aphorism of Justice Holmes
in the McAuliffe case: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." 24
The Supreme Court itself has stated that government employees enjoy
only "a privilege revocable by the sovereignty at will." 29 And certainly
the courts have in the past consistently upheld the government in the
exercise of sweeping power over the affairs of its employees, including
their right to hold a job. The tradition was sustained in the recent
decision in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, where the Supreme Court
found no constitutional objection to provisions of the Hatch Act which
drastically limit the right of government employees to engage in
political activity.29
Nevertheless the government's offhand exclusion of constitutional
considerations in the administration of the loyalty program is plainly
erroneous. In the Mitchell case itself, Justice Reed was at pains to
concede that "there are some limitations," and that "none would deny"
the incapacity of Congress to "enact a regulation providing that no
Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no
federal employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary
work." 29 A similar statement had previously been made by Justice
Cardozo for the New York Court of Appeals:
"A citizen may not be disqualified because of faith or color from
service as a juror. , . . For like reasons we assume that he may
not be disqualified because of faith or color from serving the state
in public office or employment. It is true that the individual,
though a citizen, has no legal right in any particular instance to be
selected as a contractor by the government. It does not follow,
however, that he may be declared disqualified from service, unless
the proscription bears some relation to the advancement of the
public welfare." 298
The point is obvious, and is consistent with a long series of cases
restricting the power of the legislature to attach certain kinds of con-
ditions to privileges extended by the government to its citizens."'
294. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
295. Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, 108 (1890).
296. 330 U.S. 75 (1947); cf. Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 159 F. 2d 22, (D.C. Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 838 (1947), reh'g denied, 331 U.S. 865 (1947). For a de-
tailed recital of the authorities indicating that "government employees do not occupy a
favored position in the eyes of the law," see Note, Restrictions on the Civil Rights of
Federal Employees, 47 CoL. L. REv. 1161 (1947). See also Note, Constitutional Linila-
tions on Political Discrimination in Public Employment, 60 HARv. L. R.v. 779 (1947).
297. 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) (court quoting from brief for appellants).
298. People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 168, 108 N.E. 427, 431, aft'd, 239 U.S, 195 (1915).
Cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923).
299. E.g., Frost v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) ; Missouri
[Vol. 58: 1
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Recent increases in the volume of government employment, coupled
with the likelihood of still further expansion, give added significance to
the position.
What are the constitutional limitations, then, which circumscribe the
power of the government arbitrarily to fLx its hiring and firing policies
and to prescribe the conduct of its employees? Most clearly applicable
is the right to freedom of political expression embodied in the First
Amendment. In addition, the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, with its prohibition against unreasonable or discriminatory
treatment, its limitation upon "guilt by association," and its require-
ment of definiteness, comes into play. Other possible sources of con-
stitutional restriction are the prohibitions against ex post facto laws and
bills of attainder.
0 0
Before attempting to appraise these constitutional limitations, it is
important to have a realistic understanding of the powers wielded by
the government under the loyalty program in their impact upon indi-
viduals, organizations and the political community as a whole.
To the individual applicant or employee the force of an official
determination that he is "disloyal" carries far beyond the mere loss of
his government position. President Truman, demonstrating an apti-
tude for understatement, has spoken of "the stigma attached to a
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938) ; Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 155
(1946) ("grave constitutional questions are immediately raised once it is said that the use
of the mails is a privilege which may be extended or w\ithheld on any grounds whatso-
ever"); cf. Hale, Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COL. L. RE%% 21 (1935). A
recent state case is Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District, 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171
P. 2d 885 (1946).
300. The ex post facto prohibition would appear to be applicable where past actions
were made conclusive grounds for disqualification, rather than considered merely as evi-
dence of present "disloyalty." Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1866); Ex Porte
Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1866) ; United States v. Lovett, 32- U.S. 303 (1946); Note, Re-
strictions on the Civil Rights of Federal Employees, 47 Co. L. REv. 1161, 1173 (1947).
The bill of attainder provision is of doubtful applicability to executive action. In any
event, these provisions would probably not play the major role in constitutional battles
over the loyalty program and hence they are not further considered here.
Since the present loyalty program is implemented by a Presidential Executive Order
rather than by Congressional legislation, a further question arises as to the validity of
the executive power in this area. It has been suggested in United States v. Perkins, 116
U.S. 483 (1886) and Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) that Congress may
prescribe the sole grounds for removal of inferior executive officials whose appointments
have been entrusted to department heads. Inasmuch as Congress has provided express
standards in Section 9A of the Hatch Act (53 STAT. 1148 (1939), as amended, 18 USC
§ 61h (1946)) governing the removal of such inferior federal employees, it may be argued
that the broader standards of the Executive Order fall in the conflict. It seems unliely,
however, that the Supreme Court would so restrict the executive power over removal of
the great mass of Federal employees. In any event this issue could be., and undoubtedly
would be, quickly resolved by Congressional action creating standards equivalent to these
in the Executive Order.
HeinOnline -- 58 Yale L. J. 81 1948-1949
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
removal for disloyalty." "I The Supreme Court in the case of similar
action against Lovett, Watson and Dodd pointed out that it "stig-
matized their reputation and seriously impaired their chance to earn a
living," and held it legally equivalent to punishment for a crime." 2 In
fact, the determination that a person is "disloyal" is closely akin to a
finding of treason-a crime which the framers of the constitution took
pains to define most narrowly and to hedge with restrictions.3 '
A person branded as "disloyal" finds it impossible to obtain employ-
ment either in the Federal government or in state or local government.
His opportunities for private employment are either seriously jeopar-
dized or completely extinguished. In many professional fields-atomic
energy is but one example-a person dismissed for disloyalty must
abandon his life's work.30 4 The motion picture industry, which has
officially refused to employ Communists and has undertaken a campaign
to "eliminate any subversives," is closed to him.3"' Other industries
unofficially refuse to admit him.0 ' On the personal level, his reputa-
tion is blighted and the happiness and social status of his family ruined.
Marked for life, he is likely to be relegated to a second-class citizen-
ship. 3
07
The impact of a finding by the Attorney General that an entire
organization is "subversive" is equally damaging. Such a finding
strikes hard in two vital areas: membership and funds. An organization
is likely to lose all but its most hardy members; potential members do
not join. The organization has great difficulty in raising money. It
may lose its tax exemption, local licenses or other privileges. It en-
counters increasing resistance in its efforts to obtain meeting places and
speakers for its meetings. In practical terms the organization has been
gravely stricken, perhaps may be forced out of existence. °5
301. N. Y. Times Nov. 15, 1947, p. 2, col. 3.
302. 328 U.S. 303, 314 (1946). "The fact that the punishment is inflicted through the
instrumentality of an Act specifically cutting off the pay of certain named individuals found
guilty of disloyalty, makes it no less galling or effective than if it had been done by an
Act which designated the conduct as criminal." Id. at 316.
303. U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 3. See Stone, The Founding Fathers and the Loyally
Purge, PM Jan. 4, 1948, p. 13.
304. See, e.g., Some Individual Cases of Clearance Procedures, 4 BULL. oF THa AToNIc
ScIENTIsTs 281, 283-4 (1948).
305. N. Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1947, p. 27, col. 2.
306. See e.g., Engel, Fear in Our Laboratories, 166 NATION, 63 (1948).
307. See letter from Dean Griswold and Professors Scott, Katz and Chafee of the
Harvard Law School, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1947, § 4, p. 8, col. 5; charges of Messrs.
Arnold, Fortas and Porter, N. Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1947, p. 15, col. 2; remarks of Congress-
men Holifield, Cooley and McCormack, 93 CONG. REa 8965, 8967-68, 8974 (1947) ;
Pringle, Snooping on the Potomac, SATURDAY EvENING PosT, Jan. 15, 1944, pp. 19, 93-4.
For a vivid account of the problems encountered by "Mr. Blank," an employee discharged
by the State Department on loyalty grounds, see ANDREWS, WASHINGTO11 WIrc1 1-UNT
61-73 (1948).
308. For an account of some of the actual effects of the Attorney General's ruling
that certain organizations were "subversive" see PM, Feb. 5, 1948, p. 2, col. 1; Stone,
[Vol. 58: 1
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These are matters of the utmost consequence to the entire nation.
Unwarranted charges of disloyalty against government employees
affect every citizen. As the story spreads there develops a fear of
refusing to conform, a fear of speaking, a fear of signing a petition or a
letter to a Congressman-all for fear of being declared subversive, of
losing a job, or position in society.
Unjustified charges against an organization are even more fraught
with danger to the public welfare. Modern society functions largely
through organizations; it is only by organizing and associating with
others that the individual can match his strength against other groups
or against government. The extent to which the government tolerates
or thwarts organizations of citizens is a measure of its regard for dem-
ocratic processes. Government suppression of organizations, partic-
ularly when the power is placed in the hands of a single official, thus
raises questions that penetrate to the core of our democratic way of
life.3 09
Freedom of Political Expression
Out of the specific guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of the
press, the right of assembly and the right to petition the government-
all expressly protected in the First Amendment-there emerges a clear-
cut composite concept of the right to freedom in political expression.310
The right is basic, in the deepest sense, for it underlies the whole theory
of democracy,-that all citizens are entitled to participate in the for-
The Fight Against the Blacklist Goes to the Courts, PM, Feb. 11, 1948, p. 4; New Haven
Register December 6, 1947, p. 3, col. 4 (denial of use of Bond Hotel in Hartford for
meeting, the manager saying: "The place for them to meet is in Russia!'); N.Y. Times,
Oct. 22, 1948, p. 17, col. 1 (8 designated organizations removed from tax exempt status).
See also the affidavits filed by the plaintiff in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
Clark (D.D.C., decided without opinion June 4, 194S).
309. See Wyzanskl, The Open Window and the Open Door, 35 C.%AW. L REv. 335
(1947).
310. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances" U. S. Co.NsT. AImEND. I. Since the First Amendment pro-
hibits only action by Congress, a preliminary question arises as to whether it governs in
the case of Presidential action under F-xecutive Order. Where the President's power is
derived from Congress the application of the First Amendment is clear. See, Ex Parc
Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298-9 (1945). Where the President's action is based on
executive power derived directly from the Constitution there would seem to be little doubt
that the Court would also consider the First Amendment directly applicable. See, Ex'
Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 124-5 (1866); Ex Parle Qirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942). Al-
ternatively it can be argued that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is ap-
plicable; that this clause must have the same meaning in this connection as the due proess
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment; that the latter incorporates the First Amendment
(Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)) ; and that therefore the issue under the
Fifth Amendment is the same as under the First. Cf. Hurd v. Hodge, 6S S. CL 847, 853
(1948).
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mation of their government and the framing of their laws. Embedded
in the philosophy of those who framed the Bill of Rights this principle
has, since the decision in Stromberg v. California,3 ' received increas-
ingly firm and aggressive protection from the Supreme Court, "The
maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion," said
Chief Justice Hughes in the Stromberg case, "to the end that govern-
ment may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may
be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security
of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional sys-
tem.)' 312
That the principle outlaws efforts by the government to prescribe
political orthodoxy was made clear in the oft-quoted statement of
Justice Jackson in the Barnette case:
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opin-
"t313ion ...
So fundamental does the Court consider protection of this right that
it has rejected, even reversed, the normal presumption of constitu-
tionality in such cases:
". .. the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced
by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the in-
dispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amend-
ment. . . . That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 314
And the same approach has been taken by the Court where the
specific issue of loyalty has been involved:
"Ill-tempered expressions, extreme views, even the promotion
of ideas which run counter to our American ideals, are not to be
given disloyal connotations in absence of solid, convincing evi-
dence that that is their significance." 315
311. 283 U. S. 359 (1931).
312. Id. at 369. The proposition had been stated with equal clarity and force by Justice
Brandeis in his dissent in Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 273 (1920) and in hi
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927). Cf. Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) ; Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
313. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
314. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-530 (1945). The doctrine that the Court
would scrutinize with greater care legislation infringing upon the freedoms guarantced in
the Bill of Rights was first suggested in a footnote by Chief Justice Stone in United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). Cf. Ex Pare Mitsuye Endo, 323
U. S. 283, 299 (1944) ; 40 Coi. L. REv. 531 (1940). For a recent statement of the doctrine
see the concurring opinion in United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 68 S.
Ct. 1349, 1366-7 (1948) : "The presumption, rather, is against the legislative intrusion into
these domains [of free expression]."
315. Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654, 658 (1946). Cf. Schneiderman v. United
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That the current loyalty program infringes upon freedom of political
expression is obvious from the prior discussion. It imposes serious
restrictions upon government employees, prospective employees, and
organizations; it affects deeply the operation of government and the
political life of the nation. How, then, do we determine the point at
which the acknowledged authority of the government to protect itself
from the danger of "disloyal" employees runs into conflict with the
constitutional guarantee of freedom in political expression? By what
method are we to balance the competing constitutional doctrines?
There are two legal formulae available for resolving the conflict.
One is the "reasonableness" test; the other is the touchstone of "clear
and present danger."
The test of "reasonableness" was applied by the Supreme Court in
its 4 to 3 decision in the AZ itchell case. 31 That case involved the provi-
sions of the Hatch Act prohibiting Federal employees from taking
Isany active part in political management or political campaigns." 31T
The employee whose case was considered had been a committeeman
for the Democratic Party in his ward, had been a worker at the polls,
and had assisted in the distribution of funds to pay party workers on
election day. Justide Reed, speaking for the majority, pointed out
that the problem before the Court was to "balance the extent of the
guarantees of freedom against a congressional enactment to protect a
democratic society against the supposed evil of political partisanship
by classified employees of government." In resolving this issue he held
the test to be: "For regulation of employees it is not necessary that the
act regulated be anything more than an act reasonably deemed by
Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public service." Apply-
ing this formula he found the legislation to be constitutional.
The "clear and present danger" rule, originally enunciated by Jus-
tice Holmes in the Sclwnck case, has been frequently employed to
strike a balance between the exercise of governmental authority and
the protection of rights guaranteed in the First Asnendment.31 A
modem statement of the rule, expressly distinguishing it from the test
States, 320 U. S. 118 (1943). See generally, on the right to freedom of political expres-
sion, The Constitutional Right to Advocate Political, Social and Economin Clhangc-An
Essential of American Democracy, 7 LAw. Gun.D Rv. 57 (1947).
316. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). The same test was ap-
plied in the Japanese exclusion cases. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93, 95, 93,
101 (1943).
317. 53 STAT. 1148 (1939), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 61(h) (1946).
318. In Schenck v- United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) the Court upheld a conviction un-
der the Espionage Act for circulating pamphlets to draftees denouncing conscription. The
original statement of the clear and present danger rule was as follows: "The question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Id. at 52.
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of "reasonableness," was given by the Supreme Court in Thomas v.
Collins:
"For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties (the
indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amend-
ment] must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not
doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The
rational connection between the remedy provided and the ez4l to be
curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation against at-
tack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on
firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would re-
strain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and
place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or im-
pending. Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount in-
terests, give occasion for permissible limitation." 319 (Italics sup-
plied.)
Justice Douglas, partially dissenting in the Mitchell case, urged the
application of the clear and present danger test. In his view the Hatch
Act was invalid insofar as it limited the political rights of industrial, as
distinguished from administrative, workers in government. "Those
rights," he said, "are too basic and fundamental in our democratic
political society to be sacrificed or qualified for anything short of a
clear and present danger to the civil service system. No such showing
has been made in the case of these industrial workers .... ,, 320
Both the test of "reasonableness" and the test of "clear and present
danger" are broad formulae which do not decide concrete cases. Upon
analysis both resolve into issues of balancing competing values. Yet
the "clear and present danger" rule implies a different social and
political philosophy in approaching the constitutional issue. It implies
that the courts will insist upon a stronger, more positive justification
for governmental infringement upon freedoms guaranteed by the
First Amendment. It expresses an attitude which regards these free-
doms as fundamental to our framework of democracy and holds it the
function of the courts to demand more than a mere showing of rational-
ity before such rights may be sacrificed.
It seems clear that the Supreme Court should adopt the "clear and
present danger" philosophy in judging the constitutional limitations of
the loyalty program. Its failure to take this attitude in the Mitchell
case is perhaps to be explained, though not justified, by the fact that
the provisions of the Hatch Act there involved represented part of a
319. 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). For a similar statement of the rule, distinguishing it
from the "rational basis" test, see West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 639 (1943). Recent applications of the clear and present danger test may also be
found in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S, 296
(1940) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947),
decided two months after the Mitchell Case, reaffirmed the clear and present danger test.
320. 330 U.S. 75, 126 (1947).
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hristoric campaign to eliminate the spoils system and political corrup-
tion from the Federal service. Long tradition has sanctioned the ex-
tensive use of government power in the interest of good government
and clean politics.3 21 However that may be, the issues under the
loyalty program are as basic to the democratic process as any to which
the "clear and present danger" approach has been applied in the past.
One further matter bearing upon the general nature of the constitu-
tional issue requires consideration. The main thrust of the loyalty
program, as has been already observed, is to prevent any possible
danger to the government by eliminating in advance all individuals
who might in the future engage in dangerous activities. It is primarily
in this respect that the current program goes beyond existing legisla-
tion and administrative regulation designed to punish past action in-
jurious to the Federal service. The Supreme Court has always looked
with particular disfavor upon regulation of this character where it
curtails the rights protected by the First Amendment.
Previous restraint upon freedom of expression was considered
abhorrent even in the days of Blackstone. 32 2 'Modern objection was
strongly expressed in Near v. Mllinnesota, where the Supreme Court
invalidated an attempt to eliminate possible abuse of the press through
the device of prior censorship. 323 Since the Near case the Court has
extended the principle to other fields. Thus in Schneider v. New Jersey,
where an ordinance prohibited the distribution of leaflets in order to
prevent littering of the streets, the Court had no hesitation in striking
down the regulation and limiting the government to subsequent pun-
ishment of those who did in fact litter the streets. -32 Similarly in
Thornhill v. Alabama the Court invalidated a state law which pro-
hibited picketing, refusing to sanction a sweeping prior restraint and
relegating the government to action by way of subsequent punishment
where abuses developed. 32 And in the Thomas case the Court in-
validated an ordinance requiring labor union organizers to register as a
condition to soliciting membership, again considering prior interference
with freedom of expression unwarranted and subsequent punishment
ample protection.
32 6
These decisions are simply one aspect of the broader doctrine that
government regulation infringing upon civil or political rights must be
"narrowly drawn" to meet only the essential danger and may not un-
321. See Note, Political Sterilization of Federal Employees, 47 CoL. L. REv. 295 (1947).
322. CHArEE, Fom SPExcH nT THE UXnMr SrTrns 9-22 (1941).
323. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
324. 308 U.S. 147 (1939); accord, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (193); Hague v.
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
325. 310 U.S.8S (1940).
326. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); ef. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937) ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) ; Cantwell Y. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) ; Saia v. New York, 68 S. Ct. 1148 (1948).
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necessarily sweep within its orbit a wide range of other activities under
the protection of the First Amendment.127 "Certainly laws which
restrict the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment" said Justice
Black in the Mitchell case, "should be narrowly drawn to meet the evil
aimed at and to affect only the minimum number of people imperatively
necessary to prevent a grave and imminent danger to the public." 32
It is in the light of these doctrines that the constitutional balance
must be struck, by weighing fact and value, between governmental
protection and the right of political expression.
On the one hand the government is surely entitled to erect safe-
guards against dangers that are clear, immediate and significant. In
establishing standards of disqualification for government employment
it may undoubtedly take into account forms of activity which could
not be penalized if engaged in by the ordinary citizen. And certainly
the tradition of- minimum interference by the judiciary with internal
management problems of the executive, as well as the deference due
to legislative and executive judgment, are sound principles and en-
titled to due consideration.
On the other hand must be weighed many of the other factors that
have been developed in the previous discussion: the drastic interference
with freedom of expression; the lack of clear and convincing proof that
the dangers are as serious as charged; the administrative impact of the
program upon the morale, efficiency and vitality of the government
service; the catastrophic consequences to individual and organization
of adverse government action; the fact that the problem is not only
one of internal management but acutely affects the nation as a whole.
Just where the Supreme Court will draw the line, it is of course im-
possible to predict. Nevertheless a general thesis with respect to the
constitutional limitations under the First Amendment may be sug-
gested.
Certainly there is no doubt of the validity of standards requiring
disqualification for overt acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure of
information, sabotage, or participation in a conspiracy to overthrow
the government by violent or other illegal means. Similarly there
would be little questioning of a standard disqualifying individuals who
personally advocate overthrow or change of government by violent or
illegal means. Less clear, but nevertheless still within the bounds of
probable constitutionality, are standards disqualifying upon proof of
mere membership in an organization which advocates the overthrow or
change of government by violent or illegal means, or membership in a
327. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). See concurring opinion in United
States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 68 S. Ct. 1349, 1367-74 (1948).
328. 330 U.S. 75, 110 (1947). The same views were expressed by Justice Douglas. Id,
at 126.
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political organization whose major policies are directed by an organiza-
tion or group operating outside the United States.
Beyond this point, however, grave doubts of constitutionality arise.
The validity of disqualification for membership in an organization en-
gaged in lawful activities but including among its members persons
who are also members of a conspiratorial organization might depend
upon the particular facts of the case, including the nature of the gov-
ernment position in question. Activity in support of such an organiza-
tion, but not amounting to membership, would constitute a standard
of dubious validity. In this area the kind of job involved-whether a
key position in a "sensitive" agency or a low-level position in a routine
agency-might be the decisive factor.
Advocacy or belief in policies, other than the use of violence or illegal
methods, which coincided with policies of a conspiratorial or other
organization, would clearly seem to be invalid as a standard. So would
the other possible criteria listed in the previous discussion.30 Certainly
a standard excluding individuals who simply attempted to bring about
changes in government form or policy through lawful methods, not
involving insubordination, would definitely run afoul of constitutional
limitations.
These conclusions are not offered as proposals for legislative or execu-
tive policy, but rather as marking broadly the judicial limitations
within which the legislative or executive program would be required to
operate under the First Amendment.
Due Process
Three pertinent questions arise under the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment: (1) whether the restrictions are unreasonable or
discriminatory in nature; (2) whether the application of "guilt by
association" is contrary to the constitutional prohibition; and (3)
whether the restrictions are stated with sufficient definiteness and cer-
tainty. At the outset, however, a preliminary question requires brief
attention,-whether the individual or organization is being deprived of
"liberty" or "property" within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment 30
The answer to this introductory question appears to be in the affirma-
tive. Although the Supreme Court has said that a government em-
ployee has no contract or property right in his position such as to
assure him protection against a routine dismissal, 331 it seems clear that
329. Supra pp. 50-2.
330. "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CoNsT. Amsam. V.
331. Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890) ; Taylor and Marshall v. Bechham
(No. 1), 178 U.S. 548 (1900) ; Wetzel v. McNutt, 4 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. Ind. 1933). See
Note, Restrictions on the Civil Rights of Fcdcral Employees, 47 Cor. L. Rnv. 1161, 1162
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a dismissal on grounds of disloyalty is in a different category. This
follows from the fact that a dismissal for disloyalty has far reaching
consequences, including curtailment of the employee's opportunity
for further employment and serious prejudice to his future earning
status. The Supreme Court has, in a comparable situation, recognized
that "the right to work for a living . . . is of the very essence of the
personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment to secure." 332 The injury suffered by an
organization under the loyalty program would likewise seem to give
it abundant standing to claim loss of significant property rights. The
case of an applicant rejected upon a finding of disloyalty might be less
clear; but even here such an individual might be damaged in a manner
not unlike that of a discharged employee. It is also entirely reasonable
to argue that both individuals and organizations have suffered loss of
"liberty" under the Fifth Amendment."' Thus, standing to invoke
the due process protection seems assured.
Unreasonable or Discriminatory Regulation
Assuming the due process clause to be applicable, the first inquiry is
whether the restrictions imposed by the loyalty regulations are reason-
ably related to substantial dangers, or whether persons holding par-
ticular views or engaging in certain activities are being made the objects
of unreasonable discrimination. 3 4 The considerations entering into
this judgment are substantially the same as those arising under the
First Amendment. But the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
calls attention even more sharply to the discriminatory flavor of leg-
islation which penalizes only the political activities of a special group.
(1947). On the other hand some of the state courts have held that a government employee
possesses something "in the nature" of a property right in his job. Fugate v. Weston, 156
Va. 107, 157 S.E. 736 (1931) ; State ex rel. Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 187 N.W. 830
(1922) ; Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N.W. 595 (1913) ; State ex rd. Chil&i v.
Wadhams, 64 Minn. 318, 324, 67 N.W. 64, 67 (1896). See also Dawley, The Governors'
Constitutional Powers of Appointment and Removal, 22 MiNx. L. Rav. 451, 474 (1938) ;
Westwood, The "Right" of an Employee of the United States against Arbitrary Dis-
charge, 7 Gwo. WASH. L. REv. 212 (1938).
332. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) ; cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886).
333. See Note, Constitutional Limitations on Political Discrimination in Public Ent-
ployment, 60 HARv. L. RLv. 779, 782 (1947).
334. In this respect the nature of the inquiry would be similar to that arising under the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937) ; ilirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); United
States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947) ; United States v. Schneider, 45 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.
Wis. 1942) ; but ef. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921). See generally Note,
Constitutionality of the Taft-Hartley Non-Comnmunist Afldavit Provision, 48 CoL, L. REV.
253, 256-7 (1948). On the application of the equal protection clause to state employment
see Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
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Here, in contrast with the M1fitchell case, the regulation applies not to
all government workers alike but discriminates against those who hold
certain opinions or join certain organizations. Protection against unfair
or unwarranted discrimination remains a vital function of the due
process clause. The Supreme Court would clearly not tolerate a
regulation permitting government workers of orthodox views to join
organizations and express attitudes with relative freedom but forcing
the unorthodox to remain silent or risk discharge.
Guilt by Association
To what extent, under the due process clause, may disqualification
for Federal service be based upon mere association with organizations
or individuals? This element of association plays an important part in
the loyalty program. Under the Loyalty Order "sympathetic associa-
tion" with designated organizations is one of the facts "which may be
considered in connection with the determination of disloyalty." 311 In
practice a finding of "sympathetic association" with a group named by
the Attorney General as "communist," "fascist," or "subversive"
would almost certainly result in disqualification for government em-
ployment. Congressman Rees during the debate on his bill referred
to the "sympathetic association" clause as "the heart of the thing." ' '
The State Department regulations make various types of associations
not only evidence of disloyalty but absolute grounds for removal.31
And throughout the operation of the program the question of associa-
tion has been foremost in the minds of Federal employees.
The courts have frequently rejected efforts to apply doctrines of
"guilt by association" and have repeatedly asserted that under Anglo-
American traditions guilt is a personal matter. "Guilt with us remains
individual and personal . . . ," the Supreme Court recently said. 3
Justice Murphy, concurring in Bridges v. Wixon, condemmed guilt
by association even more vigorously, "The doctrine of personal guilt
is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence. It partakes
of the very essence of the concept of freedom and due process of law. "3C
335. Exec. Order No. 9335, Pt. V, Sec. 2f, 12 Fr.. RaG. 1935, 1938 (1947). Compare:
"Personal or political relations with enemies of the working class and nation are incom-
patible vith membership in the Communist Party." Constitution of the Communist Party
of the U.S.A., Art. IX, § 4 (1945).
336. 93 CONG. RC. 8977 (1947).
337. Supra note 150.
338. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 772 (1946).
339. 326 U.S. 135, 163 (1945). For an excellent discussion of the problem of guilt by
association as related to the President's Executive Order, see O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and
Guilt by Association, 61 HAv. L. R.v. 592 (1948). See also, Gellhorn, Report on a Report
of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 60 HILnv. L. REv. 1193, 1217-24
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The issue of guilt by association has arisen in two connections. One
is where a statute makes the association itself an offense. Thus state
legislation has attempted to make association with criminals, without
more, a crime. The courts have generally refused to uphold such legis-
lation. 34
0
In other cases the attempt has been made to impute to an individual
the motives, objectives or actions of an organization or group with
which he has been in some way connected. Here the offense is not the
mere association, but something else, and the association is used to
establish the offense. In this situation, the courts have refused to
impute the activities of the organization to the individual and have
insisted upon separate proof of the individual's culpability. Thus in the
DeJonge case the Supreme Court refused to attribute to Dejonge, a
member of the Communist Party, the ideas of the Party, but held that
only what Dejonge actually said at a meeting was of legal conse-
quence.341 More recently in the Schneiderman case the Court, deciding
whether Schneiderman was attached to the principles of the constitu-
tion, rejected the government's interpretation of Communist Party
utterances and insisted upon clear proof of Schneiderman's personal
position.142 "Under our traditions," said Justice Murphy, "beliefs are
personal and not a matter of mere association ... [Mien in adher-
ing to a political party or other organization notoriously do not sub-
scribe unqualifiedly to all of its platforms or asserted principles." 313
The doctrine of guilt by association has been effectively utilized in
totalitarian countries. 344 It is noteworthy that in the Nueremberg
Trials the principle was rejected. Mere membership in Nazi organi-
zations was not there accepted as proof of war guilt without further
evidence showing personal participation.3
4
1
How do these principles apply to the loyalty program? The issues
here are not identical with those arising in cases where association is
made a criminal offense or where proof of "disloyalty" for deportation
(1947). See as well Note, Constitutionality of the Taft-Hartley Non-Communist Affidavit
Provision, 48 CoL L. REV. 253, 261-3 (1948); CHAFEE, FREE SErcH IN THE 4U1ITE
STATES, 470-84 (1941).
340. Note cases cited in Gellhorn, supra note 339, at 1223. Compare the use of the con-
spiracy charge as once used againt labor unions. A discussion of the conspiracy doctrine
and its development may be found in WITTE, THE GOVERNMENT AND LAuoR DISPUTES
(1932) 46-54.
341. Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). Accord: Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S.
242 (1937) ; but cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
342. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
343. Id. at 136; cf. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) ; Knauer v. United States,
328 U.S. 654 (1946). Compare Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
344. Infra pp. 126-32. See also O'Brian, supra note 339.
345. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 111-2, 131-2, 160, 165-7, 180, 182, 187 (1946)
Wechsler, The Issues of the'Nuremberg Trial, 62 POL. Sci. Q. 11 (1947). Compare JACK-
SoN, THE NU NBERG CASE 88-9, 103-11 (1947).
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or denaturalization purposes is involved. It is undoubtedly proper for
the government to scrutinize more closely the associations of its
employees and to impose a stricter standard in judging the consequences
of such association. But the principle of personal rather than vicarious
culpability is one that springs directly from the values placed upon in-
dividual worth and independence by a democratic society and in this
respect judical abhorrence of guilt by association is equally applicable
in the field of tests for government employment.
More concretely, the greater leeway permitted the government in
measuring the qualifications of its employees would probably sanction
a rule making certain kinds of associations in themselves a bar to
government employment. Thus it is unlikely that a court would
strike down a regulation forbidding employment to a member of a
conspiratorial group seeking the overthrow of the government by
violent or illegal means, even though there were no further proof that
the individual personally shared or supported the objectives of the
organization. The same would be true of membership in an organi-
zation, political in nature, whose major policies are directed by an
organization or group operating outside the United States. But to
extend the disqualification to members of an organization which is
engaged in wholly lawful activity but which includes in its membership
persons who are also members of a conspiratorial organization, would
appear to be more dubious. Such disqualification might well be per-
mitted only in the case of employees holding positions particularly
vital to national security. To broaden the taint of association so as to
disqualify a Federal employee because his second cousin was reputed
to have been connected with a "communist-front" organization, as
certain members of Congress recently urged, would constitute full
acceptance of the most ancient and vicious tenets of witch-hunting. 3
In cases where the government does not make associations a dis-
qualification in itself, but attempts to use it in order to impute to the
individual the opinions or activities of his associates, the principles
expressed in the Schiwiderman and other cases seem to apply with full
force. A loyalty proceeding, as we point out later, does not differ so
markedly from a denaturalization or deportation proceeding that the
presumptions and evidence outlawed in one should be permitted in the
other.
In the case of organizations charged with being "subversive" a
reverse twist of the doctrine has sometimes been applied, the guilt of
the individual being imputed to the organization. Walter Gellhorn has
described how this process was employed by the Committee on Un-
American Activities in finding the Southern Conference for Human
Welfare to be a "Communist-front organization":
346. See ANDREws, WASHINGTON WrrCH HUNT 74 (1948). Note also the Virden case,
supra note 278.
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"This .device involves, first, seeking to establish a tie, however
tenuous, between an unpopular individual or organization and
some person connected with the Southern Conference; second,
ascribing to that person all the undesirable qualities of the in-
dividual or organization with whom he has been momentarily
linked; and finally, attributing to the Southern Conference the
qualities which have been acquired by infection, as it were, by
these intermediate persons. Of course, the process is an endless
one, for any individual who becomes associated with the Southern
Conference will in turn acquire that organization's derivative
taint and will transmit it to all other organizations he may later
support." 317
It would seem clear that the courts would not permit such an appli-
cation of guilt by association. Here again the doctrine of the Schneider-
man case, and indeed the underlying objections to the whole theory,
seem fully applicable.
The Rule against Vagueness
A third issue of due process arises out of the vagueness and uncer-
tainties of the terms used in the loyalty regulations. The extreme
ambiguity of the basic criterion of "disloyalty," as well as the second-
ary standards of "totalitarian," "communist," "fascist" and "subver-
sive," has already been made clear. 348
The rule against vagueness invalidates a statute which is "so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its mean-
ing." 311 The rule has received particular application in cases involving
infringement upon civil and political rights.3"' For in that area it is of
special significance that men be not restrained through uncertainty
of what is prohibited.
The loyalty program seems highly vulnerable to constitutional at-
347. Gellhorn, supra note 339, at 1217-8. Thus, the fact that a Justice of the Supreme
Court and William Z. Foster (head of the American Communist Party) were at the same
time officers in the American Civil Liberties Union might serve as the basis for a judgment
that both the Justice and the Union were biased in favor of communist ideology. See
BuNTING, LIBERTY AND LFARNING 109 (1942).
348. Supra pp. 36-42.
349. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). The rule has been
applied mainly in criminal cases but it is applicable in civil cases as well. A. B. Small Co.
v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925).
350. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S.
242, 259 (1937) ; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 101 (1940) ; State v. Klapprott, 127 N.J.L. 395 (1941); Winters v. New York, 68
S. Ct. 665 (1948). See concurring opinion in United States v. Congress of Industrial
Organizations, 68 S. Ct. 1349, 1367-74 (1948). But cf. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S.
1 (1947). Justice Black, in his dissent in the Mitchell case, urged that the legislation there
was "too broad, ambiguous, and uncertain in its consequences to be made the basis of remov-
ing deserving employees from their jobs." United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75, 110 (1947).
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tack on these grounds. A Federal employee must necessarily speculate
as to the meaning of the controlling regulations. Hence the safest
course of action for him is to avoid any activity which might subject
him to the penalties of infringement. As the Court said in the Thomas
case, the existence of the regulation permits "no security for free dis-
cussion. In these conditions it blankets with uncertainty whatever
maybe said." 351
The vagueness of the standards gives to the administrators of the
loyalty program the opportunity to probe the minds and sift the asso-
ciations of government employees with little guide other than their
own notions of what is "disloyal" or "subversive." The meaning of the
words can shift with the winds of doctrine or the storms of increasing
tension. All the dangers that underlie sweeping and amorphous re-
strictions upon sensitive areas of civil liberties are present here. It is
difficult to believe that the Supreme Court will not require a con-
siderably greater degree of clarity and precision as a condition of con-
stitutional sanction.
VIII. PROCEDURE
Anglo-American jurisprudence has always taken special pride in its
procedures. The great procedural principles underlying our judicial
system-a full hearing upon an open record, the right to representation
by counsel, the right of cross-examination, and numerous others-
have been sympathetically developed and sternly administered by our
courts. The judiciary has shown equal concern over the procedures
employed by executive officers in the performance of their administra-
tive' functions. Indeed as modern administration has become increas-
ingly complex the courts have tended to accept as their chief function
in the process, not the substitution of judicial for administrative judg-
ment on issues of substance, but rather the maintenance of strict
adherence to procedural safeguards.
The development of fair procedures in the administration of a loyalty
program is no less important than in other fields of government. The
interests at stake-that of the individual or organization in a just
adjudication, of the government in the maintenance of high morale
and effective operation, of the general public in the preservation of free
political expression-are such as require the most careful examination
of procedural methods.
Two closely related problems arise. One involves the procedural
rights of individual employees and applicants; the other the rights of
organizations designated by the Attorney General as subversive. The
basic policy considerations are much the same for both. Since the legal
351. 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945).
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issues arise in somewhat different form, however, the two problems will
be treated separately.
Procedural Rights of Individuals
We start with a fundamental inquiry, the answer to which will
largely determine subsidiary issues of procedural detail. Is a proceed-
ing in which the government undertakes to disqualify an employee
from government service on grounds of disloyalty one to which the
basic procedural safeguards developed over the years are applicable?
Is it a proceeding comparable to a criminal proceeding or to those
types of administrative proceedings in which the legislature and courts
have in the past imposed significant procedural limitations? Or is it,
on the other hand, merely an internal management problem of govern-
ment, to be determined by summary methods?
Sponsors of the current loyalty program take a clear stand that the
government is under no legal obligation to follow time-honored pro-
cedures. "Public employment," they argue, "is a privilege, not a right"
and hence there is no obligation to extend "any hearing whatsoever."
The procedural safeguards actually provided by the Loyalty Order
they consider solely a matter of governmental grace. 11
2
This position seems erroneous. The adjudication of loyalty cases is
comparable, if not strictly to a criminal proceeding, at least to the
kind of administrative action where both legislatures and courts have
insisted upon stringent procedural protections. The reasons for this
have in large part already been given. The proceeding is akin to a
determination of treason. It entails grave and lasting consequences." 3
It would be anomalous to require less exacting standards of procedure
under these circumstances than have always been applicable in such
proceedings as rate making, administrative imposition of cease and
desist orders, or deportation.
As a matter of fact the Lovett case constitutes a decisive ruling of the
Supreme Court upon this very issue. In that case the legislature made a
determination that three employees had engaged in "subversive ac-
tivities" and undertook to bar them from Federal employment. The
Court, after pointing to the impact of this law upon the individuals,
ruled that such action was a bill of attainder in that it "clearly accom-
plishes the punishment of named individuals without a judicial trial."
The fatal defect was that the procedure employed had denied the
right to "certain tested safeguards":
"An accused in court must be tried by an impartial jury, has a
right to be represented by counsel, he must be clearly informed of
the charges against him, the law which he is charged with violating
352. Supra pp. 79-80.
353. Supra pp. 81-2.
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must have been passed before he committed the act charged, he
must be confronted by the witnesses against him, he must not be
compelled to incriminate himself, he cannot twice be put in jeop-
ardy for the same offense, and even after conviction no cruel and
unusual punishment can be inflicted upon him." 3
The Court thus held that an adjudication of disloyalty, resulting in
disqualification for government employment, is legally equivalent to
punishment for crime. A proceeding leading to this result, in the
Court's view, is one that requires the strictest kind of procedural safe-
guards. The fact that under the loyalty program the proceeding is con-
ducted by an administrative rather than a legislative or judicial agency
plainly does not alter this conclusion.
The main current of recent decisions fully supports this view of what
a loyalty proceeding should be. Thus in Bridges v. Vixon the Court
took the same approach on a comparable issue in a deportation case.
In language that is equally applicable to a loyalty matter the Court
insisted upon the most rigid standards of fair hearing:
"Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it
visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the
right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That
deportation is a penalty-at times a most serious one--cannot be
doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by
which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential stand-
ards of fairness." 155
And again in the Schneidernmzn case the government's contention
that Schneiderman had illegally procured United States citizenship,
not being "attached to the principles of the Constitution," was re-
jected on the ground that denaturalization was such a serious penalty
it should not be undertaken "without the clearest sort of justification
and proof." 35
The Japanese exclusion cases stand in sharp contrast to the Loett,
Bridges and Schneiderman cases. Here a presumption of disloyalty
against an entire race was accepted by the Court, and no procedural
safeguards were afforded or required. The military program included at
first a discriminatory curfew against all Japanese, and later their ex-
354. 328 U.S. 303, 317-18 (1946). Cf. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1866) ; Ex
Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1866).
355. 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) ; cf. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
356. Sclmeiderman v. U.S., 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943). For other cases, not in the
loyalty field, in which the court has insisted upon rigid procedural protection by adminis-
trative agencies where important property rights were at stake, see e.g. Ashbacker Radio
Corp. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327 (1945) ; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 28S (1944) ; Columbia
Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942) ; Walker v. Popenoc, 149
F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945). See also Morgan v. United States, -9S U.S. 463 (1936);
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
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clusion from the West Coast, their confinement pending investigations
of "loyalty," and the indefinite incarceration of those found to be "dis-
loyal." "I In passing favorably on this program the Court necessarily
ratified the complete denial of procedural due process involved. The
cases are to be explained by the exigencies of a threatening war situa-
tion. Even so it would seem that the arbitrary treatment of Japanese-
Americans countenanced by the Court is highly aberrational and out-
side the main stream of American judicial tradition."'
The courts have likewise sanctioned the use of summary procedure,
and even the complete absence of procedure, in the case of government
employees discharged for incompetence or other reasons not involving
disloyalty. Thus under the Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912 Federal
employees in the classified civil service may be removed provided only
they are served with written notice of the charges and given an oppor-
tunity to answer in writing.359 This procedure has been accepted by
the courts without question."' Sound reasons of personnel adminis-
tration dictate a wide measure of executive discretion, both as to
procedure and substance, where normal issues of government tenure
are involved. For the reasons already stated, however, disqualification
on loyalty grounds raises a different kind of problem. This was fully
recognized in the Lovett case.
It is true that in Friedman v. Schwellenbach the Court of Appeals for
357. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) ; Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943) ; cf. Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). These cases were
followed in Von Knorr v. Miles, 60 F. Supp. 962 (D. Mass. 1945), aff'd on other grounds,
156 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1946), in which the court upheld the right of the War Department
to exclude the employee of a war contractor from a war plant, on grounds that the cti-
ployee was subversive, without prior notice or hearing. But cf. Scherzberg v. Maderia, 57
F. Supp. 42 (E. D. Pa. 1944) ; Ebel v. Drum, 52 F. Supp. 189 (D. Mass. 1943) ; Schueller
v. Drum, 51 F. Supp. 383 (E. D. Pa. 1943).
358. ". . . tIlt is the case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to
imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely because of his
ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards
the United States. If this be a correct statement of the facts disclosed by this record,...
I need hardly labor the conclusion that Constitutional rights have been violated," Roberts,
J., dissenting, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 226 (1944). For a critical study
of the Japanese exclusion cases see Rostow, The rapanese American Cascs-A Disaster,
54 Y. z L. J. 489 (1945).
359. 37 StAr. 555 (1912), 5 U.S.C. §652 (1946).
360. Eberlein v. U.S., 257 U.S. 82 (1921); Borak v. Biddle, 141 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 738 (1944) ; Levine v. Farley, 107 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 622 (1940), Prior to the Lloyd-LaFollette Act the courts had
ruled that where an employee was discharged for reasons set forth in a statute, notice and
hearing were necessary, but that a discharge on non-statutory grounds did not require no-
tice or hearing. Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903) ; Reagan v. United States,
182 U.S. 419 (1901). See Note, Constitutional Limitations on Political Discrimination il
Public Employment, 60 HAxv. L. Rnv. 779, 784-5 (1947). It is apparent from the cases un-
der the Lloyd-LaFollette Act however, that the "notice and hearing" required could be
summary in character." With respect to judicial review see infra p. 110-14.
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the District of Columbia approved the use of the Lloyd-La Follette
procedure in a loyalty case.oi That decision, however, is hardly con-
clusive. The basic procedural issue, centering around the lack of a full
hearing, was raised only incidentally in Friedman's reply brief. Under
the circumstances the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari would ap-




If we turn from judicial decision to legislative policy we find, again
with occasional lapses, the same scrupulous concern for the procedural
rights of persons importantly affected by government action. Almost
every significant piece of legislation enacted in recent years delegating
either rulemaking or adjudicatory power to administrative agencies
has included elaborate provisions affording full procedural protection
to persons affected. 311 Recently in the Administrative Procedure Act
Congress consolidated and amplified these provisions, establishing in
effect a code of minimum procedural requirements."0 4 This code, so
far as it affects adjudicatory proceedings, imposes strict standards for a
full and fair hearing and decision. 3 5 It is true that the Administrative
361. 159 F2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1946). See supra pp. 46-7. See also Galardi v. Hague, 15
U.S. L. WVEan 2469 (U.S., D. Mass. Feb. 25, 1947), mentioned in Wyzansli, The Opn
Window and thw Open Door, 35 CAn,. L. Rnv. 336, 339 (1947).
362. 330 U.S. 838 (1947), reh'g denied, 331 U.S. 865 (1947), Justices Black and Doug-
las dissenting. The denial of certiorari may have been due in part to the fact that Friedman
held only a probationary war position, subject to the results of the Civil Service Commis-
sion's loyalty investigation. He was thus in the position of an applicant rather than an em-
ployee. Although in our view an applicant should be accorded the same procedural rights
as an employee it must be recognized that the constitutional issue is not as clear in such a
case.
Some courts have laid down minimal procedural practices which must be followed
prior to expelling members from beneficial associations. In a recent case plaintiffs were
expelled from their union vithout a hearing. The court ordered them reinstated. "It has
been settled by a long line of decisions that, whether or not the by-laws of an association
provide for it, a member is entitled to Imow the charges against him in an expulsion pro-
ceeding, to an opportunity to be heard, and to a fair trial.. .. The proceeding need not
take on the formalities of a court proceeding, but it must satisfy these elementary require-
ments of any judicial proceeding. The importance of such procedure is manifest where, as
here, employment is dependent upon membership and the power to expel is the power to
deprive men of their livelihood." Glauber v. Patof, 47 N. Y. S-2d 762, 763-4, 183 Misc. 400,
402 (1944) ; aff'd 54 N. Y. S. 2d 384, 269 App. Div. 687 (1945) ; ren,erscd only uith regard
to the damages awarded, 294 N.Y. 58 3, 63 N. E.2d 181 (1945). See cases collected in
Note, Procedural "Due Process" i, Union, Disciplinary Proceedings, 57 YAM L. J. 1302,
1312 n. 34 (1948). In other instances courts have reacted to cases of denial of due process
in union expulsion proceedings with doctrinal propositions denying jurisdiction. Id. at
1307-11. Cf. Raynovic v. Vrlinic, 334 Pa. 529, 6 A.2d 283 (1939) ; Kramer v. Slovenian
Ladies Soc., 14 Cal. App.2d 384, 58 P2d 176 (1936).
363. Perhaps the outstanding exception is the provision of the Second War Powers Act
under which wartime allocation and rationing was conducted. 56 STAT. 176 (1942), 50
U.S.C. § 633 (1946). Even here, however, the agencies administering the power established
careful safeguards. See e.g., J.-P. Steuart & Bro. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398 (1944).
364. 60 STAT. 237,5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1946).
365. 60 STAT. 241,242, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1006, 1007 (1946).
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Procedure Act exempts from these provisions proceedings involving the
"selection or tenure of an officer or employee of the United States."
But this was directed at the normal conduct of government hiring,
discipline and discharge; there is nothing to indicate that Congress had
in mind the loyalty problem. 6 Considerations already stated, as well
as those developed subsequently, disclose no reason why these mini-
mum procedural safeguards are not as fully applicable in loyalty pro-
ceedings as in the proceedings involving property and personal rights
so carefully protected by that legislation.
It may be concluded, therefore, that the adjudication of employee
loyalty falls within that category of proceedings which by tradition,
constitutional precept and legislative policy have been surrounded
with procedural requirements characteristic of the more formal kind of
administrative proceedings. It is noteworthy that there has been al-
most universal condemnation of the current loyalty program for its
failure to accept this principle. 6
In what respects, then, does the Loyalty Order fall short of meeting
traditional requirements? Are there sufficient reasons for relaxing any
of these restrictions in the case of loyalty proceedings?
It should be observed that the procedures established by the Loyalty
Order are, in some respects, an improvement over the loyalty practices
prevailing before 1947. Prior to the Order, as just noted, a Federal
employee in the classified civil service could 'be removed on loyalty
grounds subject only to the limitations imposed upon dismissal for
routine administrative reasons. The various agencies differed in the
actual administration of these provisions. And employees not in the
classified civil service possessed no procedural rights whatever. 6
The Loyalty Order, in contrast, sets up a uniform procedure, under
366. The explanation for the exemption offered by the Senate Judiciary Committee
bears this out: ". . . because thereby are excluded the great mass of administrative routine
as well as pensions, claims, and a variety of similar matters in which Congress has usually
intentionally or traditionally refrained from requiring an administrative hearing." AD-
MINISTRATIVE PROcEDURE Acr-LIsLATIvE HISTORY, SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 22 (1946). See also id. at 202, 261.
In the Rees bill (supra p. 20) the House did not adhere to the usual Congressional
insistence upon strict procedural protection. This action, as in the legislation involvig
Lovett, should perhaps be classified as aberrational.
367. See, e.g., Board of Directors, American Civil Liberties Union, Statement on Loy-
alty Tests for Federal Employment, April 7, 1947 (mimeographed) ; letter from Dean
Griswold and Professors Chafee, Katz and Scott of the Harvard Law School, N. Y. Times,
Apr. 13, 1947, § 4, p. 8, col. 5; letter from 33 citizens to Seth Richardson, N. Y. Times,
Jan. 12, 1948, p. 10, col. 3; Schlesinger, Jr., What is Loyalty? A Difilcult Question, N. Y.
Times Nov. 2, 1947, § 6, p. 7; Miller and Brown, Loyalty Procedures of the A.E,.C,, 4
BuLL. OF THE Aoaxmic ScIENSTS 45 (1948) ; Kaplan, Loyalty Review of Federal Employ-
ees, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 437 (1948).
368. Except possibly in rare instances where statutory causes for removal existed. See
supra note 360.
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the supervision of the Loyalty Review Board, and provides for the
right to counsel, a limited hearing, the calling of witnesses in the em-
ployee's behalf, a transcript of the hearing, and an appeal to the agency
head and to the Loyalty Review BoardY3c Despite these safeguards,
the Order conflicts at major points with traditional principles of pro-
cedural fairness. The most significant defects are:
(1) The failure to provide for complete notice of the charges and for
full disclosure of the evidence upon which the decision is reached, these
deficiencies resulting in denial of the traditional rights of rebuttal,
confrontation and cross-examination.
(2) The failure to provide for judicial review.
The "sensitive agencies" are authorized to dismiss "security risks"
without charges, hearing or any other kind of procedure. In practise,
most of these agencies seem to follow procedures similar to those re-
quired by the Loyalty OrderY0
Failure to Re-eal the Charges or Disclose the Evidence. The loyalty
Order provides that an employee accused of disloyalty shall be informed
of the charges in writing, but the charges need only be "stated as
specifically and completely as, in the discretion of the employing
department or agency, security considerations permit." 1" There is
no provision in the Order requiring disclosure of the evidence upon
which the government relies, or for the presentation of the government's
case through the sworn testimony of witnesses in open hearing, or for
cross-examination of witnesses. On the contrary the procedure es-
tablished under the Order contemplates that the government's case
against the employee will consist largely or wholly of the FBI report., 2̂
This report need not include, and in practice does not normally include,
the names of the persons from whom information was obtained or other
369. The procedural provisions of the Order are summarized supra at pp. 31-2.
370. State Department Regulations, N. Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1947, p. 8, col. 4; Transcript
of hearing in case of M- , before Brooklyn Navy Yard Loyalty Board, February
1948; AEC Interim Procedure for Local Security Boards, 4 Bu. oF Tim ATouic Sci-
Exvisrs 198 (1948). Apparently the Army at times does not even have a hearing. See
A-.ancA Cr. Lmmeavss UNIoN, OuR U.NCER.IN Li nmnns 24 (194S).
371. Exec. Order No. 9835, Pt. II, § 2b, 12 FED. REG. 1937 (1947).
372. Richardson, Aims and Procedures of Loyalty Recew Board, N. Y. Times, Dec.
28, 1947, p. 28, col. 4. Recently the Loyalty Review Board promulgated the following
changes in procedure:
"... the Agency or Regional Loyalty Board is authorized, in its discretion, to invite
any person not a confidential informant to appear before the Board and testify....
"... any non-confidential witness called to testify may be interrogated as to whether
such witness has theretofore been interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and,
if so, as to what statements such witness may have made to the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation." Memorandum No. 27, Loyalty Review Board, Nov. 2, 194S (Mimeographed).
It should be noted that Agency Boards are permitted to apply these rules at their dis-
cretion, that Agency Boards do not have the power of compulsory process, and finally, that
it is the FBI which classifies an informant as "confidential" or "non-confidential." Com-
pare notes 265, 375, 379, 388, 389.
HeinOnline -- 58 Yale L. J. 101 1948-1949
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
disclosure of sources.373 The report is not made accessible to the
employee.1 4 This failure to disclose the Government's evidence, ac-
cording to the frank statement of the Chairman of the Loyalty Review
Board, will occur "in the great majority of the cases." "I
Faced with the task of defending himself under such circumstances
the accused is confronted with almost unsurmountable obstacles. Ile
is rarely able to form a clear impression of the nature of the case which
the FBI report makes out against him. It is quite conceivable that he
may prepare his entire defense on an erroneous inference. It is possible
that he may not be able to formulate any defensive position whatever.
His only defense may have to be an affirmative statement of loyalty,
buttressed by as many statements of his good character as he can
obtain. It is impossible for him to know when he has sustained a
burden of proof sufficient to result in a determination of loyalty. The
employee's opportunity to defend his reputation may thus be hopeless.
He finds that he is taking part in an insane grotesque of the trial
process.
Bert Andrews in his Washington Witch Hunt has furnished a dramatic
illustration of what this procedure means in practice. Andrews
succeeded in gaining access to the secret transcript of a "hearing"
given to "Mr. Blank," a State Department employee dismissed on
loyalty grounds. Attempting to establish his loyalty the employee was
bedeviled by the fact that he never heard any of the evidence against
him. Accused of being a "poor security risk," he professed his loyalty
and requested repeatedly that specific charges be made so that he could
defend himself. The best reply he received to this request was:
"Well, we realize the difficulty you are in, in this position; on
'the other hand, I'd suggest that you might think back over your
own career and perhaps in your own mind delve into some of the
factors that have gone into your career which you think might
have been subject to question, and see what they are and see
whether you'd like to explain or make any statement with regard
373. Ibid.; Exec. Order No. 9835, Pt. IV, § 2, 12 FED. RE. 1938 (1947). See i, ra
note 396.
374. Richardson, Aimns and Procedures of Loyalty Review Board, N. Y. Times, Dec.
28, 1947, p. 28, col. 4.
375. Ibid. The procedure under State Department regulations is similar: "Evidence on
behalf of the Department of State shall be presented to said [loyalty] board by CON
[office of controls] in advance of said hearing, and shall not be presented at said hearing.
For security reasons the officer or employe, his representative or counsel, cannot be per-
mitted to hear or examine such evidence, which shall be classified as confideitial or secret.
" N. Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1947, p. 8, col. 7.
With respect to charges of membership in, affiliation with, or sympathetic association
with organizations designated by the Attorney General under subsection f of the Loyalty
Order,. the employee is not only without any information as to the basis of the Attorney
General's action, but he is not permitted to introduce any evidence contradictilg the At-
torney General's designation. See infra note 430.
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to any of them-that is about the best I can do as far as helping
you along that line." 3G
As a matter of fact the agency loyalty board, as well as the Loyalty
Review Board on appeal, find themselves in an almost equally unten-
able position. Again the chief source of difficulty is the report of the
FBI. In attempting to evaluate the Government's evidence of dis-
loyalty the Board discovers that informers are referred to by symbols,
T-1, T-2, etc.; that the use of such symbols and the indiscriminate
scrambling together of casual and careful remarks make the report
difficult to interpret; and that a report will rarely show a clear case of
guilt. The problem of reaching a sound conclusion under these con-
ditions was pointed out by Attorney General Biddle's Inter-departmen-
tal Committee early in the development of the loyalty program:
"[ihe Bureau's reports generally designated informants by
symbols only. Moreover, in using such reports, the credibility of
informants could ordinarily be appraised only by noting position
held, relation to the subject, opportunities for observing, the
nature of the information supplied, and any further clues as to
credibility which the report itself might contain. In no circum-
stances did the report indicate conclusions or make recommenda-
tions. While a report might be so consistently negative as to point
clearly to exoneration by the employing department or agency, it
was rarely so consistently or clearly positive as to create more than
a prima facie case for dismissal." 3n
The Loyalty Order does provide that the FBI must furnish the
agency board "sufficient information about such informants on the
basis of which the requesting department or agency can make an
adequate evaluation of the information furnished by them." 3 And
the Director of FBI has stated that "a representative of the FBI Vill
be available to confer with other government officials or a Loyalty
Hearing Board and evaluate the source of the information by describ-
ing the degree of reliability." 179 A procedure by which the investigat-
376. Axmnaws, VWAsIarNGToxN WTcH HUNT 30 (1948). Another reply to the employ-
ee's request for specific charges: ". . . [T]he only w-ay I can suggest helping you is that
you just go ahead and spill your feelings about all the things that you might think: might
have been involved." Id. at 31. Andrews' story of "Mr. Blank" w; as originally published in
N. Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 2, 1947, p. 3 6, col. 4.
Compare this procedure with English criminal trial practice early in the 17th century.
STEPHmN, A HisToRY or T= CnmimrAL LAW oF ENGL,' 349-E0 (1833).
The State Department Regulations, issued subsequent to the "Blank" case, authorized
a statement of the charges but continued the policy of not revealing the government's evi-
dence. See supra, note 375.
377. Report to Attorney General Biddle from the Interdepartmental Committee on In-
vestigations, in H.R. Doc. No. 833, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1942).
378. Exec. Order No. 9835, Pt. IV, § 2, 12 FED. Rm . 1933 (1947).
379. Mimeographed Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, Nov. 17, 1947, p. 2.
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ing or prosecuting officers confer ex parte with adjudicating officers
regarding the credibility of witness is, to say the least, an unusual one.
In practical effect it transfers the judge's mantle from the loyalty
board to the FBI."'
The courts have never tolerated the failure to produce in open
hearing any part of the evidence upon which the deciding official relies
in an administrative adjudication requiring a fair hearing. In a rate
adjudication early in the history of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, the Supreme Court summarily rejected such a proposition:
"The Government further insists that the Commerce Act (36
Stat. 743) requires the Commission to obtain information neces-
sary to enable it to perform the duties and carry out the objects
for which it was created, and having been given legislative power
to make rates it can act, as could Congress, on silch information,
and therefore its findings must be presumed to have been sup-
ported by such information, even though not formally proved at
the hearing. But such a construction would nullify the right to a
hearing,-for manifestly there is no hearing when the party does
not know what evidence is offered or considered and is not given
an opportunity to test, explain, or refute. The information gath-
ered under the provisions of § 12 may be used as basis for insti-
tuting prosecutions for violation of the law, and for many other
380. See, e.g., examination of an accused employee in a loyalty hearing:
"Bd. Did you ever act as an organizer for the Communist Party or attempt to recruit
others?
G. No. ...
Bd. [That you have] has been corroborated, checked, and verified.
Atty. for G. By whom?
Bd. I can't tell you.
Atty. for G .... When you say that it has been verified and corroborated, it is by
some source other than the material that the Loyalty Board has available even to it?
Bd. That is right.
Atty. for G. The Loyalty Board is supposed to pass on this man's loyalty on the basis
of evidence that it does not even have before it?
Bd .... We don't even know who the accuser is."
Transcript of hearing in the case of G .... , before Brooklyn Navy Yard Loyalty
Board, December, 1947.
Perhaps the best known trial on undisclosed evidence is the Dreyfus case. Dreyfus
was tried in camera, secret documents were utilized as basis for judgment without afford-
ing the accused an opportunity to scrutinize them, and the reported statement of an in-
former was admitted as evidence despite the fact that the prosecution refused to name its
source of information. Throughout the proceedings military intelligence exercised a con-
tinuing pressure on the judges. Dreyfus was convicted twice of treason. He was later
vindicated after it had been made clear that the secret documents were either forgeries
or not probative evidence, that the informer was non-existent, and that in fact another
officer had committed the treasonable act for which Dreyfus had been convicted. Dreyfus
had been the victim of a conspiracy of high military officers which probably would have
failed if there had been adherence to normal procedural safeguards. KAYssR, Tnm Dtay-
Fus AFFAm (1931).
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purposes, but is not available, as such, in cases where the party is
entitled to a hearing. ... In such cases the Commissioners cannot
act upon their own information as could jurors in primitive days.
All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to
be considered, and must be given opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses, to inspect documents and to offer evidence in explana-
tion or rebuttal. In no other way can a party maintain its rights
or make its defense. In no other way can it test the sufficiency of
the facts to support the finding. ... 11
The principle has been consistently reiterated, both in criminal
cases S2 and in cases of administrative adjudication.Y3 3 Such exceptions
as have been permitted-in cases of inspections, official notice, or
rule-making-have no application to loyalty adjudications. 4 The
Administrative Procedure Act codifies for federal agencies the estab-
lished law.Ys If we are correct that a determination of disloyalty re-
quires a fair administrative hearing, the failure to disclose the evidence
is a gross and fatal defect.
No less fatal to the fairness of the procedure under the Loyalty Order
is denial of the right to cross-examination. Reliance upon the FBI
report as the basis of the Government's case of course precludes any
possibility of cross-examinationY3 6 The result, once again, is to frus-
trate the accused in makinj a satisfactory defense and to thwart the
deciding officials in reaching a satisfactory judgment. It is difficult to
conceive of a situation where the right of cross-examination is more
essential.
381. I.C.C. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. 83, 93 (1913). Similarly the
California Supreme Court rejected a like proposal in an early workmen's compensation
case: "The suggestion that the succeeding passage [of the statute] gives power to the
commission to take evidence secretly, without notice to either party, and to consider it
without even giving the parties an opportunity to read the report of it, or to meet it in
any reasonable way, is contrary to all principles of justice and fairness. It cannot be
entertained for a moment. Even if the language were capable to such an interpretation, it
would be a clear violation of the right to due process of law to follow it... But ;e do
not think the section, when given a reasonable interpretation, authorizes such star-cham-
ber proceedings." Carstens v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 572, 577-3, 153 Pac. 218, 220 (1916).
382. E.g., in Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937) : "Conviction upon a charge
not made would be sheer denial of due process.'
383. United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry., 265 U.S. 274 (1924); Ohio Bell
Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n., 301 U.S. 292 (1937); Morgan v. United
States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938) ; Chew Hoy Quong v. White, 249 Fed. 869 (9th Cir. 1918) ;
Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 1920). The cases are collected in Gw.-
noax, AD.zNIsTRATIvm LAW, 512-601 (2d ed. 1947). See also Davis, The Rcqvirc-
merit of Opportmzity to be Heard in the Administratire Process, 51 YAix kJ. 1093 (1942).
384. For cases involving inspections and official notice, see GELLUen0, op. Cit. Snpra
note 383 at 236-44, 553-601. For a unique case involving rule making see Norwegian
Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
385. 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1946).
386. Richardson, Aims and Procedures of Loyalty Retiew Board, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 28, 1947, p. 28, col. 4.
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Mere perusal of the FBI report affords little opportunity for evalu-
ating the competence or credibility of informants or judging the
reliability of interviewing methods. Clearly the manner of questioning
used by the FBI agent may be extremely suggestive and may influence
the informant to make statements which he would not make on re-
flection.8 7 Such a result is even more likely where the informant has
been promised that his identity will be kept secret and that he will not
be required to appear before the agency loyalty board.8 8 Moreover,
the report which reaches the board does not contain the questions
asked, but rather consists of selected answers synthesized so as to make
up a running narrative. The possibility of distortion is thus plain.
An additional difficulty-one of semantics-is present to a high degree
in loyalty matters. There is no way of telling whether investigator and
informant understand each other when they use words like "loyalty"
and "subversive." Yet on such evidence the board must decide the
issue of loyalty.
Under these conditions the policy basis for confrontation and cross-
examination becomes manifest. Perhaps the witness is a complete
fabricator. Perhaps his imagination has been inflamed by politically
lurid accounts in the newspapers of mass subversive infiltration into
the Government service. Perhaps he has only given a partial account
of an incident. His statements may be hearsay, biased, distorted.
All these factors can be brought out through the cross-examination
process. It provides an opportunity essential for refutation or con-
firmation of the Government's case." 9
In all comparable adversary proceedings cross-examination is con-
sidered a necessary element. In administrative hearings conducted by
such agencies as the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal
Trade Commission the right to cross-examine is not questioned." 0
387. See WMoRE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF § 214 (2d ed. 1931).
388. Id. at § 213.
A recent case before a U.S. Department of Labor Loyalty Board, in which an accused
employee was permitted to confront and cross-examine a government witness, (see supra
note 372), bears this point out ". . . one of the charges against the employee was that
he was a regular reader of the Daily Worker, Communist newspaper. The Government
presented as its informant in this matter the janitor in the apartment house in which the
defendant had lived.
"The janitor is a naturalized citizen of German origin, whose sympathies were al-
leged to have been pro-Nazi before the U.S. entered the war. The defendant is a Jew.
The story the janitor told the FBI appears to have differed radically from the story
he was willing to testify to under oath.
"Under oath, the janitor would not testify that the accused was a regular reader of
the Daily Worker, but limited himself to stating that he had found the newspaper in
the accused's garbage pail 'once or twice' in the course of two years." N.Y. Star, Oct. 29,
1948, p. 4, col. 4.
389. For a full statement of the case for cross-examination see 5 WIoGMo, EVIDENCE
§ 1368 (3d ed. 1940).
390. Segal Lock & Hardware Co. v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1944), ccrl. denied,
323 U.S. 791 (1945).
[Vol. 58:1
HeinOnline -- 58 Yale L. J. 106 1948-1949
19481 LOYALTY AMONG GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 107
Even in rate making proceedings, where the use of statistical data
makes cross-examintion less significant, the right has been carefully
preserved.391 Exceptions to the general principle, such as in cases of
official notice or the use of official records,0 2 reliance upon written data
in rule making proceedings, 3 and acceptance of hearsay,, 4̂ have
never gone to the point of sanctioning the complete absence of cross-
examination in adversary proceedings. Here also legislative policy
supports judicial policy. The Administrative Procedure Act expressly
guarantees in cases of adjudication the right "to conduct such cross-
examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the
facts." 395
The Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board has acknowledged
that objections based upon the failure to disclose evidence and the
denial of cross-examination have "obvious force" and present "grave
considerations." And he has entered the following plea of confession
and avoidance:
"In nearly all cases the bureau [FBI] secures the facts for inclu-
sion in its reports from confidential sources, many of them closely
connected with considerations sounding in national security. We
are advised by the bureau, that, in its experienced opinion, prac-
tically none of the evidential sources available will continue to be
available to the bureau if proper secrecy and confidence cannot at
all times be maintained with respect to the original source of in-
formation, and that if the source of such information is to be dis-
closed--save in the exceptional cases-the bureau can be of much
less service to the board in making the essential basic investiga-
tion."
"We have given the matter the most careful consideration, and
we can see no way in which the loyalty program may have the
benefit of the skilled investigation of any competent investigative
agency, and particularly of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
unless the facts received in confidence by the investigators can be
kept entirely confidential at all times and under all conditions.
"We were, therefore, faced with the decision whether to refuse at
all times to disclose the Bureau report to the employee-save in
the exceptional cases noted above-or to advise the Civil Service
391. Cases cited supra note 383; Powhatan Mining Co. v. Ickes, 118 F2d 105 (6th
Cir. 1941). The cases are collected in GELHoRNq, op. cit. supra note 33, at 512-626.
392. Market Street Ry. v. Railroad Commission of California, 324 U.S. 54S (1945);
United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515 (1946).
393. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 2,3S U.S. 294 (1933);
Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division, 312 U.S. 126
(1941); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
394. Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197 (1938); N.L.R.B. v. Reming-
ton Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. dcnicd, 304 U.S. 576, 5S5 (1938).
395. 60 STA. 241, 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (c) (1946).
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Commission that, in our opinion, the proposed loyalty program as
planned should not be permitted to function.
"After the most careful consideration, we have concluded that
the objection to non-confrontation and no cross-examination,
while important, is not essentially controlling." 0
One finds it difficult to accept this position or reconcile it with
accepted standards of fairness in the administration of law. Public
prosecutors and police officials have often advanced the same argument
as a reason for dispensing with traditional safeguards. Thus they have
urged that convictions in vice and narcotic cases are difficult to obtain
because of the rules of evidence. Without calling informers to take the
stand, it is argued, conviction is frequently impossible for want of
evidence; but if informers are used as witnesses the defendant im-
peaches their character before the jury.397 Yet this dilemma of the pros-
ecution has never been accepted as justification for relaxing evidentlary
safeguards. And prosecuting officials, forced to accede, have found a
solution in using the informer for leads to other evidence that is less
vulnerable in open court.
The same argument has also been urged in behalf of third degree
methods for procuring evidence.9 But the courts have never been
willing to countenance confessions extracted by duress, regardless of
the advantage that laxity in such regard would afford in securing con-
victions.9 9 And recently the Supreme Court in the McNabb case
sought to give further and more adequate protection against such
methods by ruling that admissions or confessions obtained while a
defendant was being held incommunicado, contrary to statutory pro-
visions for prompt arraignment, were not admissible in evidence.1 0
Despite the anguished outcries of prosecuting officials, Congress failed
to change this rule and it was incorporated into the new Rules of the
Federal Criminal Procedure. 401
The difficulties confronting the FBI do not seem more insuperable,
nor the reasons for preserving adequate safeguards less cogent, in
loyalty cases than in the usual criminal proceeding. So far as concerns
396. Richardson, Aims and Procedures of Loyalty Review Board, N.Y. Times, Dec,
28, 1947, p. 28, cols. 4 and 5. For the F.B.I. defense of the practice see testimony of
J. Edgar Hoover before House Appropriations Committee, Hearings on Department
of Justice Appropriation Bill, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 245-7 (1947).
397. For a typical statement of the police viewpoint, see VoLLMWER, THE POLICE AND
MoDm SocmTr 87, 110-1 (1936).
398. See Warner, How Can the Third Degree Be Elininated?, 1 BILL or RiniuTs l v.Y
24 (1940).
399. See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) ; Haley v. Ohio, 68 S. Ct. 302
(1948).
400. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Anderson v. United States, 318
U.S. 350 (1943).
401. See Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 55 YAsn L. J. 694,
706-13 (1946).
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the information obtained by the FBI from the average citizen, that
agency would still be free to collect all the data it could from house-
wives, landladies, neighbors and acquaintances of the employee under
investigation. This information could be used as leads to further
inquiry. But where the Government seeks to rely upon it to prove a
serious charge of disloyalty it does not seem unreasonable to require
that the evidence be brought into the light of day and put to the test of
rebuttal and cross-examination. It hardly seems too much to ask that
an investigating agency of the FBI's reputed competence take on such
additional burden as these standards of fairness demand.
With respect to investigations aimed at discovery of more sinister
activity, involving the use of professional informers or the surveillance
of an under-cover conspiracy, the problem is no different from that
facing any police official. A judgment must be made as to when to
draw the net and "break the case." In such a situation the very filing
of charges against a particular employee would serve to warn his con-
federates. The withholding of evidence might protect confidential
sources of information for a longer period but the preservation of
traditional American rights must be taken into consideration more
than the convenience of the FBI. The record of the FBI in preventing
espionage and sabotage during the recent war, despite adherence to
evidentiary safeguards, demonstrates that the problem can be solved
without shocking departures from conventional methods.
The Supreme Court has recently taken occasion to reiterate that
enforcement officials must mould their methods to the requirements of
due process. In the case of In re Oliver the defendant had been con-
victed of contempt by a Michigan one man judge-grand jury. On
appeal the prosecution attempted to justify an incomplete record of
the contempt proceeding upon the ground that full disclosure of all the
evidence would seriously hamper the investigative activities of the
grand jury. The Court rejected sucha rationale of expedience as a
violation of due process. Justice Black defined the minimal rights of
the accused in language fully applicable to loyalty proceedings:
"XWe . . . hold that failure to afford the petitioner reasonable
opportunity to defend himself . . . was a denial of due process of
law. A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him,
and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day
in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights
include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against
him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel." *-12
402. It re Oliver, 68 S. Ct. 499, 507-S (1948).
Of course various intermediate procedures, midway between full disclosure and the
present practice, are possible. Miller and Browm have suggested that the agency loyalty
board be given full access to all the evidence, secret or othervse, and that where evidence
is withheld from the employee, the board should appoint a supplementary defense counsel
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Judicial Review. Does an employee discharged from government
employment on loyalty grounds have a: legal right to judicial review?
Should judicial review be afforded as a matter of sound government
policy? If review is made available, what should be its scope? These
questions turn upon a variety of considerations, most important of
which are the nature of the interests involved and the role which the
courts are equipped to play in relation to the employing agencies. We
turn first to an examination of legislative and judicial policy.
The Loyalty Order makes no express provision for participation by
the courts in adjudications of disloyalty. Nor is such participation
contemplated. The evidence supporting a determination of disloyalty
is, as stated, not available for inspection by the employee or the public.
Furthermore, the regulations of the Loyalty Review Board provide
that the decision by agency loyalty boards "shall state merely the
action taken," thus forbidding issuance of findings of fact or a state-
ment of reasons.10 3 Hence there is no possibility for judicial review of
the merits of a decision upon the record before the administrative
agency. Likewise there is no provision in the federal civil service
statutes which purports to afford review.
404
The absence of administrative or statutory provision does not, of
course, preclude the courts from making judicial review available.
Quite apart from such provision the right may be founded upon the
constitutional protection of due process or upon the general jurisdic-
tion of the courts. In deciding issues of this nature the courts have
usually not distinguished clearly between these two grounds for review.
Where government employees have been dismissed or disciplined for
incompetence, insubordination or other reasons not involving loyalty,
the federal courts have consistently taken the position that judicial
review will be limited to the question of whether statutory procedures
have been followed. No issue going to the merits of the dismissal will
be considered. 40 5 Many state courts have adopted the same practice,"'
although some have granted liberal review on substantive issues."7 In
who should have access to all the evidence and who may request supplementary investiga-
tion and file a special brief without disclosure to the employee. Miller and Brown, Loyally
Procedures of the A.E.C., 4 BuLL. OF THF ATomic SciENTzsTs 45 (1948).
403. Directives to the Regional Loyalty Boards, 13 FFn. RE(. 257, 259 (1948).
404. During House debate upon the Rees Bill an express provision for judicial review
was rejected. 93 CONG. REc. 8979 (1947).
405. See cases cited su ra note 360.
406. E.g., State v. McDonald, 154 Fla. 456, 18 So.2d 16 (1944) ; Nider v. City Com-
mission of Fresno, 36 Cal. App.2d 14, 97 P.2d 293 (1939).
407. E.g., Horvat v. Jenkins Twp. School Dist., 337 Pa. 193, 10 A.2d 390 (1940)
(plaintiff, the principal of a school with a three year contract, was dismissed for political
reasons; in granting his claim for all money due the court refused to be bound by the
"technical" grounds for dismissal given by the school board); Anderson v. Board of
Civil Service Commissioners, 227 Iowa 1164, 1167, 290 RI.W. 493, 494 (1940) ("The bur-
den of proving incompetency or misconduct rests on the party alleging the same");
[Vol. 58: 1
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Friedman v. Schwellenbach the court applied the rule of limited review
to a loyalty dismissal, rejecting the plea that it consider whether the
discharge was substantively justified under federal statutes.'c
While it is clear from these decisions that at least a limited judicial
review is available in loyalty cases, the practical protection afforded
employees by such review is slight. The real issue is whether the re-
view should be sufficiently broad in scope to embrace substantive
questions.
The Supreme Court has rightly been reluctant to extend judicial
review to matters of purely internal government management. In
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. it went so far as to deny any right of review
to determinations by the Secretary of Labor fixing the wage rates
which government contractors were required to meet under the Walsh-
Healy Act.40 9 The narrow limits it has placed upon review of ordinary
discharge cases is a manifestation of the same viewpoint. The position
of the Court in these cases seems entirely sound. The protection which
might be afforded through judicial supervision is heavily outweighed
by the practical difficulties of government operation if resort to the
courts is permitted and by the lesser importance attaching to the in-
terests at stake.
The Court has likewise tended to withhold the right of judicial re-
view in cases involving a simple grant of government gratuities or
privileges. Thus it has declined review in pension cases -,1 and in cases
arising under legislation affording relief to business enterprises for
losses incurred in war operations.41 1 On the other hand where a system
of government privileges has become an integral part of the economic
structure and important interests are involved, the Court has not
hesitated to afford judicial relief from improper administrative action.
Thus it has consistently reviewed action of the Post Office Department
in denying use of mailing privileges under the postal laws.11
The Court has shown a disinclination to extend judicial review to
State v. Williams, 149 Fla. 48, 58, 5 So2d 269, 273 (1941) (appellate court granted
certiorari on the ground that the personnel officer had certified petitioner's service rating
to be 100 per cent; the Court stated that it found "no evidence that tends to overcome
this rating or even to challenge it"). See also recent Virginia legislation which pro-
vides for a judicial trial de novo for employees dismissed on charges of taking part in a
strike. Va. Code § 2695i (1948). Cf. New York Civil Service Act, which grants only
limited review. L 1947, c. 391, (1947).
408. 159 F2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1946) ; see notes 361 and 362 supra.
409. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
410. Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Peters 496 (1840); but cf. Dismuke Y. United States,
297 U.S. 167 (1936).
411. Butte, A. &- P. Ry. v. United States, 290 U.S. 127 (1933); Work v. Rives, 267
U.S. 175 (1925).
412. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902);
Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
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certain administrative actions involving labor disputes,413 or to situa-
tions where the interests affected are indirect or remote.4" But in the
field of business regulation it has in recent years taken increasing pains
to assure judicial review to persons whose interests are directly and
substantially affected.
415
Under the principles of the foregoing decisions the case for judicial
review in loyalty adjudications is a persuasive one. The practical rea-
sons for denying review in matters of internal government operation
are not serious if review be confined to loyalty issues. The cases have
not been so numerous as to obstruct governmental machinery. The
decision does not turn on subtle issues of workmanship largely within
the sole competence of the employing agency. On the other hand the
interests at stake are vital, as the Lovett case recognized, and reach far
beyond narrow limits of personnel administration. The major con-
siderations which have led to granting review in the past are thus
present to a high degree in loyalty adjudications.
Indeed there are certain factors which make judicial review particu-
larly appropriate in loyalty cases. Judicial review, by its very nature,
operates as a block upon administrative action. It is not adapted to
securing affirmative results. Its function is rather a negative one; by
imposing the judgment of two bodies before final action can be taken
it serves as a double check on the possibility of wrongful action. This
characteristic of judicial review is of doubtful advantage in many gov-
ernment operations where regulation of property rights is involved
and the need for swift and positive accomplishment is imperative. But
where rights under the First Amendment are at stake-rights to which
the courts have consistently given a preferred constitutional status-
the negative features of judicial review serve an especially useful pur-
pose. In such situations the presumption of administrative legality is
reversed, or at least neutral, and careful scrutiny by a second agency
becomes of positive value.
It is possible to trace a recognition of this principle in the Supreme
Court decisions dealing with judicial review of civil rights. An out-
standing example is the attitude of the Court toward the attempted
413. Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Meditation Board, 320 U.S.
297 (1943) ; General Committee v. M-K-T Ry., 320 U.S. 323 (1943); American Federa-
tion of Labor v. N.L.1.B., 308 U.S. 401 (1940) ; N.L.R.B. v. International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, 308 U.S. 413 (1940); Inland Empire District Council v. Millis,
325 U.S. 697 (1945) ; and cases cited infra note 435.
414. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Tennessee Power Co. v.
T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118 (1939) ; Standard Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U.S. 571 (1919).
415. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); Stark
v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944); L. P. Steuart & Bro. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398 (1944);
Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947); Parker v. Fleming, 329 U.S. 531
(1947) ; Illinois Packing Co. v. Snyder, 151 F.2d 337 (Emerg. Ct. App. 1945). But cf.
Chicago & So. Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 68 S. Ct. 431 (1948).
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deportation of Harry Bridges, the west coast labor leader. Despite the
fact that it was operating within the relatively narrow scope of review
afforded by a habeas corpus proceeding the Court not only insisted
upon rigid adherence to procedural standards in the administrative
proceeding but virtually substituted its judgment for that of the
Department of Justice on the substantive issue whether the evidence
before that agency warranted deportation under the applicable stat-
ute.416 The Court has likewise gone out of its way to assure judicial
review in Selective Service cases. 417 And recently it has shown a
similar concern on issues of freedom of the press.
418
Legislative policy has paralleded the course of judicial decision in
making court review increasingly available. Most legislation setting up
machinery for business or other controls in recent years has made ex-
press provision for judicial review. And in the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act Congress codified and extended the right:
"Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2)
agency action is by law committed to agency discretion-
(a) RiGHT OF REVIEw,-Any person suffering legal wrong be-
cause of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be
entitled to judicial review thereof.
(c) RVIEWABLE Acrs.-Every agency action made reviewable
by statute and every final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to judicial re-
view." 419
This provision would seem to apply to loyalty adjudications. In
view of the constitutional rights involved it can scarcely be said that
dismissal on loyalty grounds is an action "committed to agency dis-
cretion." Under the Lovett case an employee so discharged would
clearly have suffered a "legal wrong." A proceeding, in the Court of
Claims or elsewhere, which did not afford review on substantive issues
would hardly constitute an "adequate remedy." The requirements of
the Act would thus seem fulfilled.
In view of the above considerations it is fair to conclude, not only
that sound policy dictates judicial review on substantive issues in
loyalty cases, but that judicial precedent and the Administrative
416. Bridges v. Wxon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); cf. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S.
276 (1922).
417. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946); Gibson v. United States, 329 U.S.
338 (1946).
418. Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946). For a general summary of the
Supreme Court decisions granting or denying judicial review of administrative action, see
Davis, Nonreviewable Administrative Action, 96 U. or PA. L. REv. 749 (1948).
419. 60 STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1946).
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Procedure Act affords the right. Such review should be conducted on
the basis of an open record made by the loyalty boards and should be
as broad in scope as that provided in the Administrative Procedure
Act.
42 0
Other Procedural Safeguards. In addition to a full and open hearing,
and to judicial review, there are certain other procedural protections
which should be afforded an accused employee. These may be sum-
marized briefly:
(1) The Loyalty Order provides that the basis for disqualification of
an applicant or employee "shall be that, on all the evidence, reasonable
grounds exist for the belief that the person involved is disloyal to the
Government of the United States." 421 This standard of proof is
unique in judicial and administrative adjudication. It requires the
loyalty board to rule that an applicant or employee is disloyal, not on a
preponderance of the evidence, but merely if any rational basis for that
conclusion appears in the record. The Administrative Procedure Act
stipulates that administrative adjudications shall be "in accordance
with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." 422 No less
stringent requirements should be imposed in loyalty cases.
(2) When an employee does not have the means to hire counsel, he
ought to be furnished counsel at government expense.
(3) An employee should have the right to subpoena witnesses. The
Attorney General has proposed something less than this: that the
government pay traveling and other expenses of witnesses needed by
the defense.
423
420. "ScopE OF RmEvw.--So far as necessary to decision and where presented the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any agency
action. It shall (A) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed;
and (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to ba
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity; (3) in excess
of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) with-
out observance of procedure required by law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence
in any case subject to the requirements of sections 7 [Hearings] and 8 [Decisions] or
otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (6) un-
warranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the re-
viewing court. In making the foregoing determinations the court shall review the whole
record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party, and due account shall be
taken of the rule of prejudicial error." 60 STAT. 243, 244, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (e) (1946).
421. Exec. Order 9835, Pt. V, § 1, 12 FED. REG, 1938 (1947) (Italics supplied). In prac-
tice, the'standard has been applied as follows: "In a loyalty hearing the employees can
only be informed of the evidence against him in a general way .... Despite this, the et-
ployee has to assume the burden of proof in rebutting the information presented in his
charge." Transcript of hearing in case of M -, before Brooklyn Navy Yard Loyalty
Board, February 1948, p. 3.
422. 60STAT. 241, 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (c) (1946).
423. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1948, p. 13, col. 4. In Memorandum No. 13, July 7, 1948, the
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(4) The testimony of all witnesses should be under oath. The
requirement of an oath tends to impress on witnesses the seriousness
of the proceeding as well as to lay a foundation for perjury. 
4
(5) The record of the proceeding should be made available to an
accused employee. The State Department has refused to grant de-
fending employees even transcripts of the hearing.42
(6) Provision should be made for the furnishing of a bill of par-
ticulars.
(7) An agency board decision on loyalty should contain a statement
of the findings of fact and a statement of the reasons for the conclusion
reached.
(8) A loyalty hearing should be public, at least to the extent of
permitting the accused to invite close friends, relatives and observ-
ers.4
2 6
(9) Great care should be exercised in the selection of those who are
to serve on the agency boards. It would be best to select individuals
not in the public service, since they are not subject to the pressures of
executive superiors or legislative investigators. A good source of selec-
tion might be from among retired civil servants. This seems to have
been the experience of the British.
27
(10) In cases where the Government feels that it is seriously en-
dangered by the retention of an employee, the device of suspension,
pending the results of an investigation and hearing, may be utilized.4 2
Procedural Rights of Organizations
The authority conferred upon an administrative official to designate
organizations or groups as subversive or disloyal raises novel issues of
Loyalty Review Board enunciated the following principle: "If and when an employee is re-
stored to duty on the ground that his suspension or removal was improperly made, it be-
comes the duty of the employing Department or Agency to pay him the salary or compen-
sation that was lost."
424. Under the Loyalty Review Board's regulations such witnesses as are heard,
primarily witnesses for the accused employee, are required to testify under oath. The
Operations of the Loyalty Review Board, 13 FED. R . 254, 255 (194); Directives to
the Departments and Agencies, 13 Fmn. Rao. 255, 256 (1948).
425. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1947, p. 8, col. 7. The Loyalty Review Board regulations
provide that a copy of the transcript of the testimony taken at the oral hearing shall b2
furnished the employee. Directives to the Regional Loyalty Boards, 13 FED. RaF,. 257,
259 (1948).
426. See Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Ta i. L.Q. 381 (1932) for an ap-
proach which might prove desirable in loyalty hearings. Loyalty Review Board Reg-
ulations now limit attendance to the employee, his counsel and the witness who is testify-
ing. Directives to the Regional Loyalty Boards, supra, note 425.
427. See infra p. 126.
428. This is provided for in Exec. Order No. 9835, Pt. II, § 4, 12 FED. REa. 1937-33
(1947). For other suggestions with respect to procedure, including rotating membership
on the agency loyalty boards, see the excellent discussion in Miller and Brown, Loyalty
Procedures of the A.E.C., 4 Buu. OF THE Aromic Scmmicas 45 (1948).
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profound importance. No precedent exists, so far as we are aware,
for the exercise of this far-reaching power by an executive officer.
42 9
The wisdom of utilizing the administrative process, rather than the
more rigid procedures of the courts, to make adjudications in this
sensitive and vital field of political liberty-adjudications that closely
approach criminal proceedings-is open to grave question. That
such authority should be placed in the Attorney General-Chief
of the Government's prosecuting agency and ultimate director of its
political intelligence bureau-seems plainly unsound.
Apart from this fundamental issue, however, there remain vital
questions of procedure. The Loyalty Order places no procedural
limitation upon the Attorney General's power to designate an organ-
ization or group as "totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive,"
or otherwise within the ban of the Order. No provision is made for a
hearing or any participation by the accused organization. In practice
the Attorney General has made his determinations wholly without
notice or hearing of any kind, and without making any findings or
giving any statement of reasons for his action. He has simply published
his list.41
°
This procedure-or rather lack of procedure-seems even less
defensible on policy grounds than the partial hearing afforded an
accused employee. The blow dealt to an organization by the Attorney
General's designation is, as already pointed out, just as grave as in the
case of the employee. The impairment of rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment is more far-reaching in its consequences. It be-
comes particularly important that an open hearing be held so that the
public may judge for itself the nature of the evidence and may take
appropriate steps to protest or check the Attorney General's course of
action. Likewise the need for protection through judicial review be-
comes more imperative.
The official justification for denial of hearing and review to organi-
zations labelled subversive has never been clearly enunciated. It may
be assumed that the framers of the Loyalty Order had in mind the
429. A similar procedure for administrative determination that an organization is a
"communist political organization" or a "communist front organization" was incorporated
in Section 13 of the Mundt bill. H.R. 5852, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1948). See supra
p. 21.
430. See supra p. 32. The Order does not even require publication of the list, but
the Attorney General has thus far made his designations public. The Attorney General,
at the request of the Loyalty Review Board, wrote the Board a letter giving his reasons
for designating the Communist Party. The letter recited prior legislative and adminis-
trative rulings, without giving specific factual data. Letter from Attorney General Clark
to Seth W. Richardson, May 27, 1948 (mimeographed). In Memorandum No. 2, March 9,
1948, the Loyalty Review Board ruled that Agency Boards were not to "enter upon any
evidential investigation . . . for the purpose of attacking, contradicting, or modifying the
controlling conclusion reached by the Attorney General" regarding a designated organiza-
tion. The ruling was repeated in Memorandum No. 12, June 23, 1948.
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same considerations advanced in connection with the denial of similar
rights to employees-the need to protect informers. But this argument
has even less substance here. Where an entire organization is charged
with disloyalty the use of informers as witnesses is a far less costly proc-
ess than in the case of an individual. The convenience to enforcement
officials must, in this situation again, be subordinated to the protection
of basic rights.43'
Certain additional legal questions arise out of the fact that designa-
tion by the Attorney General does not compel an organization to do or
refrain from doing anything. It is therefore argued that the action is
purely "informatory," a simple finding of fact, with no "legal" con-
sequences and giving rise to no "legal wrong." It is also urged that the
finding is made in connection with an internal problem of government
administration and its impact on the organization is secondary and
incidental. The argument concludes, upon the basis of these consid-
erations, that a designated organization can make no assertion to a
hearing or judicial review.
432
It is true that the government undoubtedly has broad powers to
conduct ex parte investigations and to publish its findings. iMany
government agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Bureau of Standards,
commonly perform functions of this sort. Under many circumstances
these inquires should certainly give rise to no right of hearing or judicial
review. The important power of the government to collect information
and advise the public should not be hindered by formal requirements
unless countervailing interests of the individual or the common welfare
are compelling.
There have been a number of decisions in which the courts have re-
fused to place procedural limitations on this fact-finding function of
government. The leading case is Standard Scale Co. v. Farrell.433
There the State Superintendent of Weights and Measures published in
431. It may be noted that the Mundt bill, which authorizes the Attorney General to
designate "communist political organizations" and "communist front organizations,"
thereby subjecting them to the requirement of registration and other severe restrictions,
does make provision for a full hearing and judicial review. H.R. 5852 80th Cong., 2d
Sess., §§ 13(2), 14 (1948). The House Committee reporting the Mundt bill took the view
that this procedure "will eventually replace the e% parte findings under the present loyalty
order." Report of the Subcommittee on Legislation of the Committee on Un-American
Activities, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1948) [committee print].
432. If the lack of adequate procedure is raised by a discharged employee in a pro-
ceeding to review his dismissal, the issue would be governed by the considerations just
discussed. The question here goes to the rights of the organization itself to raise the
matter in a suit for injunction or declaratory judgment. Several such suits, brought by
organizations designated by the Attorney General, are now pending. See, e.g., Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Clark (D. D.C., complaint dismissed v.ithout opinion
June 4, 1948; now on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia).
433. 249 U.S. 571 (1919).
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a monthly bulletin a statement of specifications which concluded that,
in order to maintain accuracy, a certain kind of scale required an auto-
matic device which would allow for changes in temperature. The
Standard Scale Company, manufacturers of such scales, did not install
this device and were adversely affected because city and county bureaus
of weights and measures, basing their decisions on the specifications
deemed necessary by the State Superintendent, refused to certify the
company's scales as accurate. The Superintendent had held no formal
hearing but he had published his opinion after "prolonged investigation
and extensive experimentation" and had given the scale company
opportunity to present its views both before and after publication.
The company sued to have the Superintendent's statement of specifi-
cations declared void. The suit failed, the Supreme Court holding that
the statement was not a formal regulation but merely "advisory" and
"educational," not coercive in its effect.
Similarly the Supreme Court has held that there was no right to
judicial review of the findings of the Railroad Labor Board, published
in an effort to mediate a labor dispute and imposing no legal obligation
upon the contestants. 4 4 During the war the courts likewise declined
to review the decisions of the National War Labor Board, an agency
established by Executive Order to adjust labor controversies in war
industries.435 And the Supreme Court has also refused to review pre-
liminary or intermediate administrative action, subject to review at a
later state of the administrative process, even though incidental injury,
such as impairment of credit standing or cost of litigation, might
result.41
In other situations, however, the Supreme Court has granted
review of administrative action even though the individual invoking
judicial protection was not compelled to act or to refrain from action.
Thus in Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States the Court per-
mitted a chain broadcasting system to seek review of regulations of
the Federal Communications Commission which established con-
ditions for licensing independent stations that had contractual re-
lations with the system. The Court said:
434. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Railroad Labor Board, 261 U.S. 72 (1923); cf. Pennsyl-
vania Railroad System v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 U.S. 203 (1925).
435. Employers Group of Motor Freight Carriers v. N.W.L.B., 143 F.2d 145 (D.C.
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944). The Executive Order creating the
N.W.L.B. gave it no enforcing powers. The courts reached the same conclusion, however,
even where a second Executive Order imposed the obligation on other agencies to en-
force the Board's decisions through withdrawal of allocation of scarce materials and by
other similar methods. N.W.L.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 144 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 774 (1944); N.W.L.B. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 145 F.2d 97
(D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 856 (1945).
436. United States v. Los Angeles & S.L. R.R., 273 U.S. 299 (1927); Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp,,
327 U.S. 540 (1946).
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"Appellant's standing to maintain the present suit in equity is
unaffected by the fact that the regulations are not directed to ap-
pellant and do not in terms compel action by it or impose penalties
upon it because of its action or failure to act. It is enough that, by
setting the controlling standards for the Commission's action, the
regulations purport to operate to alter and affect adversely ap-
pellant's contract rights and business relations with station owmers
whose applications for licenses the regulations ,ill cause to be re-
jected and whose licenses the regulations may cause to be re-
voked." 43
And in Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission the
Court granted judicial review to a group of corporations which asserted
that they would be damaged from the release of information by an
administrative agency. The Commission had collected data from vari-
ous coal producers pertaining to production costs and prices. There-
after it announced that these data would be made public in connection
with a contemplated hearing on coal prices. Claiming that the infor-
mation had been collected on a confidential basis and that the statute
prohibited publication, certain coal producers filed suit to enjoin dis-
closure. The Court ruled that it possessed jurisdiction to review the
Commission's action:
"Considering the circumstances here alleged, the great and
obvious damage which might be suffered, the importance of the
rights asserted, and the lack of any other remedy, we think com-
plainants could properly ask relief in equity." "-s
It is thus apparent that the question whether action by an adminis-
trative agency in the nature of fact finding will be held subject to
procedural safeguards will depend upon the character of the action and
the nature of the interests affected. The action of the Attorney Gen-
eral in declaring organizations subversive seems scarcely comparable
to that of the administrative officials in the Standard Scale case. The
problem there was one of mechanical testing, capable of relatively
precise determination through scientific methods. Furthermore no
issue of civil rights was involved. In the labor cases the courts appar-
ently felt that the matters in dispute were better handled through
437. 316 U.S. 407, 422 (1942). But cf. Hearst Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission, 167 F2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948). See Stark v. Vickard, 321 U.S. 283 (1944).
438. 306 U.S. 56, 60 (1939). Other cases in which the courts have granted review of
actions by administrative agencies in malting information public are Bank of America
v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100 (D.C. Cir. 1939), and American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v.
S.E.C., 93 F2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937). In the latter case the court said: "Here the peti-
tions for review allege irreparable injury through the threatened disclosure of the in-
formation... In such case it is fundamental that the property rights of the citizen
may not be put in jeopardy or destroyed in any proceeding before an administrative
board without notice, hearing, and judicial review... ." Id. at 239. Cf. Shields v. Utah
Idaho Central R.R., 305 U.S. 177, 182 (1938).
HeinOnline -- 58 Yale L. J. 119 1948-1949
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
mediation devices than through legal procedures. The cases refusing
review at intermediate stages raise questions of exhausting adminis-
trative remedies.
On the other hand the interests involved in an administrative finding
that a particular organization is subversive are of a totally different
kind. The fact that the injury arises out of the publicity flowing from
official action does not diminish its significance. On the contrary
publicity has come to play an increasingly crucial role in government
operations and is particularly effective in the civil rights area. To
permit executive action of this sort, unrestrained by elemental safe-
guards of due process, is to jeopardize a most vital part of the demo-
cratic process.
Many years ago a keen observer of American democracy recognized
the dangers in allowing unrestrained executive control over the right
of free association:
"This is more especially true when the executive government has
a discretionary power of allowing or prohibiting associations.
When certain associations are simply prohibited by law, and the
courts of justice have to punish infringements of that law, the evil
is far less considerable. Then every citizen knows beforehand
pretty nearly what he has to expect. . . . But if the legislature
should invest a man with a power of ascertaining beforehand
which associations are dangerous and which are useful and should
authorize him to destroy all associations in the bud or to allow
them to be formed, as nobody would be able to foresee in what
cases associations might be established and in what cases they
would be put down, the spirit of association would be entirely
paralyzed. . . . I do not concede that any government has the
right of enacting the latter." 41
IX. THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN GRANTING
POLITICAL LIBERTY TO CIVIL SERVANTS
Every country with a large scale governmental structure has faced
the problem of the extent to which public employees should be granted
political liberty.4 0 The extreme democratic view, put forth by the
French civil service unions, asserts that a civil servant has two roles,
that of employee of the State and that of private citizen, and contends
that a civil servant ought to have full political freedom when not
formally serving the government. 441 At the other extreme is the
439. DE TOCQUEVILLE. 2 DEMOCRACY wI AMERICA 117 n. 1 (Bradley ed., 1945).
440. See generally, MORSTEIN MARX, ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC ADMiNIsTRATION Ch. 21
(1946); KINGSLEY, REPRESENTATIVE BuREAucRAcY (1944); MORSTEPIN MARX, PuBLIC
MANAGEMFENT IN THE NEW DEMOCRACY (1940); MOSHER AND KINGSLEY, PUBLIc PER-
SONNEL ADMINISTRATION Ch. xvi (1936); FINER, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN
GOVERNMENT (Part VII) (1932).
441. SHARP, PUBLIC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN FRANCE, in CIVIL SERVICE ABROAD
139-53 (1935).
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totalitarian view. The Nazis looked on civil servants as "Hitler's
soldiers in plain clothes." 442 Employment by the State was therefore
conditioned on positive political support of the National Socialist
Party.
A middle view urges the idea of political neutrality. This concept
can, of course, be meaningful only in a democratic society. It is based
on the theory that the civil service serves the nation, no matter which
political party happens to be temporarily in power. Partisan political
activity by government employees is considered damaging to public
confidence in the civil service. Therefore it is felt that some degree of
political liberty must be surrendered by the public servant. But this
curtailment of liberty, being contrary to the main principles of a demo-
cratic society, should be held to the minimum consonant with main-
taining public faith in the fairness of the government service.
The experience of four countries-France, Great Britain, Italy and




In the last ten years the French civil servant has known freedom of
expression and organization under the Third Republic, followed by the
repressive regime of Vichy, and finally a return to conditions approxi-
mating those of the Third Republic.
The government of the Third Republic granted its employees a
maximum of political freedom. Membership in any legally recognized
political party was an accepted right. In addition, civil servants were
permitted to engage in party activities outside working hours, so long
as their government work did not suffer. 4 A public employee could
even run for office. If he wished to devote all his time to his campaign,
he was granted a leave of absence. If he felt that his spare time was
sufficient, he might maintain his position with full pay. Should his
442. MORSTEIN MnARx, CivI SERvicE ix GERMSANY, in CQviL SERvicn Arno.% 266 (1935).
443. These four countries were selected primarily because of the availability of adequate
data. The problem in the Soviet Union is somewhat different because of the high per-
centage of workers who are employees of the government. Detailed information with
regard to standards and procedures applicable to that segment of the Soviet population
which corresponds to the United States government working force could not be obtained.
It is dear, of course, that employment in the Soviet government, as in all phases of Soviet
life, demands full conformity with current political ideology. For a recent analysis, see
the series of articles by Werth, Russia, Pis and Minus, 167 NATio. 118, 156, 178, 207
(1948).
444. SHAnP, PUBLIC PERSONNEL MA'NAGEMENT IN FRANCE, in CIVIL SEavIcE AnnoAD 151
(1935). "Although freedom of political thought and action v.'as permitted, public ex-
pression of unpopular opinions on moral or patriotic matters might result in severe
punishment. Thus, teachers have suffered dismissal for engaging in birth control
propaganda or pacificist demonstrations." Id. at 151-2.
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candidacy prove unsuccessful, he was entitled to full reinstatement."'
Loyalty tests were unknown under the Third Republic.
4"1
To protect the civil servant from abuse in the application of dis-
ciplinary standards, the civil service regulations and practices pro-
vided extensive procedural safeguards. A public employee accused of
an act which would subject him to discipline had the right to inspect
his personnel file, including all confidential documents made part of
the record in his case.4 ' At the trial before a specialized disciplinary
board, composed of members selected from his department, a pro-
cedure analogous to that of courts was followed: "adverse pleadings,
right of defense, obligation to give reasoned decisions, etc." "I On
appeal the Council of State, an administrative court which reviewed
all serious disciplinary decisions, was empowered to revoke administra-
tive judgments based on religion or politics. For instance, if a civil
servant could show that his position was eliminated by his department
head because of the employee's unorthodox political beliefs, the Coun-
cil of State was required to reverse the change and return the public
employee to his position. 449 Thus, "reasons of security" were not per-
mitted to interfere with the government worker's right to defend his
character and his position.
During the period of Petain's rule, public service workers were re-
quired to swear a number of oaths. The Vichy Civil Oath stated that
the employee had never belonged to any of a listed number of organi-
zations, including such groups as the Mixed International Order for
Human Rights and the Theosophical Society. Past or present affilia-
tion with such organizations was the basis for dismissal from the
service.450 In addition, the public servant was forced to swear an oath
445. Ibid. See generally pp. 139-153. So far was freedom of political action carried
that Sharp concluded that "civic and political activity outside working hours has been
only partially reconciled with the demands of efficiency and neutrality while on duty."
Ibid.
446. "We do not know of any particular criterion of loyalty required of Civil Servants
in France before the Vichy Government. Civil Servants in France have always been
chosen by competitive examinations. The requirements, essentially, are that candidates
have no police record, that they be French citizens, that they have the degrees required
for the examinations to which they wish to present themselves. In the present Govern-
ment, the pre-war criterion has been adhered to. . . ." Communication to the authors,
from the Information Service of the French Embassy, Oct. 22, 1947.
447. Finance Law of April 23, 1905, Article 65.
448. Lefas, The French Civil Service in WHITE, THE CIVIL SERVIcE IN T11'I MODMLN
STAm 251-3 (1930).
449. Id. at 260.
450. The full oath reads as follows: "I the undersigned declare upon oath that I have
never belonged to any one of the following societies under any designation whatever: the
Grand Orient de France, Grande Loge de France, Grande Lodge Nationale Ind6pente,
Ordre Mixte International du Droit Humain, Socidt6 Th~osophique, Grand Pricur6 de
Gaules, or to any one of the branches or off-shoots of said societies whatever, or to any
society prescribed by the law of August 14, 1940, and I pledge my word upon my honor
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of allegiance to the person of Marshal Petain. 0 ' Should future in-
vestigation reveal that the oath was taken in bad faith the accused
was liable to forfeit "his liberty, his life and his worldly possessions." 452
Liberation wiped out the Vichy concept of loyalty. With the excep-
tion of the purge committees, which on an informal basis purified the
public service of those employees who had willingly aided the Ger-
mans,4 53 the government service revived the standards used to delimit
political liberty and the procedural safeguards employed in pre-Vichy
days.
Britain
Tradition and custom, to a far greater extent than statute, shape
standards of conduct and disciplinary practice in the British Civil
Service. 454 The general attitude of the government service is that
political rights must be tempered in the interest of preserving neu-
trality. The goal is to have an administrative instrument of an im-
that I shall never make common cause with them in the event that they should he re-con-
stituted either directly or indirectly."
The material for notes 450 through 453 was provided by the Information Service
of the French Embassy.
451. "1 swear fidelity to the person of the Chief of State and I promise to discharge
my duties for the good of the State and in accordance with the laws of honor and of
probity." Ibid.
452. Administrative Ruling, August 24, 1941. The Ruling also provides: "Outside
of civil liability, penalties may constitute deprivation of political rights, placement under
surveillance, administrative internment, and imprisonment [for those considered re-
sponsible for the recent war fiasco]. These penalties are to attach to every former
Minister, high functionary and high dignitary in office within less than ten years. One
may, however, in order to seek out those responsible for the war go back as far as 1931."
For a further account of measures taken by the Vichy Regime, see PvrrnzAx, Tri
GRAvE DiGoGEs oF FRANcE 472-5 (1944).
453. Conduct warranting dismissal -vas defined generally as (1) "kmowingly aiding
the enemy or his allies; (2) directly or indirectly injuring the unity of the nation or the
liberty of Frenchmen or the equality among the latter." Specific criteria were: "(1)
participation in the Government or pseudo-Government during the period of enemy occu-
pation; (2) having occupied a responsible executive function in the propaganda services
of said Government; (3) having occupied a responsible function in the Department re-
sponsible for the regulation and liquidation of French and non-French Jews; (4) having
become a member or having remained a member after January 1, 1941, even though with-
out active participation in any collaborationist organization; (5) having participated in
the organization of artistic, economic, political or any other manifestation in favor of
collaboration with the enemy; (6) having published articles or made speeches in favor of
the enemy, collaboration, racism or totalitarian doctrines." The Repression of Collabora-
tionist Acts in DoCUmENTARY NOTmS AND STUDIES No. 245, at 7-S (French State De-
partment of Information, 1946).
454. See generally, GLADDEN, THE Crv. Smvicn: ITS PronrLsjs AND FUTI'rn (1945);
GLADDEN, CIvI SERvicE STAFF RELATiONSHIPS (1943); CoHEN, THE GnowT or 'mr
BriSH CIvIL Savmwcn (1941) ; FnxER, THE BRmsH CIL SER IcE (1937) ; WnT, The
Britsh Civil Service in CVIL SF.Rw ADoAD (1935); FiNEr, Tim BruTisn Crxvi
SERvxcE (1927).
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partial and efficient character which can serve any party that captures
the support of the electorate. To achieve this end it is customary for
civil servants not to take an "overt part in public political affairs." "I
It is considered proper to vote and to participate in party matters if a
"certain reticence" is observed. However, should an employee of the
government wish to run for Parliament, regulations require that he
resign from his position as soon as he announces his candidacy
5 0
Faith in the 'loyalty" of the British public employee was severely
tested by the General Strike of 1926. As a result of the sympathetic
acts of some of the civil service trade union officials and the demand
of employee representatives that government employees not be used
to fill the positions of strikers, the Conservative government in power
included public employees in the Trade Disputes Act of 1927.111 Clause
V of that Act prohibited government workers from belonging to any
union affiliated with unions of non-government workers or with any
political party. This restraint on the right of civil servants to organize
economically and politically was removed by the repeal of the Trade
Disputes Act in 1946 .48
With respect to procedures, in theory the department head has full
power to discharge subordinates at will; there are no established pro-
cedural safeguards, and no appeal or judicial review.4 19 Nevertheless,
should a public service employee be dismissed on political grounds by
his department head, he would not be in a hopeless position. The ag-
455. FINER, THE BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE 74-82 (1928). "By generations of custom and
precedent, the loyalty of the civil service to the government of the day is universally ac-
cepted, both by ministers and by the service itself. . . .Members of the civil service may
have private convictions of their own on matters of public policy, but they do not allow
them to color the impartial advice which it is their duty to give to ministers." WmTa1
The British Civil Service in CIVIL SERVICE ABROAD 44 et seq. (1935).
456. Id. at 46.
457. Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927, 17 & 18 GEo. V, c. 22. For an
account of the conduct of the Civil Service unions leading up to the passage of the Act,
see WHITE, THE BRITISH CIVIL SERvIcE, in CIvIL SERVIcE ABROAD 48-51 (1935).
"After the strike the Whitley system was able to return to its ordinary function and
to protect from possible victimization members of the staff who were liable to be subjected
to the antagonisms engendered by the costly political experiment. Assurances were
sought and obtained that references to the actions of individuals during the strike should
not appear in their personal records and so affect their future careers." GLAD N, CIVIL
SERVICE STAFF RELATIONSHIPS 67 (1943).
458. The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1946 9 & 10 GEo. 6, c. 52.
459. "Security of tenure rests entirely upon usage. . . .An interesting sidelight upon
the peculiar nature of the civil servant's terms of tenure is reflected by the power of dis-
missal for delinquency or inefficiency which rests entirely with the head of the department.
There is no appeal against his decision. It speaks volumes for the excellent spirit and at-
mosphere of goodwill that, despite this somewhat autocratic element in its organization,
there is no strong demand in the Civil Service for the whole matter to be placed upon a
more logical basis. In effect, the number of dismissals is not great and there is no evi-
dence of any tendency to victimization." GLADDEN, THE CIVIL SERVICE: ITS PaonaLVM'-
AND FUTURE 40-1 (1945). See FINER, THE BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE 166 (1937).
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grieved employee can always turn to the Whitley Council in his de-
partment for redress. These councils are composed of members chosen
equally from the staff and from the topmost policy-making officials.
Most personnel grievances are resolved by them. While their decisions
are not binding, in practice the party in power invariably supports
them.- 0 Any tendency to political victimization on the part of a high
official would thus be quickly frustrated. The fact that very few cases
of a political nature come before the councils indicates that adminis-
trators who have the power to dismiss rarely misuse it."0' It is recog-
nized that an opposite policy would have a deleterious affect on service
morale.
Today, with the exception of those employed on "secret" govern-
ment work, there is no limitation on the political freedom of govern-
ment workers to join political parties of their choice--and this includes
the Communist Party-provided that there is adherence to the canon
of civil service respectability. In other words there is full political
freedom limited by the injunction against public display.0 2
Recently the Prime Minister announced a new policy governing
employees who handle "secret" State documents:
"The government have . . . reached the conclusion that the
only prudent course to adopt is to insure that no one who is known
to be a member of the Communist Party, or to be associated with
it in a way to raise legitimate doubts about his or her reliability, is
employed in connection with work, the nature of which is vital to
the security of the State." "I
The same rule applies to those actively associated with fascist or-
460. WHrrx, WirrLEY CouNciLs ix THE BRnisn Cwnm Sruavic 9-26 (1933). "It
is usual for the Staff side. . . vigorously to pursue any cases where they imagine in-
justice to have been done." GLADD.N, Cimm Snavicn ST.&Fn RPLTIO:NSniPS 52-3 (1943).
461. GLADDEN, op. cit. supra, note 459.
462. Espionage activity, on the other hand, is treated as a serious crime: "A person
who (1) uses information in his possession for the benefit of any foreign power or in any
other manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State, or (2) makes for any
purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State any sketch, plan, model, or note
which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an
enemy, or (3) for any purpose prejuaicial to the safety or interests of the State obtains,
collects, records, publishes or communicates to any other person any secret official code
word or pass word, any sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document or informa-
tion which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful
to any enemy is guilty of a felony." Mus;ToE, THE LAW AND OnGATNZATION OF Tn
BaIrisH Civi. SEmvicE 113-4 et seq. (1932).
463. 83 Hansard 1704, farch 1948. Preceding the exposition of the standard, the
Prime Minister offered an explanation in justification: "It is not suggested that in
matters affecting the security of the State all those who adhere to the Communist Party
would allow themselves thus to forget their primary loyalty to the State. But there is no
way of distinguishing such people from those who, if opportunity offered, would be
prepared to endanger the security of the State in the interests of another power." M14d.
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ganizations. Wherever possible the Government will transfer an
employee whose loyalty is in doubt to a position involving "non-secret
Government work." Only if an equivalent non-secret position is not
available will the employee be dismissed, 4"4 The machinery for deter-
ming disloyalty provides for a hearing before an impartial board,
disclosure of the Government's case, and full opportunity to rebut."'
Evidently, the British loyalty program affects only a very small num-
ber of government employees.
466
Italy
In a totalitarian state the highest value is placed on conformity
with the principles of the party of the dictatorship.1 7 Study of the
basic civil service statute in Fascist Italy reveals this emphasis on
conformity. An applicant for the Italian civil service, in addition to
required moral and academic attributes, must have comported himself
politically in a manner acceptable to the appointing authority.46S Polit-
ical orthodoxy was likewise demanded by the oath of allegiance:
"I swear that I do not belong to an association or party whose
activities are not in harmony with my official duties, nor will I
belong to one." 469
To rid the service of disloyal elements, the Civil Service Code estab-
lished extremely flexible criteria. These were sufficiently vague to
allow department chiefs to discipline or dismiss employees without hay-
464. Id. at 1705. Recently, a leading atomic research scientist was removed from his
government research post because of membership in the British Communist Party. The
Government rejected his defense of having resigned from the party on accepting a govern-
ment position. The scientist was, however, not dismissed, but suspended with full pay
pending an effort to place him in some non-secret government work. N.Y. Times, Sept.
7, 1948, p. 10, col. 5.
465. "The security authorities are to be neither the judges nor the deciding factor.
Where a Civil Servant's conduct is suspect, he is to be given an opportunity of studying
the case against himself, of putting in his reply, and also of making his reply. Represen-
tations are'to be considered by three retired Civil Servants of high repute. . . ." Com-
munication to the authors from British Information Services, April 23, 1948. But see
N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1948, p. 15, col. 3, which states that an employee transferred from
secret work will receive the usual privilege of appealing to the Minister in his department.
No mention.of an impartial board is made.
466. A recent New York Times report on the administration of the "British Loyalty
Order" concluded as follows: "Since the middle of May no civil servant has been (is-
missed under these provisions. It is believed that only twelve or fifteen men have becti
transferred to non-secret posts." N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1948, § 4, p. 4, col. 7.
467. See generally, BRAmsTEDT, DICTATORSHIP AND POLITICAL POLICZ (1945); Nnt-
MANN, BEHEmOTH (1944); EBENSTEIN, FASCIST ITALY (1939); S'rEiNLa, GovEaNMMT'
IN FASCIST ITALY (1938) ; EL'wiN, FAscism AT WoRx (1934) ; Symposium on the Totali-
tarian State, 82 Am. PHnLo. Soc. (1939).
468. Royal Decree, Dec. 30, 1923, Article 1. The entire statute is translated in WmTwi,
THE CIVIL SERVICE IN THE MODERM STATE 318-39 (1930).
469. Id., Article 6. 1
[Vol, 58' 1
HeinOnline -- 58 Yale L. J. 126 1948-1949
19481 LOYALTY AMONG GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 127
ing to offer detailed charges in justification. A public employee's salary
could be reduced for "manifestations, acts or deeds inconvenient to the
political, social, and administrative co-ordination of the state." 17"
Hardly more dangerous conduct, "public manifestation, of ideals con-
trary to existing institutions," 471 was ground for the more serious
punishment of dismissal. Further bases for dismissal were: "disloyal
criticism . . . diminishing the prestige of the state;" "offense to the
dignity of the administration;" and "offenses against honor." 172
Loyalty to the State was thus only possible through loyalty to the
principles of the Fascist Party. Membership in any other party was
clear evidence of disloyalty. A law passed after the Civil Service Code
further weakened security of tenure by authorizing the dismissal of
civil and military personnel "who do not furnish full guarantees as to
their loyal fulfillment of duty or who show a lack of snympathy towards
the general political direction of the government." -13 Conformance
thus gave way to active support of fascism as the accepted standard
of conduct.
In paradoxical contrast to its vague standards of political reliability
the Civil Service Code established certain important procedural safe-
guards. A charge was made only after a thorough investigation and
hearing conducted by the personnel office of the department in which
the accused employee worked. 4 4 During the period of investigation
the accused "may be authorized to make a partial or total examination
of the files in his case." 475 At the close of the investigation he was en-
titied to a copy of the report and a statement of the charges to be
brought against him. Trial on the charges was had before a disciplinary
commission of three civil servants appointed annually by the minister
of each department. The personnel officer presented the results of his
investigation; the accused was permitted to rebut and explain. Appeal
was allowed to the Minister. Thus at the very least the accused had
two opportunities to establish his innocence, at the hearing before the
personnel officer and at the trial before the commission.fo
These procedural safeguards undoubtedly proved to be paper
guarantees in some instances. It was notorious that citizens were
subject to a call from the political police, the OVRA, if they were con-
sidered "socially dangerous people," or if they associated with a politi-
470. Id., Article 59.
471. Id., Article 65.
472. Id., Articles 62, 64.
473. Law of December 24, 1925, quoted in EBEx T sM, FAscIsT ITALY 70 (1939).
474. Royal Decree, Dec. 30, 1923, Articles 60, 69.
475. Id., Article 72.
476. Id, Articles 74, 75. "Two years at least after disposition of a case, if the em-
ployee has given clear evidence of reform, the effects of any penalty may be made
void.. " Id., Article 80.
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cally suspect person. 47 Civil service employees, it appears, were simi-
larly subject to the vagaries of the OVRA. Nevertheless, the inclusion
of procedural protection in the Civil Code showed a recognition of its
importance in securing good service morale.
Germavy
The change from Weimar democracy to the National Socialism of
Hitler resulted in a radical alteration in the spirit and practice, if not
the outward structure, of the German Civil Service. Equality for
women employees, freedom of association and the ideal of political
neutrality were all rejected by the Nazi Government.47 8 The nature of
the transformation is made clear by contrasting the civil service before
and after the coming to power of the National Socialists.
Recruitment for the civil service during the Weimar Republic was
based entirely on merit principles, the standard being set by the
Constitution of 1919:
"All citizens without distinction are eligible for public office in
accordance with the laws and according to their ability and serv-
ices." 479
Another article of the Constitution guaranteed life tenure and
provided safeguards against arbitrary discipline .41 The two values of
neutrality and political freedom were protected by the following
generalized proposition:
"The civil servants are servants of the whole community, not
of a party.
"Freedom of political opinion and of association are assured to
all civil servants." 481
477. BRAmSTEDT, DICTATORSHIPS AND POLITICAL POLICE 61-66 (1945). "The 232 Arti-
cles of the Public Safety Act of November 25, 1926, comprise the complete machinery
for the annihilation of the last remnants of personal liberty .... Danger arises not only
from actual crimes against the State; it is sufficient for 'public opinion' to denounce a
person as 'dangerous'." EBENSTEIN, FASCIST ITALY 72 (1939).
"The law requires citizens not to associate with a suspect person, and in the eyes of
the Fascists friends of a suspect person become politically discredited from contact with
him." Id. at 73.
478. For full accounts of the changes in the civil service see PoIaocx and BoEnNwn,
THE GERmAN CIVIL SERVICE ACT 5-11 (1938); Morstein Marx, German Bureaucracy
in Transition, 28 Am. POL. SCL REv. 467 (1934).
479. Weimar Constitution, Article 128.
480. Id., Article 129.
481. Id., Article 130. In addition Article 39 provided that "civil servants . .. need no
leave for the performance of their duties as members of the Reichstag or of a state diet.
If they become candidates for election to these legislative bodies, leave must be granted
them for the amount of time necessary to prepare for their election."
For an account of the rights granted to civil service employees, see MORSTMN MARX,
CIvIL SERVICE IN GERMANY, in CIVIL SERvICE ABROAD 195-243 (1935).
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Conduct specifically required of the civil servant was set out in the
Civil Service Code. He was obliged to uphold the constitutional
republic in his official activities.412 He was specifically forbidden to
engage in revolutionary activity, to speak against the constitution
while in an official capacity, and, whether within the service or when
acting as a private citizen, to plot the destruction of the government.1 3
These injunctions, it was hoped, would insure a necessary degree of
neutrality. While on duty the civil servant ias expected to act in a
wholly impartial manner.4 14 To this extent it was felt necessary to
restrict his political freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. Some
students of the service further contended that the constitutional
guarantee referred only to freedom of conscience and that the ideal of
neutrality in the civil service was important enough to justify a pro-
hibition against mere membership in or support of a revolutionary
party."3 5 The courts, however, felt otherwise. Thus the Prussian
Superior Administrative Court ruled that a civil servant could maintain
his position and at the same time declare his support of the Communist
Part3y:
". .T. iThe disciplinary punishment of a civil servant because
of the mere profession for a political party is excluded in all cases.
A civil servant would commit disciplinary offense which might lead
to dismissal from service only if he undertook to further by overt
acts the achievement of the purpose of the party which is aiming at
the forcible overthrow of the existing political order. ....
In a later case the same court upheld the dismissal of a public employee
who had actively and openly worked for the Communist Party.4"
Subsequently, partisan support or activity in behalf of an avowedly
revolutionary party was prohibited by decree.15
482. The National Civil Service Act, Article 10, translated in WrIrE Tns CzmL
SERVICE IN THE MODERN STATE 393 et seq. (1930).
483. Ibid. In addition, Article 11 provided that a "civil servant must observe secrecy
about all matters which have come to his kmowledge by virtue of his office and which
should remain secret either because of their very nature or because such secrecy has been
prescribed by his superior."
484. "In his official capacity the civil servant must pursue the common good, and not
only remain impartial but not even endanger his impartiality or give occasion for dis-
trust of it." ARNDT, DAs REiCHSBEAMTENGEsETz 33 (4th ed., 1931), quoted in Csvm
SERvicE ABROAD 245 (1935).
485. For an account of the clash of opinion on this matter see MosTNn MArLx, CIvIL
SERvicE IN GERMANY, in CVI. S.RvicF ABROAD 250-6 (1935).
486. An extract of the opinion is translated in WarrE Tin CIVn SERIC n. IMn
loDmN STATE 437 (1930).
487. ".... activities of a civil servant on behalf of a party whose aim is the forcible
overthrow of the existing political order is incompatible with the fulfillment of a public
office." Id. at 437-8.
488. E.g., "'Vith regard to the development of the NTational Socialist German Workers'
Party and the Communist Party, both parties must be considered as organizations aiming
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Substantial procedural safeguards were provided by the Civil
Service Code to protect the civil servant from wrongful discipline or
dismissal. A basic protection was the guarantee that civil servants
were to have access to all their personnel records.4" Before a dismis-
sal could take place there had to be a trial before the department
disciplinary court.490 This court was composed of judges and civil
servants, with the latter in the majority. The trial was public, the
subject matter being limited to the statement of written charges re-
ceived by the employee. 491 After hearing the prosecutor, the accused
(or his lawyer), and the testimony of the witnesses, the court pro-
nounced sentence. Should the verdict be against the accused, he had the
right to appeal to the National Supreme Disciplinary Court whose
decision was final.
492
The Nazi revolution resulted in immediate changes in the civil
service. The emphasis shifted from neutrality to political reliability.
4 3
Every civil servant was required to fill out a questionnaire stating his
training, war service, antecedents and party affiliations. With few
exceptions those of "non-germanic" blood were immediately weeded
out of the service. In addition, unreconstructed Communists, So-
cialists, liberals and pacifists, were dismissed from the government. 494
Political reliability, which meant unreserved indentification with the
goals of National Socialism, became the minimum requirement for
maintaining government employment. This was also true of the
universities where dissent came to be considered heresy which in turn
was equated with treason. 4'9 Standards of unacceptable behavior
became very broad. For example, the following acts were considered
unbecoming conduct and ground for disciplinary action:
". .. buying at a Jewish store; expressing concern over the
closing of denominational schools; pointing to any parallels be-
at the overthrow of the present government by violence. A civil servant who participates
in such an organization or supports it by action . . .violates the bond of loyalty toward
the state which results from his position as civil servant, and is guilty of an offense agalnst
civil service discipline. It is, therefore, forbidden all public officers to participate in
those organizations or to support them by action...." Decree of Prussian State Cabinet,
June 25, 1930.
489. Weimar Constitution, Article 129.
490. § 84 of the Civil Service Code.
491. See id. §§ 72-144.for a complete account of the disciplinary procedure.
492. Id. § 144. Judicial review was permitted in the case of "any decision by which
a civil servant is declared responsible for the restitution of a deficiency."
493. "Officials who, because of their previous political activity, do not offer security
that they will exert themselves for the national State without reservations may be dis-
charged . . ." Federal Law, April 7, 1933, § 4. See also MORSTM1 MARX, GOVERNMENT
IN THE THIRD REICH 132 et seq. (1937).
494. SCHUMAN, THE NAZI DICTATORSHIP 251 (1935).
495. See, e.g., HARTSHORNE, THE GERMAN UNIVERSITIES AND NATIONAL Soc0AIAA9M
153 (1937).
[Vol, 58' 1
HeinOnline -- 58 Yale L. J. 130 1948-1949
19481 LOYALTY AMONG GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 131
tween National Socialism and Communism; failing to protest
against 'insults' to National Socialism uttered in the course of
church services." 4"
In the first period of the new regime the right to a hearing and appeal
was abolished. Intrigue and espionage were encouraged. A wave of
denunciations swept the desks of personnel officers. Those whose
"inner conviction" was felt to be in opposition to the new order were
in imminent danger of separation from the service. " 7 Although at
most only ten per cent were removed during the first two years of the
new regime, demoralization resulted, and the service was on the verge of
being destroyed as a useful instrument for carrying out the ends of the
new order.43 Since only four per cent of the civil service had enrolled
in the National Socialist Party prior to its coming to power, it was
necessary to give the remaining numbers a renewed sense of security
if the service was to operate at its old efficiency. By early 1937 a
marriage of compromise between the Party and the service had been
worked out which resulted for the most part in maintaining the old
civil service structure through which was suffused a new philosophy.4
The compromise was embodied in the Civil Service Code of 1937.
In return for being a National Socialist "to the marrow of his bones"
the civil servant was guaranteed life tenure."' Each employee had to
swear the following oath:
"I swear: I will be true and obedient to the Fuhrer of the Ger-
man Reich and Volk, Adolph Hitler, respect the laws and fulfill my
duties conscientiously, so help me God." Z01
By the close of 1937 the marriage of party and service was complete:
28 per cent of the civil service belonged to the party and all belonged
to the civil service union which was dominated by a high Nazi offi-
cial.10 2 It was no longer possible to enter the civil service Nithout first
496. Morstein Marx, Germanys New Civil Service Act, 31 Au. Por. So. Rw 87--9
(1937).
497. Morstein Marx, German Burcaucracy in Transition, 28 Au. Por. Sci. RMx
477-9 (1934).
498. Ibid. See also MORSTEIN MAPx, Go% ii'imN-r mn TExn Rnmcu 134 (1937).
499. PoLLoc AND BomxE, THE GEPmu. Cnvm Smvicn Acr 5-11 (1933).
500. Civil Service Code (Reiclsgesctcblatt) §§ 27, 28 (1937).
501. Id., at § 4. See also the statement of Pfundtner, Secretary of State in the Min-
istry of the Interior: "The German Civil Servant must... be a member of the party
or of one of its formations. The state will primarily see to it that the Young Guard of
the movement is directed toward a civil service career and also that the civil servant takes
an active part in the party so that the political idea and service of the state become
closely welded." Quoted in MuRPHY, NATioNTAL Socuas.!, 51 (U.S. Dept. State, 1943).
502. NEUMAN.N, BEEMOTH 379 (1944); Monsrx M.ax, Civm SmvcE n Gu-
MANY, in Civim SERviCE AmoAD 269 (1935). See also § 11 of the Civil Service Code (1937) :
"Permission is not required for the acceptance of an unsalaried office in the National
Socialist German Workers' Party .. ..
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receiving the approval of the local party official."° Expulsion from
the National Socialist Party automatically resulted in dismissal from
the service.1°4 The 1937 Code set out other causes for removal, in-
cluding dismissal
". .. if the official does not any longer give assurance of acting
at all times in the interest of the National Socialist state." 505
Accompanying the vague standards was a provision guaranteeing
the accused employee a trial. A disciplinary court procedure and
appellate review somewhat similar to that of the Weimar Republic
were instituted, and independence of the disciplinary courts guaranteed:
"The service disciplinary courts are independent and subject
only to the law.
"The members of the disciplinary courts carry out their func-
tions in judicial independence. Their retirement under section 71
[for political reasons] of the German Civil Service Act may not be
based on the factual content of a decision rendered in the exercise
of these functions." 606
Thus under National Socialism, as under Fascist Italy, one finds the
phenomenon of broad and flexible standards of loyalty but, at least on
paper, procedural safeguards affording the accused an opportunity to
negative charges of unreliability and to establish his political respect-
ability. 0 7°
Conclusions from Foreign Experience
From this brief survey of foreign experience certain conclusions may
be drawn:
503. Morstein Marx, Germany's New Civil Service Act, 31 Amt. POL. Sci, REV, 882
(1937).
504. Civil Service Code § 32.
505. Civil Service Code § 71 (1937). Prior to this, "in the summer of 1935 the Crim-
inal Code was amended so as to penalize also acts not mentioned in it which 'deserve pun-
ishment according to the fundamental idea underlying a provision of criminal law, or
according to sound popular sentiment'." Quoted in MORSTEIN MARX, GoVERNMaENT IN Thr
TH D RzicH 93 (1937). Other standards of removal are given in §§ 51-72 of the Code,
There was some attempt, however, to promote morale by cutting down on denuncia-
tions of disloyalty made directly to the Party. Compare the statement of the head of the
civil service union recognizing the "right and duty" of civil servants to keep party
agencies informed on deviations from National Socialist Principles should such deviations
occur in administrative departments (in Frankfurter Zeitung, July 1, 1934), with:
"The official has to bring requests and complaints by way of service channels. If he be-
lieves that he observes actions which might be injurious to the . . . Party, he must report
them through official channels .. .or to the Fuhrer and National Chancellor. For com-
plaints of a personal nature, the service channels must be followed." Civil Service Code
§42 (1937).
506. National Service Disciplinary Code § 31 (1937).
507. Under the pressures of war these remaining procedural safeguards were swept
away. "In almost all spheres of administration the Gaulieter reigned supreme." NEu-
mAiN, BmoTH 630 (1944).
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In the first place the totalitarian states, which do not tolerate differ-
ence of political opinion in government service, enforce rigid political
orthodoxy through the use of vague and sweeping standards of loyalty
that are calculated to embrace any action or attitude offensive to the
regime.
Secondly, even the totalitarian states have found it worth while to
establish procedural safeguards which would afford substantial protec-
tion to an accused employee. At a minimum these procedures have
embraced a full and open hearing, before an independent tribunal,
with complete disclosure of the evidence against the accused. While
such procedures have been subject to the overriding powers of the
secret police, the fact that they have been formulated at all indicates
their estimated importance in terms of employee morale and efficient
government operation.
Thirdly, the democratic states have accorded government em-
ployees a maximum of political freedom consistent with varying con-
cepts of a neutral civil service. Despite conditious of political instabil-
ity far exceeding those in the United States, other democratic nations
have not found it necessary to impose loyalty tests going beyond the
standard of active participation in a revolutionary party, adopted by
the Weimar republic, or the transfer of Communist employees to "non-
secret" government work, recently instituted in England.
Lastly, no precedent is to be found in foreign experience, outside the
totalitarian states, for a comprehensive, continuous system of loyalty
surveillance similar to that instituted by the Loyalty Order in the
United States. s3
X. APPRAISAL AND CONCLUSIONS
In one sense the loyalty program appears as a new phenomenon in
American government. It was unknown until a few years ago. In a
deeper sense the controversy over loyalty among government em-
ployees simply raises in a current form the age old struggle between
freedom and restriction in political expression. Charges of "disloyalty"
have always been hurled at those who seek to change established modes
of political life. It is hardly surprising that with the growth of modern
government the public employee should become a focal point in this
conflict.
This is not to say that a valid problem does not exist. Any govern-
ment must always be able to protect itself against dangerous activity
within its own ranks. The problem now has a new setting. Interna-
tional tensions, internal stresses, the nature of present day warfare and
political tactics raise the issues in a new form. But it is most unfortu-
508. This conclusion is based upon a survey of available material relating to the follow-
ing countries: Canada, Australia, Belgium, Switzerland, Nor-way, Sweden, New Zealand
and Mexico.
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nate that the President's Temporary Commission on Employee
Loyalty, entrusted with the task of studying the entire situation,
should ,have failed so deplorably to grasp the broader issues and should
'have recommended a solution so intolerant and repressive in its ap-
proach. It is tragic that the Administration should have accepted the
Commission's report.
The program adopted by the Administration already goes substan-
tially beyond any measures considered necessary by other democratic
countries, even those troubled with much greater instability in govern-
ment. It is more nearly comparable to the programs of totalitarian
countries.'
In essence the loyalty program is a comprehensive, continuing and
aggressive effort to weed out the "potentially disloyal." Existing legis-
lation and administrative regulation afford adequate protection against
actions of public employees that are dangerous to the operation of
government. The program is designed to purge from government
service individuals whose ideas, associations and legal activities give
rise to an inference that such persons may in the future engage in con-
duct injurious to the government.
It is this characteristic of the loyalty program which gives rise to its
major difficulties. It is this factor which comes into immediate conflict
with basic American traditions of freedom for speech and belief, free-
dom for political expression, freedom for experimentation. This factor
is also :largely responsible for the need of a large staff of secret police,
the maintenance of a master file of "derogatory information," investi-
gations and hearings which probe into every corner of a man's life for
information on opinions, associations and personal habits. Similarly it
produces many of the procedural difficulties; it lies, for instance, at the
basis of the claim that sources of information and evidence itself cannot
be disclosed to the individual under attack. And finally, since it is by
nature illimitable, it tends irresistibly in practical administration
toward excesses and abuse of power, toward ever increasing efforts to
avoid all risk by eliminating any unorthodox or questionable element
from the government service. Thus it brings with it the whole train of
evils that, result in demoralization of men and women, in suppression
of ideas and experiment, in impairment of government service, and in
making the Federal government an example of repression for the
country as a whole.
The dramatic words of Edward Livingstone, uttered during the
debate on the Alien Bill, have relevance today:
"The country will swarm with informers, spies, delators, and
all the odious reptile tribe. . . .The hours of the most unsus-
pected confidence, the intimacies of friendship, or the recesses of
domestic retirement, afford no security. The companion whom
you must trust, the friend in whom you must confide, the domestic
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who waits in your chamber, are all tempted to betray your im-
prudent or unguarded follies; to misrepresent your words; to con-
vey them, distorted by calumny, to the secret tribunal vhere
jealousy presides-where fear officiates as accuser, and suspicion
is the only evidence that is heard. .... Do not let us be told that
we are to excite a fervor against a foreign aggression to establish a
tyranny at home. . ." 653
Administration of the Loyalty Order thus far, due largely to public
protest against the trend and to the restraining influence of the Loyalty
Review Board, has not realized its worst possibilities. Nevertheless the
vicious impact of the program upon the Federal service has remained
and, at least in the case of the sensitive agencies, has grown worse.
Congress continues to press for expansion of the program and stricter
enforcement. And in any event the principles of the program remain
on the books, and its machinery in readiness, with the possibility of
more intensive application upon a change in administration or a height-
ening of the tensions that led to its development.
What, then, is the alternative? The problem is one of weighing the
actual dangers confronting the government today against the heavy
cost of a program designed to root out every trace of danger in advance.
This issue must be considered not only in the light of basic constitu-
tional limitations but in terms of the urgent need for a dynamic and
progressive democracy.
Is a General Loyalty Program Necessary?
The first question is whether a general loyalty program, embracing
all Federal employees, is necessary or desirable. The authors are of
the opinion that no sufficient case for such a program has been dem-
onstrated. No concrete showing of immediate and widespread danger,
adequate to outweigh the price that must be paid in the loss of dem-
ocratic values, has thus far been presented to the country. The con-
tention of the Committee on Un-American Activities and of certain
other members of Congress-that the government service is pervaded
with "subversive" elements-has never been documented with
specific and persuasive evidence. The official position of the Adminis-
tration-that the dangers cannot be estimated but that the presence
of any "disloyal" employee threatens the government--does not furnish
an adequate justification for a sweeping and all-inclusive program.
The recent allegations and disclosures of espionage, even if taken at
face value, present a problem that is better handled by traditional
counter-espionage methods and special clearance procedures.
As to the great mass of Federal employees there is no reason to
believe that existing criminal statutes, plus the normal disciplinary
509. Quoted in Boines. JmnsoN AND HmI Toiz 378 (1928).
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powers of a government agency, are not sufficient to meet any present
or immediately foreseeable danger. This includes the numerous
employees engaged in ordinary clerical, minor administrative, main-
tenance and industrial positions. It includes the overwhelming bulk
of employees in most of the Federal departments, such as the Post
Office, Agriculture, Interior, the T.V.A. and many others. Attempts
to predict dangerous behavior on the part of such employees, through
a system of loyalty checks, simply produce a host of evils with little
or no compensating benefit.
This leaves for consideration two groups of Federal employees. The
first group consists of the limited number of persons occupying impor-
tant policy-making positions; the second includes employees dealing
directly with vital and highly secret matters of national defense, pri-
marily in the Defense and State Departments and the Atomic Energy
Commission.
As to the first group it seems doubtful whether, even here, a loyalty
program is advisable under present conditions. These employees, also,
must conform to the policies of their superiors, and overt acts of es-
pionage, sabotage or conspiracy on their part can be dealt with by
customary methods of detection and punishment. It is difficult to
believe that any substantial number of such, employees, operating
within an agency on a satisfactory day-to-day basis, possess latent
traits of "disloyalty" which could crop out and cause damage in a time
of crisis. And even if such a danger exists it is highly doubtful that
loyalty procedures will eliminate it.
Nevertheless the present temper of Congress, and perhaps of the
country, seems to demand some action. We shall therefore consider,
with respect to these key employees, whether standards and procedures
can be developed which might assure a greater measure of protection
and at the same time avoid some of the worst pitfalls of the current
program.
As to the second group, considerations of national security warrant
greater precautions than are applicable to ordinary employees. In
large measure, if not entirely, this is a problem of adopting adequate
methods of clearance for persons having access to highly secret data.
The requirements for such clearance will necessarily include many
elements apart from loyalty. Insofar as loyalty is involved the ques-
tion is again one of developing satisfactory standards and procedures. 1
510. A fortiori there seems no need for any general loyalty program applicable to
state or local employees. Special investigation of such employees in key positions would
also seem unnecessary. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNIONT, REPORT oF CoMx lTrrES
ON EMPLOYEES' LOYALTY ON STATE AND LOCAL LOYALTY TEST (Jan. 28, 1948):
"The proposals in state and city legislatures for checks of loyalty of public em-
ployees would not appear to meet any practical need. Administrative officials are
entirely capable of choosing employees on the basis of their fitness and of dismissing
[Vol. 58: 1
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criteria
What should the Federal government demand, then, of employees
occupying key positions? What activities, beliefs or associations
should be considered so pregnant with danger as to constitute a dis-
qualification from holding these positions? The problem must be
considered in terms of the specific dangers against which protection is
sought.
In the first place, no qualification or standard should be established
to screen out individuals who advocate or believe in political, economic
or social changes accomplished by peaceful, legal and democratic
means. The extent of any change advocated or the intensity -ith
which the views are held should be equally immaterial. If such ad-
vocacy or belief makes impossible the satisfactory performance of
duties within the existing framework of organization and policy, then
the government is protected by its authority to dismiss or discipline
for incompetency or infraction of rules. And, of course, the President
and his aides are entitled to the services of assistants who will vig-
orously carry out official policy. But these are questions of government
administration within the civil service laws; they do not involve issues
of loyalty to the United States and should not be incorporated in a
loyalty program.
The establishment of criteria of such a character seems clearly in
conflict with constitutional guarantees. They are not aimed at any
clear and present danger, nor at a danger against which the govern-
ment is entitled to protection. They are contrary to all traditions of
a democratic form of government.
The Loyalty Review Board apparently accepts this principle. But
the Loyalty Order, the Rees bill, the regulations of the "sensitive"
agencies, the administration of the loyalty program in the past and
its present administration at the lower levels, as well as the position of
the Committee on Un-American Activities and of the other members
of Congress, are all predicated upon contrary assumptions. Full ac-
ceptance of this restriction on loyalty review would change the whole
nature of the current program.
A second issue relates to the extent of advance screening necessary
to afford protection against espionage, disclosure of information,
sabotage, and conspiracy to overthrow the government. In our judg-
ment the standards for disqualification in this connection should be
limited to two:
those unfit. The application of a blanket loyalty test of all employees is both un-
necessary and undesirable. Where conduct and associations are found demonstrating
a loyalty to undemocratic principles or practices in conflict w:ith the obligations of
a particular job, an employee may properly be discharged. It is to be assumed
that all discharges are based upon existing fair procedure."
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(1) Personal advocacy of the overthrow or change of govern-
ment by violent or other illegal means.
(2) Membership in an organization after such organization has
been found, in accordance with appropriate procedures including
court review, to advocate the overthrow or change of government
by violent or other illegal means. 511
The first is the primary standard. It is intended to eliminate those
individuals who do not believe in peaceful, voluntary methods of
arriving at common decisions through orderly governmental processes.
Advocacy of violence or illegal methods carries with it a strong pre-
sumption that the individual is likely to engage in unlawful practices
which no government can tolerate.
Proof that a particular individual falls within the ban should be
based upon direct evidence inculpating that individual. Statements,
oral or written, would constitute such evidence. Mere membership
in an organization advocating violent or illegal methods should not,
without more, be sufficient. Active participation with knowledge of
the illegal objectives, or some further corroborating evidence, should
be required.512 Thus guilt by association would be avoided.
The second criterion is a corollary of the first. "Membership"
should not be limited to actual card-holding but should include active
participation in the activities or management of the organization re-
gardless of formal status.-1 3 This standard does, to a degree, accept the
principle of guilt by association. But continued membership in an
organization after a formal finding of illegal advocacy carries a fair
presumption that the individual accepts that position. Consequently
the application of the doctrine of guilt by association is more apparent
than real and, at least in the light of stricter standards applicable to
government employment, would seem justified.
The process of investigation under the two suggested standards does
raise some of the difficulties already pointed out. But the object of the
investigation would be far more limited and, with only key employees
involved, the impact of the whole program would be far less demor-
alizing.
The proposed standards omit various other factors which might have
a bearing upon the likelihood of an employee engaging in the dangerous
activities against which protection is sought. Thus the standards do
not include participation in an organization which advocates entirely
511. Obviously these criteria, while far more concrete and meaningful than the general
standard of "disloyalty" or such terms as "subversive," present many questions of in-
terpretation. Some of these issues are considered in the subsequent discussion. A com-
plete analysis would carry us beyond the limits of this article.
512. This would set up a standard similar to that used in the Nurenberg trials.
513. The concept might be labelled "constructive membership." It would In effect
include "'affiliation" as defined by the Supreme Court in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135 (1945).
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legitimate objectives but includes among its membership, to a greater
or lesser extent, individuals who are members of another organization
that does advocate illegal methods,-the problem of so-called "front
organizations." Nor do the standards include the holding or expression
of views which are legitimate in themselves but coincide with the
policies of an organization that also advocates violent or illegal meth-
ods,-the problem of so-called "fellow-travellers." Not only should
these activities not be established as criteria of disloyalty but they
should not be determinative, at least by themselves, that the individual
comes within the ban of the two proposed standards.
Activities of this nature are entirely consistent with full and honest
belief in peaceful, democratic methods. In the absence of a further
showing they do not establish such a strong likelihood that the em-
ployee will engage in illegal or unauthorized acts of espionage, dis-
closure, sabotage or conspiracy as to outweigh the dangers that their
consideration necessarily entails. As soon as one enters this area it
becomes impossible to draw a satisfactory line of limitation. One is
drawn inevitably further and further into the position of penalizing
actions or opinions which are wholly legitimate. Investigation delves
further and further into the realm of lawful beliefs and associations.
The whole process carries one irresistibly forward into the sweeping
loyalty program which the Attorney General's Interdepartmental
Committee warned against and which brings with it all the disabilities
that have been noted above.
It will be conceded that the strict standards proposed do not elimi-
nate all possible sources of danger. But the issue is one of balancing
considerations. Not only does a probe beyond the limits suggested
raise highly doubtful constitutional questions but it seems plainly un-
sound in terms of preserving the widest area of free expression and the
most effective kind of government operation.
The final issue concerns the problem of "allegiance to a foreign
power." This raises the most vexing question of all. In our judgment
disqualification on these grounds should be limited to membership in a
political organization after it has been found, in accordance vith
appropriate procedures including court review, that the major policies
of such organization are directed by an organization dominated by
citizens and residents of a foreign country or countries. 1 4
Membership of key government employees in a political organization
committed in advance to policies determined in another country
presents obvious dangers to our government. At least in the case of a
highly disciplined organization it raises a strong presumption that
decisions will be made upon the basis of policies formulated outside the
514. The term "membership' should be defined as set forth above. As in the case of
the prior standards numerous issues of interpretation, beyond the scope of this article,
would arise in the application of this criterion.
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functioning of the political process in this country. The government
would seem entitled to draw its key employees from persons not com-
mitted in advance to policies thus determined. Further, the scope of
investigation and proof required to establish the factual basis for
application of the standard is relatively narrow and precise. The re-
quirement of a prior decision as to the nature of the organization
eliminates the worst features of guilt by association.
We believe, however, that the line should be drawn at this point.
The standard should not include membership in an organization pri-
marily non-political in character but possessing certain political aspects
or objectives. Such membership might bear upon the appropriateness
of particular assignments within the government; but it should not
be a standard for complete disqualification from all government service.
The standard should likewise not apply to membership in an organiza-
tion which merely adheres to policies originated or developed outside
the country where there is no proof 'that the domestic organization
accepts direction from a foreign organization. Acceptance of foreign
ideas, in the absence of foreign determination of specific policies, is not
a danger of sufficient magnitude to warrant disqualification; and at-
tempts to press the standard to this point would lead to a meaningless
and dangerous effort to distinguish between "American" and "foreign"
ideas. A fortiori the standard should not attempt to weed out in-
dividuals who have no membership in any organization but who may
be said to hold ideas developed abroad or be influenced by "foreign
ideologies." There would appear to be no real danger from such in-
fluences, but acute danger from attempting to eliminate them. Again,
the standard should not reach to membership in domestic organizations
dominated by non-citizens. Here the organization works within the
domestic environment and presents no danger of a kind which the
government is entitled to suppress.
A closer question arises in the case of persons who are not members
of an organization coming within the proposed standard but who
advocate the major policies of such an organization. This is again the
question of the so-called "party liners." The fact that such persons
do not accept the discipline of the party organization would seem to
leave them sufficiently free intellectually to make decisions on a basis
that does not raise serious dangers to the government. On the other
hand the attempt to eliminate such persons poses an impossible deci-
sion in drawing a line and raises acutely the worst evils of a strict
loyalty program. Dangers from this source can be handled in other
ways. We would therefore not extend the standard to include these
individuals.
With respect to employees dealing directly with secret matters of
national security, in our judgment the foregoing criteria constitute
adequate tests of clearance to meet any present danger. The British
[Vol. 58: 1
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seem to consider such standards satisfactory. Possibly stricter criteria
would be justified in exceptional circumstances. But counter-espionage
must be relied upon as a major source of protection in this area. In
any event refusal of clearance should not involve disqualification from
other government employment.
Administration
Limitation of the loyalty program in the manner we have suggested
should eliminate the worst features of administration. Two further
suggestions to mitigate possible abuses in administration may be
offered. The Loyalty Review Board, assuming it continues to be staffed
with men of liberal and tolerant tendencies, should maintain affirmative
supervision of the administration of the program. The Board should
not confine its activities to appellate review of formal cases. It should
undertake constant surveillance of the informal operation of the
program. It should provide a sympathetic hearing to individuals who
complain that abuses are occurring. It should create a positive atmos-
phere of reason and tolerance, and stand as a bulwark to strengthen
and protect subordinate officials in the employing agencies who are
more vulnerable to bigoted pressures.
Secondly, the FBI and other professional investigating agencies
should be subjected to a greater degree of "civilian" control. The FBI,
in particular, operates on a completely independent basis, acknowl-
edging little or no responsibility to anyone outside its ownm organiza-
tion. Inevitably such an institution develops an ingrown tradition of
militant police methods. A secret police established to investigate the
"loyalty" of American citizens can develop into a grave and ruthless
menace to democratic processes. There are signs that the FBI is
moving dangerously in this direction.
Like the military, a secret police must be guided and directed by
"civilians" not subject to the traditions and disciplines of the pro-
fessional organizations. The Attorney General should therefore set
up machinery to maintain close supervision over the FBI,-over its
recruitment of personnel, its investigating techniques, the atmosphere
of its bureaucracy, its whole method of operation. Particularly is
this essential as to its activities in the field of "loyalty" investigations.
Only in this way can the abuses inherent in such an institution be
effectively kept in check.
Procedure
Our conclusions with respect to the formal procedures in loyalty
cases, whatever the criteria of loyalty adopted, are readily apparent
from the prior discussion. They may be summarized briefly as follows:
(1) Application of loyalty standards to individual employees or
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applicants should be made only within the strict confines of the pro-
cedure established for adjudication by the Administrative Procedure
Act. This includes adequate notice; opportunity to know the evidence,
to present testimony, to rebut, to confront witnesses, to cross-examine;
and decision upon the record made at the hearing in accordance with
the preponderance of the evidence. This is no more than seems guar-
anteed by the Constitution. In any event no democracy can afford to
entrust such determinations to any administrative official except in
accordance with the regular procedures of our Anglo-American tradi-
tion for making decisions of comparable weight and significance.
(2) Any determination with respect to the character of an organiza-
tion or group should similarly be made in accordance with the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act. This is equally important, and for the same
reasons.
(3) Decisions by administrative officials, both in the case of in-
dividuals and organizations, should be subject to court review in
accordance with the standards laid down in the Administrative
Procedure Act. For the reasons already made clear the courts can
perform a particularly valuable function in maintaining supervision
over executive action in this sensitive domain of civil liberties.
Conclusion
The American people are confronted with a decision of far reaching
proportions. The answer will vitally affect not only the character of
our government service but of all democratic institutions.
The task of those who man the government service has steadily
grown more difficult, more exacting, more in need of unconventional
attack. The answer to the basic problem of our time-the development
of national common control over the functioning of our economic
system and at the same time the preservation and extension of individ-
ual freedoms-depends upon the evolution of new methods of govern-
ment and the creation of an alert, flexible and tolerant staff of ad-
ministrators.
There are those who feel that the problems of modern government
are beyond the capacity of ordinary man. Certainly the job cannot be
done in an atmosphere of distrust and fear. It cannot be done under a
program that stifles initiative, experimentation, and the expression of
new or unpopular views; that rigidly penalizes the questioning of
policies laid down from the top; that discourages our best talent from
entering government service at all. Time may well reveal that the
major weakness of the totalitarian governments lies in the rigidity of
their bureaucracy. The democracies, which cannot compete in terms of
highly, centralized discipline, must seek their strength in resourceful
and imaginative administration. If this be true the loyalty program is
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fast dissipating one of our most precious assets. What John Stuart
Mill said of all citizens is peculiarly applicable to those who serve their
government:
U.. . a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they be more
docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes-will
find that with small men no great thing can really be accom-
plished .... ,, 515
The problem extends beyond the government service. It raises in
bold relief the broader issue whether democratic political institutions
can readjust themselves to the forces that are reshaping the world
today. If we succumb to the fears and passions of those who shun the
new ideas and seek to postpone inevitable change by repressive mea-
sures, we shall deal a crippling blow to all democratic institutions and
values.
The rapid growth of the loyalty program in the last decade, and its
maintenance in the elaborate form in which it exists today, mark an
ominous sign of the times. It is part of the whole development that
focuses public attention and energy upon emotional appeals to main-
tain the status quo and obscures the real dangers that confront us.
The problem of loyalty is of minor significance in a healthy society.
It grows out of differences and tensions that spring from a failure to
readjust our society to the demands of a new situation. In the end it
will not be solved by elaboration of loyalty tests and creation of a
gigantic machinery to ferret out "disloyal" elements. In the long run
the issue can be met only by an intelligent solution of the real problems
which give rise to the conflicts that are now mistakenly viewed as
questions of loyalty.
515. Mun., ON LiERTY 141 (World's Classics ed. 1942).
Professor Chafee has pointed out the positive obligation of the government to invo!:e
loyalty:'
"... It is all very well to say that men ought to be loyal to the state. What do
we mean by the state? After all, it comes right down to the government that v.e deal with,
and the government comes down to the human beings that we deal with, which means those
who will on occasion put us into the hands of the police. If the individuals in the legis-
latures and the departments of justice and on the bench do not stand for the best things
men stand for-for the development of mind and spirit, and the search for truth-men
begin to wonder whether, after all, that government ought to endure. We cannot love
the state as a mystical unity if that unity as we actually face it prevents us from living a
true human life. So, in order to make people loyal to the state, you must make the state
the kind of institution that they want to be loyal to." CH~rrc, THE I:2uxrn-:;o MUM
224-5 (1928).
See also Merriam, Some Aspects of Loyalty, 8 Pu . Awxsr,. RE%. 81 (1948).
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